Intentionality and Content in McDowell |
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| Authors: | Patrice Philie |
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| Affiliation: | University of Ottawa, Department of Philosophy, Ottawa, ON, Canada |
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| Abstract: | In its most general form, the issue of intentionality takes the following shape: How can something be about something else? In basic cases, this relation is one between a subjective occurrence and a state of affairs, allowing the problem of intentionality to be articulated in this manner: What makes it the case that a subjective occurrence has the capacity to be about something external to it? The views of John McDowell on intentionality form the focus of this article. They are examined through the notion of content and via the later Wittgenstein's standpoint on content and intentionality. The main objective is to reach a conspicuous perspective of McDowell's stance on intentionality in order to uncover its presuppositions. This leads to the identification of a pivotal point of tension in McDowell's philosophical commitments, in particular the extent to which he can legitimately claim to be a quietist. |
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| Keywords: | content intentionality McDowell quietism Wittgenstein |
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