On Ground as a Guide to Realism |
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| Authors: | Emad H. Atiq |
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| Affiliation: | Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, 1879 Hall, Princeton, NJ |
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| Abstract: | According to Fine (among others), a nonbasic factual proposition must be grounded in facts involving those of its constituents that are both real and fundamental. But the principle is vulnerable to several dialectically significant counterexamples. It entails, for example, that a logical Platonist cannot accept that true disjunctions are grounded in the truth of their disjuncts; that a Platonist about mathematical objects cannot accept that sets are grounded in their members; and that a colour primitivist cannot accept that an object's being scarlet grounds its not being chartreuse. The Finean might try to defend these implications, but it generates further problems. Instead, the principle should be rejected. An important upshot is that the principle cannot be relied on to distinguish robust realism from anti‐realism about a propositional domain, for the principle obscures ways of taking features to be both real and fundamental. |
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| Keywords: | Grounding Fundamentality Realism Anti‐Realism Moral Non‐Naturalism |
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