Why Externalist Representationalism is a Form of Disjunctivism |
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| Authors: | Laura Gow |
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| Affiliation: | Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge, Sidgwick Avenue, Cambridge |
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| Abstract: | Externalist representationalism is touted as a superior rival to naïve realism, and yet a careful analysis of the externalist representationalist's analysis of our ordinary perceptual experiences shows the view to be far closer to naïve realism than we might have expected. One of the central advertised benefits of representationalist views in general is that they are compatible with the idea that ordinary, illusory and hallucinatory perceptual experiences are of the same fundamental kind. Naïve realists are forced to deny the ‘common fundamental kind claim’ and adopt disjunctivism. However, I argue that externalist representationalism is also a version of disjunctivism. Consequently, one of the main rivals to naïve realism turns out not to be a rival at all. |
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| Keywords: | Perception Perceptual Experience Representationalism Disjunctivism Naï ve Realism |
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