Are some video games associated with more life interference and psychopathology than others? Comparing massively multiplayer online role‐playing games with other forms of video game

Massively multiplayer online role‐playing games (MMORPGs) are a type of video game that is considered to have particular potential to be associated with life interference and psychopathology when played frequently and intensively. This study sought to compare players of MMORPGs with players of other types of video game in terms of problematic use, life interference, and levels of psychopathology. An international sample of 1,945 video game players completed a series of questionnaires online. While MMORPG players reported increased rates of problematic use and life interference compared with non‐MMORPG players, there were no differences in levels of psychopathology. Differences between MMORPG players and non‐MMORPG players appeared to be associated with the increased amounts of time that MMORPG players played for: The amount of time spent playing appeared to mediate the relationships between type of game played and each of the problematic use and life interference variables. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

Responsibility: The tie that binds

People share significantly more money with others in common lab paradigms like the dictator game than they do in real life. What accounts for this difference? Paradigms like the dictator game link each recipient to a single dictator with the implication that each recipient can receive funds from only one person. We argue that this “burden” of responsibility to a single recipient helps to explain high levels of laboratory sharing. In two experiments—a modified dictator game experiment and a charitable giving experiment—participants donated significantly more to others when they were solely responsible for a recipient's outcome than when the responsibility for a recipient was potentially shared. Taken together with past findings from social psychology and experimental economics, the results show how unambiguous responsibility for a single recipient increases generosity.     

Game Birds: The Ethics of Shooting Birds for Sport

This paper aims to provide an ethical assessment of the shooting of animals for sport. In particular, it discusses the use of partridges and pheasants for shooting. While opposition to hunting and shooting large wild mammals is strong, game birds have often taken a back seat in everyday animal welfare concerns. However, the practice of raising game birds for sport poses significant ethical issues. Most birds shot are raised in factory-farming conditions, and there is a considerable amount of evidence to show that these birds endure extensive suffering on these farms. Considering the fact that birds do have interests, including interests in life and not suffering, what are the ethical implications of using them for blood sports? Indeed, in the light of the suffering that game birds endure in factory farms, it may be that shooting such birds for sport is more morally problematic than other types of hunting and shooting which many people are often fiercely opposed to, for while it seems plausible to say that some animals may be harmed more by death than others (due to, say, their greater capacities), there may be harms that are worse than death (such as a life of intolerable suffering). The objective of this paper is to assess the ethics of shooting animals for sport, and in particular the practice of raising game birds for use in blood sports, by applying principles commonly used in ethics; specifically the principle of non-maleficence and equal consideration of (like) interests.     

INDIVIDUAL PROCREATIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE NON-IDENTITY PROBLEM

The question I address in this paper is whether and under what conditions it is morally right to bring a person into existence. I defend the commonsensical thesis that, other things being equal, it is morally wrong to create a person who will be below some threshold of quality of life, even if the life of this potential person, once created, will nevertheless be worth living. However commonsensical this view might seem, it has shown to be problematic because of the so-called 'Non-Identity Problem'. Both utilitarian and rights-based approaches have been unable to provide a solution to this problem. I rest my thesis on two premises: that causing a disability or impairment in a future person is prima facie wrong, so long as we can avoid causing such a disability to that very person; and that reproduction, under normal conditions, is prima facie morally indifferent. From these two premises, I conclude that it is prima facie wrong to bring into existence a person with a non-trivial disability or impairment (which might be, nonetheless, compatible with a worthwhile life), even if the only available alternative is to remain childless.     

Normative Practical Reasoning: Christian Pillar

In the first part I discuss the thesis, advanced by John Broome, that intentions are normatively required by all-things-considered judgments about what one ought to do. I endorse this thesis, but remain sceptical about Broome's programme of grounding the correctness of reasoning in formal relations between contents of mental states. After discussing objections to the thesis, I concentrate in the second part on the relation between rational action and rational intention. I distinguish between content-related and attitude-related reasons for propositional attitudes like believing, wanting, and intending something. The former appeal to features of the content of the propositional attitude they are reasons for, the latter would be reasons for a propositional attitude because of features of the propositional attitude as a whole, for example the feature of its being beneficial to believe or to want that p . I try to show that the common philosophical reaction to attitude-related reasons, namely to claim that they are merely content-related reasons in disguise, is mistaken. In its most extreme form such a reaction would fail to respect the first-person character of reasoning which manifests itself in, among other things, the fact that a Moore-sentence and its analogue for intentions cannot be a conclusion of reasoning. In the third part I argue that there are attitude-related reasons for intentions, and, in showing how they influence practical deliberation, I find that their existence can be rendered compatible with the thesis that it is rational to intend to do what one thinks one ought to do.     

Three ways of watching a sports video

It does not typically seem to be worthwhile rewatching a sport match, for example, in a video recording, once the result is known. Sports matches are like detective stories. Once one knows ‘whodunit’, there seems little point in revisiting the tale. By drawing on an argument from musicologist Edward T. Cone, this paper argues that certain sports matches may be revisited with profit. The initial experience of a game may be of a series of events that are often ambiguous or confusing as to their meaning or purpose. The full appreciation of a sport match requires, not just this initial familiarity with the immediately perceived events of the game, but also an awareness of the tactics being deployed by both sides. An understanding of tactics and strategy is akin to the analysis of a piece of music (or other art work). A further (third) viewing of the game, during which one can appreciate how the tactics inform the events naively experienced in the first viewing, will yield, it will be argued, an aesthetic pleasure. This takes the experience of sport beyond the merely entertaining or exciting. In certain games, the third viewing may also transcend an appreciation of the merely formal qualities of the game, and so offer substantial insights into what it is to be human.     

Regular probability comparisons imply the Banach–Tarski Paradox

Consider the regularity thesis that each possible event has non-zero probability. Hájek challenges this in two ways: (a) there can be nonmeasurable events that have no probability at all and (b) on a large enough sample space, some probabilities will have to be zero. But arguments for the existence of nonmeasurable events depend on the axiom of choice (AC). We shall show that the existence of anything like regular probabilities is by itself enough to imply a weak version of AC sufficient to prove the Banach–Tarski Paradox on the decomposition of a ball into two equally sized balls, and hence to show the existence of nonmeasurable events. This provides a powerful argument against unrestricted orthodox Bayesianism that works even without AC. A corollary of our formal result is that if every partial order extends to a total preorder while maintaining strict comparisons, then the Banach–Tarski Paradox holds. This yields an argument that incommensurability cannot be avoided in ambitious versions of decision theory.     

Locke and Whately on the Argumentum ad Hominem

This is an exploration of what Locke and Whately said about the Argumentatum ad Hominem, especially in the context of what they said about the other ad arguments, and with a view to ascertaining whether what they said lends support to the understanding of this argument implicit in Johnstone's thesis that all valid philosophical arguments are ad hominem. It is concluded that this support is forthcoming insofar as Locke and Whately had in mind an argument concerned with principles.The essay ends with a brief reformulation of Johnstone's generalization regarding philosophical arguments.     

Tropes in space

Tropes are particular features of concrete objects. Properties—the extensions of predicates—are primitive resemblance classes of tropes. Friends of tropes have been criticized for failing to answer three questions. First, are there fundamental items other than tropes? Second, what criteria determine whether some tropes are all and only the features of some one object? Third, can trope classes be formed adequately using only primitive resemblance? Trading on the spatiotemporal status of tropes, this essay offers new responses to each of these questions. The novel thesis is that there is a sui generis property called ‘markedness’, whose tropes “mark” certain locations in an ontologically basic way. The spatiotemporal distribution of markedness tropes fixes the distribution of familiar characterizing tropes like mass and charge, and characterizing tropes are bundled by being co-contained in the location of a maximally connected markedness trope. This novel theory of trope bundling is defended by appeal to theoretical utility: it is ontologically parsimonious and solves outstanding problems involving co-location and resemblance class construction.     

A Characterization of von Neumann Games in Terms of Memory

An information completion of an extensive game is obtained by extending the information partition of every player from the set of her decision nodes to the set of all nodes. The extended partition satisfies Memory of Past Knowledge (MPK) if at any node a player remembers what she knew at earlier nodes. It is shown that MPK can be satisfied in a game if and only if the game is von Neumann (vN) and satisfies memory at decision nodes (the restriction of MPK to a player's own decision nodes). A game is vN if any two decision nodes that belong to the same information set of a player have the same number of predecessors. By providing an axiom for MPK we also obtain a syntactic characterization of the said class of vN games.     

‘Developing’ the Self in the Knowledge Economy

The term ‘knowledge economy’, like the term ‘globalisation’, has become a catchword in political and educational debate over the last decade or so, especially in debates upon educational policy where the role of education in preparing young people to take their part in the Knowledge Economy is often seen as paramount over other traditional schooling activities. It is said in such debates that the production of knowledge, information and skills, will become more valuable than traditional primary and secondary production. A lot is said about the knowledge required in the Knowledge Economy, and about how institutions, businesses, activities and human beings are to be ordered or structured in accordance with views of knowledge and new Management theories. But little is said of the young people expected to take their part in the knowledge economy. Do they have a choice? Is lying on a surfboard excluded from their life options? How will they be developed, trained or educated to take their part? Will they be committed to developing their selves in accordance with the model of the IT Knowledge Entrepreneur (hereinafter TIKE) presented as a model for education by policy makers in the Knowledge Economy? This article will argue against this latter notion of the development of the self, arguing that because knowledge is prioritised over ethics, there is both an inadequate notion of the self and the educational development of the self and, because of its implicit view only of ethics, an inadequate ethical and moral view of education [246 words].     

心理理论发展研究的一种新范式——矩阵博弈

心理理论指对他人心理状态的理解,是一种毕生发展的能力。但之前的研究在研究对象和研究内容上存在一些缺陷。本文介绍了一种新范式——矩阵博弈(matrix game),对利用其研究心理理论进行了可行性分析,同时指出了两者相结合的理论基础和实证证据。未来研究可利用矩阵博弈来研究更广年龄范围人群心理理论的发展轨迹,并借助fMRI等技术来测查矩阵博弈中心理理论推理的脑机制。     

What Assertion Doesn't Show

Abstract: Some recent arguments against the classical invariantist account of knowledge exploit the idea that there is a ‘knowledge norm’ for assertion. It is claimed that, given the existence of this norm, certain intuitions about assertability support contextualism, or contrastivism, over classical invariantism. In this paper I show that, even if we accept the existence of a knowledge norm, these assertability‐based arguments fail. The classical invariantist can accommodate and explain the relevant intuitions about assertability, in a way that retains the idea that knowledge is the epistemic norm for assertion. When we consider the role of assertion as a conversational act, it becomes plausible that a subject's epistemic warrant to assert can be defeated even though she has knowledge. This defeasibility thesis is what allows the classical invariantist to accommodate and explain the kinds of intuitions on which assertability‐based arguments depend.     

Far Away Now: Time and Distance Revisited

Einstein claimed that we do not know what it means to say that events distant from one another are simultaneous, because there is no way to determine this operationally. Reichenbach and Grunbaum claimed that determinate time relations just do not exist among events not connectible by a causal signal and that, therefore, such relations can, within certain limits, be stipulated by convention. But I argue that the independent existence of such relations is demonstrated by asking and answering a series of questions based on the intelligibility, though not the existence, of faster-than-light signals. I further argue that (1) only by demonstrating the unintelligibility of such questions and their answers can the conventionality thesis be maintained; (2) none of the available arguments to show such unintelligibility works; and (3) the conventionality thesis is therefore false.     

Intergenerational Visiting Patterns: Variation in Boundary Maintenance as an Explanation

SOCIOLOGISTS can now quite fairly be said to have recognized the importance of kinship in a modern industrial society. Beginning with Sussman's study of intergenerational helping patterns in the middle class ( 22 ), an increasing number of investigators have documented the importance of kindred to the city dweller's existence. These findings are contrary to the Simmel-Wirth picture of the urbanite as an isolated individual cut off from extended family contacts ( 19, 24 ). The trend in the literature is now so firmly against this thesis that a scholarly textbook in the area of family sociology has recently appeared in which the theoretical focus is on intergenerational ties ( 8 ). The present article is in the same vein. The first section is devoted to developing a theoretical rationale concerning factors influencing frequency of kinship contacts based on the phenomenon of boundary setting and maintenance that characterizes primary groups. The second section concerns an examination of hypotheses derived from the rationale using data from a sample of three generation lineages.     

The Shape of a Life and Desire Satisfaction

It is widely accepted by philosophers of well‐being that the shape or narrative structure of a life is a significant determinant of its overall welfare value. Most arguments for this thesis posit agent‐independent value in certain life shapes. The desire theory of well‐being, I argue, has all of the resources needed to account for the value that many philosophers have identified in lives with certain shapes. The theory denies that there is any agent‐independent value in shapes and, indeed, allows that there can be both agent‐dependent value and agent‐dependent disvalue in the shapes commonly claimed to hold agent‐independent value.     

A Classical Prejudice?

In this paper, I reassess Floridi’s solution to the Bar-Hillel–Carnap paradox (the information yield of inconsistent propositions is maximal) by questioning the orthodox view that contradictions cannot be true. The main part of the paper is devoted to showing that the veridicality thesis (semantic information has to be true) is compatible with dialetheism (there are true contradictions) and that, unless we accept the additional non-falsity thesis (information cannot be false), there is no reason to presuppose that there is no such thing like contradictory information.     

不同博弈情境下社会排斥对社会决策的影响作用

本研究借助经典的最后通牒博弈范式(UG)和独裁者博弈范式(DG),将回应者/接受者作为研究对象,考察了不同公平条件、平等条件下社会排斥对社会决策的影响作用。实验结果发现:(1)在面对高不公平性的分配方案时,被排斥组比被接纳组更倾向于拒绝接受该分配方案;(2)被排斥组对高不公平性分配方案的满意度要显著低于被接纳组;(3)被排斥组在不平等的博弈(DG)条件下对分配方案的满意度显著低于平等博弈(UG)条件下对分配方案的满意度。本研究结果说明,社会排斥情境下的被试对公平与平等因素更加敏感:在高不公平条件下,被排斥的个体表现出更少的合作互惠行为,甚至不惜放弃自身经济利益,也要惩罚博弈对方的不公平行为;此外,在不平等的博弈条件下,被排斥的个体产生了更多的消极情绪体验。本文的研究结果提高了社会决策研究的生态效度和传统决策模型的预测效度,有利于更加完整透彻地了解社会决策的影响因素。     

A Reconsideration of Altruism From an Evolutionary and Psychodynamic Perspective

Altruistic behavior and motivation has traditionally been regarded as a defense mechanism defined by the vicissitudes of instinctual gratification. In this article, we suggest that there exists a substantial body of evidence from the fields of ethology, infant research, and experimental psychology to support the existence of an independently motivated altruism that is nondefensive in nature. We attempt to show how the view of altruism as a universal motivational system stems from the recent developments in evolutionary theory and contributes to our understanding of intrapsychic factors influencing human behavior in general and the process of psychotherapy in particular. It is not our goal to prove the existence of "pure altruism" that can never be derived from selfish motives. Rather, our thesis is that self-oriented and altruistic motivations are equal and essential partners in human evolution and development. It is the optimal balance of these two forces that is necessary for evolutionary advancement and for psychological health.