The phenomenology of respect: with special attention to Kant,Scheler, and Confucianism

In this paper, I focus on analyzing the manifestation and significance of respect. I first illustrate the two (or three) meanings of jing 敬 and their connection in Confucian classical texts, which is helpful to understand the Confucian phenomenology of respect. The two (or three) meanings are (1) seriousness as a mind-state and (2) respect (and attention) as an intentional feeling. After clarifying this point, I undertake a phenomenological analysis of respect, in order to show that respect helps one to achieve moral pursuit. This analysis takes the Kantian notion of respect as a starting point but further is accomplished by the phenomenology of value and feeling. The respect for duties and affairs, the respect for personhood and dignity, and the respect for the worthy with merit motivate one to take moral actions. For example, respect contributes in taking one’s duties seriously, appreciating human beings’ spiritual values and good tendencies even when they have not been actualized, supporting the worthy to play a role (offering them important positions), and emulating the worthy to make a contribution and serve others. In Subsequently, I clarify how respect helps one to achieve religious pursuit in one form of Christianity, in light of Max Scheler’s discussion on humility and reverence. Through revering God one respects others; through serving God and participating in God’s humble spirit one serves others. I elucidate the Confucian classics’ discussions on religious experience, in order to show how respect helps one to achieve religious pursuit in one form of Confucianism, and how it is similar and different from Max Scheler’s clarification. The concrete relation between respect and li 禮 in the Confucian tradition will be treated in another work.     

The morality of vengeance: Confucianism and Tutuism in dialogue

This paper analyzes two main pro-vengeance Confucian arguments in light of Desmond Tutu's thinking. In the absence of just authority, Confucianism argues that carrying out blood vengeance is fulfillment of filial piety and fulfillment of moral duty for deterring crime and reforming the wrongdoer's character. Confucianism does not propose a systematic theory of blood vengeance after laws have been installed to prohibit act of revenge. As Confucian ethics focuses on virtue cultivation and advocates moral learning over punishment, it may find the Tutuist approach of addressing wrongdoing compatible and complementary. In line with Tutuism, we argue that revenge is not justified because engaging in vengeance fuels negative and obsessive emotions, which undermine virtue and may lead to undesirable results, such as escalation of violence and harming of the innocent. Moreover, we defend that more conditions need to be met than the ones enunciated by the pro-vengeance standpoint to justify an act of revenge.     

The Values of Confucian Benevolence and the Universality of the Confucian Way of Extending Love

The spirit of Confucianism, which holds benevolence as its core value, has positive significance in the dialogue between civilizations and in the construction of global ethics. The values represented in Confucian benevolence are similar to the values in Christian Charity. Confucian values such as the doctrine of magnanimity, the idea of putting oneself in the place of another, and the Confucian way of extending love and favors, are crucial resources to hold in close connection with the relationship between human beings and nature, individuals and society, self and others, and one and oneself. The Confucian idea of “differentiated love” is a concrete and practical idea, which can be extended to be “universal love.” Furthermore, the Confucian way of extending love can also be interpreted as eco-ethical: On the one hand, Confucianism affirms the intrinsic value of the universe and calls for a universal moral concern for the ecological world; on the other hand, it recognizes a distinction between human beings and the nature, revealing an eco-ethical awareness of distinction and a consciousness of the differentiation between different ethical spheres. In extracting the instrumental value of ecological resources, Confucians never disregard the intrinsic value of animals and plants. Confucianism puts emphasis on subjectivity, especially the subjectivity of morality. Relationships between man and himself, between self and others, however, are inter-subjective. For Confucians, the universe exists and grows in the process of perfecting oneself, others, and the world. Such an understanding is of modern significance for the exchange and dialogue between civilizations, and the growth of personality and the mental regulation of gentleman today.     

中晚明阳明学的格物之辩

对《大学》中“格物”观念的不同理解与诠释,可以反映朱子学与阳明学这理学传统两大典范的基本差异。但中晚明阳明学“格物”观念的发展却呈现出较为复杂的面貌。由中晚明不同阳明学者的格物之辩可见,中晚明阳明学的“格物”观表现为两种不同的取向。一种以聂双江、王宗沐、王艮以及刘蕺山等人为代表,将“格物”完全收缩到自我意识的领域,不免取消了“格物”这一经典用语本身所具有的面对客观事物的致思方向。另一种以王龙溪、周海门、欧阳南野、王塘南等人为代表,通过将“物”理解为意向性中的对象或者作为各种实际生活行为的“事”,使“格物”工夫不再是一种单纯自我意识的孤立活动,而是展开于自我与外界事物的关系结构与互动过程。在后者看来,如果说朱子学的“格物”“忘内求外”而不免“逐物”的话,前者则又“务内遗外”而不免“绝物”。作为一种既不“逐物”又不“绝物”的“合内外”工夫,后者其实是阳明晚年成熟“格物”思想的继承和发扬,反映了阳明学在与朱子学互动过程中由反对到吸收的动向。并且,这一动向在中晚明一些朱子学者的“格物”观处也有鲜明的体现。     

Principles,Virtues, or Detachment? Some Appreciative Reflections on Karen Stohr’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">On Manners</Emphasis>

Karen Stohr’s book On Manners argues persuasively that rules of etiquette, though conventional, play an essential moral role, because they “serve as vehicles through which we express important moral values like respect and consideration for the needs, ideas, and opinions of others” (Stohr 2012: 3–4). Stohr frequently invokes Kantian concepts and principles in order to make her point. In Part 2 of this essay, I shall argue that the significance of etiquette is better understood using a virtue ethics framework, like that of Confucianism, rather than the language of Kantianism. Within the Chinese tradition, Daoists have frequently been critics of Confucian ritualism. Consequently, in Part 3, I shall consider some possible Daoist critiques of Stohr’s work.     

Virtue,Norm, and Moral Practice

Virtue, as a tendency toward goodness, has an interrelated structure made up of a stable disposition of intentions and emotions on the one hand and the ability to make rational analysis and obtain moral knowledge on the other. All these elements of knowing, feeling, and willing in the structure of virtue cannot be fully understood merely from a psychological perspective. Emotion, will, and rationality in virtue always have certain moral content. Virtue, as a structure with good disposition, constitutes a moral agent and consequently an intrinsic foundation for moral practice. Of course, virtue is not a priori. On the contrary, its development is closely associated with an individual’s social and historical background. Because of virtue, an agent goes beyond the rational compulsion and intended efforts into a realm of nature.     

A Confucian in Buddhist clothing? – Interpreting Nishida’s conception of the good as a realisation of the Mandate of Heaven

ABSTRACT

In this study, I examine the Confucian influence upon An Inquiry into the Good, the first publication of Nishida Kitarō. Nishida’s student Kōsaka Masaaki depicts his mentor’s conception of the good in terms of realising the 'Mandate of Heaven'. Taking this to be indicative of the importance of Confucianism for Nishida’s early thought, I compare his philosophy of pure experience and ethical project of ‘self-realisation’ with corresponding ideas found in the Confucian corpus. I especially focus on the Great Learning and Doctrine of the Mean as interpreted by the Neo-Confucian Wang Yang-Ming. This study builds upon the pioneering work of Michel Dalissier, Dermott Walsh and David Williams on the Kyoto School and Confucianism. My portrayal of Confucianism is indebted to the ‘philosophical’ translations of Roger Ames, David Hall and Henry Rosemont, Jr., which bring into relief the tradition’s ‘relational ontology’ that Graham Parkes teaches is shared by the Kyoto School.     

直感判断力:理解儒学的心之能力

Mou Zongsan incorrectly uses Kant’s practical reason to interpret Confucianism. The saying that “what is it that we have in common in our minds? It is the li 理 (principles) and the yi 义 (righteousness)” reveals how Mencius explains the origin of li and yi through a theory of common sense. In “the li and the yi please our minds, just as the flesh of beef and mutton and pork please our mouths,” “please” is used twice, proving aesthetic judgment is necessary to understanding Mencius. An analysis of Zhu Xi and Wang Yangming’s ideas will show that Confucianism should be interpreted by appealing to aesthetic judgment, and a discussion of Kant’s theory of judgment and Gadamer’s critique of Kant’s theory will support the same point. The conclusion is that Chinese moral philosophy should be interpreted through aesthetic judgment.     

Adaptationism and Early Confucian Moral Psychology

Ryan Nichols in his recent article ‘A genealogy of early Confucian moral psychology’ argues that the discussion of Confucius and Mencius on moral emotions can be provided an evolutionary analysis. Nichols’ argument is based on the evolutionary value of kin-relations and the origin of emotions toward kin in human society. In this article I argue that Nichols’ argument is flawed because he endorses an adaptationist program of human moral psychology. The adaptationists treat kin-relations and our emotions toward kin as a straightforward result of natural selection and adaptation. They ignore any non-adaptationist interpretation of biological traits. As more and more evolutionary biologists discover that the adaptationist program is too simplistic to understand the diverse evolutionary pathways of living beings, Nichols’ project is not justified due to its reliance on this problematic adaptationist program.     

Is Confucianism a religion? Modern Confucian theories on the ethical nature of classical discourses

When dealing with the study of diverse Confucian traditions in eastern Asia, we are often confronted by the issue of the religious dimension of Confucianism and how can it be compared to the Western (or ‘general’) connotations of the term. Proceeding from the basic question as to how Confucianism sees itself, the paper focuses on the approaches of two representatives of the Modern Confucian intellectual movement, namely Mou Zongsan and Xu Fuguan. In addition, we shall also take into consideration the various contemporary Confucian interpretations of the previously delineated problems, for instance Liu Shu-hsien’s or Chen Lai’s. Based on these discourses, the paper clarifies the reasons for Modern Confucian interpretations, according to which Confucianism is not a religion in the Western sense but a discourse that represents both a practical moral teaching and an abstract philosophy of immanent transcendence.     

儒家道德情感论的核心特质及其内在理路

直下心源、直契本心是由孔子确立的儒家道德情感论的核心特质,孔子后学由此出发,基于天人合一的视域建构了诚学,将诚提升为了贯通天人、真实无妄的道德情感。儒家从质直、至诚之本心情感出发,涵养与推扩道德情感的内在理路可以概括为以下三个维度:第一,以反观内省的道德理性时时提撕和体认本心情感; 第二,以本心情感为体,以礼乐文化为用,以文质彬彬为旨归; 第三,以“亲亲而仁民,仁民而爱物”为路径,以四端之心为内在心理情感根据,在由近及远、由厚及薄、由亲及疏的无限推扩中实现对道德情感的涵养、提升与超越。     

Toward a Confucian Notion of Human Dignity

This essay discusses the possibility of conceptualizing a Confucian notion of human dignity. Previous discussions on this topic have been either historical or reconstructive, the former discussing mainly how Confucianism considers dignity and the latter exploring the possibility of conceptualizing a Confucian human dignity as an alternative to Kant’s Menschenwürde. This essay focuses on mainly the latter effort. Specifically, I critically evaluate professor Ni Peimin’s celebrated attempt at reconstructing Confucian dignity in the context of Kant’s Menschenwürde, arguing that Ni’s work offers us novel and original insights on human dignity but fails to be coherent in several senses. On the other hand, Kant’s Menschenwürde may well lack motivation in particular circumstances, and gives no credit to moral efforts. Building upon this criticism, I further Ni’s discussion of the “four hearts” and propose a revised version of Confucian dignity.     

Varieties of Empathy and Moral Agency

Contemporary literature includes a wide variety of definitions of empathy. At the same time, the revival of sentimentalism has proposed that empathy serves as a necessary criterion of moral agency. The paper explores four common definitions in order to map out which of them best serves such agency. Historical figures are used as the backdrop against which contemporary literature is analysed. David Hume’s philosophy is linked to contemporary notions of affective and cognitive empathy, Adam Smith’s philosophy to projective empathy, and Max Scheler’s account to embodied empathy. Whereas cognitive and projective empathy suffer from detachment and atomism, thereby providing poor support for the type of other-directedness and openness entailed by moral agency, embodied and affective empathy intrinsically facilitate these factors, and hence are viewed as fruitful candidates. However, the theory of affective empathy struggles to explain why the experience of empathy includes more than pure affective mimicry, whilst embodied empathy fails to take into account forms of empathy that do not include contextual, narrative information. In order to navigate through these difficulties, Edith Stein’s take on non-primordial experience is used as a base upon which a definition of affective empathy, inclusive of an embodied dimension, and founded on a movement between resonation and response, is sketched. It is argued that, of the four candidates, this new definition best facilitates moral agency.     

Emotion and Judgment: Two Sources of Moral Motivation in Mèngzǐ

David Nivison has argued that Mèngzǐ 孟子 postulates only one source of moral motivation (namely “heart” as the locus of moral emotions or feelings), whereas Mèngzǐ’s rival thinkers such as Gàozǐ 告子 or the Mohist Yí Zhī 夷之 additionally postulate “maxims” or “doctrines” that are produced by some sort of moral reasoning. In this essay I critically examine this interpretation of Nivison’s, and alternatively argue that moral emotions in Mèngzǐ, basically understood as concern-based construals, are often an insufficient source of moral action, and an additional source of moral motivation, specifically a conviction or judgment of what is the right thing to do in a certain situation in question, is often necessary for one to complete a moral action. This implies that Mèngzǐ should be interpreted to postulate two sources of moral motivation just as his rival thinkers do, namely moral emotion on one hand and judgment and practical reasoning on the other.     

良知与和谐社会建设

“致良知”是阳明学说的核心。“致良知”是他的宇宙论、道德论,也是其修养论。“致良知”对构建和谐社会有重要意义。如今中国社会出现了许多不和谐,人与人、人与社会、人与自然冲突、矛盾、对立,比比皆是。但归根到底是人自己与自己不和谐,即身心不和谐。为此,需要从阳明学中,吸取一些智慧“省察克治”,限制乃至祛除无限膨胀的私欲,抛弃消费主义,过勤俭生活。     

儒家敬畏的核心文化心理特征及其内在理路

儒家围绕敬畏的心理机制、对象、涵育和效用构建了敬畏的理论体系。敬畏是主体在自觉体认崇高价值时所持守的旨在自我超越的既崇敬又谨畏的理性化道德情感; 儒家以内在的道德本心作为敬畏的本根,并将其落实为道德实践中对人伦、自然、生命、职事和人文等的外在崇高价值的敬畏; 儒家敬畏涵育围绕心理动力、内在涵养、外在范导和积习沉淀系统展开,可谓环环相扣、层层递进; 敬畏作为进德修业之基不仅不会戕害自由、尊严与创造,反而是达至无入而不自得的洒落境界的必由之路。     

Memory,Rite, and Tradition： A Comparative Confucian-Christian Literary Analysis

I The Confucian Classics and Christian Scriptures speak often about the role ＂the past＂ plays in shaping individual and communal character, life, perception, morality and purpose. In both Christianity and classical Confucianism, memory, rite and tradition are each accorded a central place in preserving and interpreting the past as a dynamic force in the present. The first part of this paper studies points of thematic similarity in Christian and Confucian interpretation of memory, rite and tradition. In the second part of the paper, however, critical points of divergence are addressed; for behind the formal similarities lie deeper intellectual, relational and moral differences in understanding the nature and function of ＂the past＂ in determining both the present and the future. Comparative literary analysis provides a rich resource for contemporary application of the Confucian Classics and Christian Scriptures to discussion of cultural memory and global harmony. The comparative reading of ＇texts＇ also provides an important point of access for understanding the role literature itself plays in determining the form, content and power of memory, ritual and tradition in both Confucianism and Christianity.     

On Confucius’ Principle of Consanguineous Affection: A Reading of the Dialogue about the Three-Year Mourning in the Lunyu 1

In his dialogue with Zai Wo about the three-year mourning, Confucius establishes a principle of ‘justification by feeling at ease,’ and insists that one should transcend natural desires by moral emotions. More significantly, he further regards kinship love as the ultimate root and supreme principle of human life. Thus, this dialogue contains almost all the basic elements of the Confucian spirit of consanguineous affection.