Animal Mindreading and the Principle of Conservatism |
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| Authors: | Tyler K. Fagan |
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| Abstract: | Skeptics about nonlinguistic mindreading often use an inferential rule of thumb—the principle of conservatism—to cast doubt on purported empirical evidence of mindreading abilities in nonlinguistic creatures. This principle, if warranted, would seem to count generally against explanatory hypotheses that posit nonlinguistic mindreading, instead favoring mere behavior‐reading hypotheses. Using a test case from research with chimpanzees, I show that this principle is best understood as an appeal to parsimony; that, regardless of how one conceives of parsimony, the principle is unwarranted; and that, once we put the principle aside, the prospects for nonlinguistic mindreading are brighter than traditionally thought. |
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