Money Pumps,Incompleteness, and Indeterminacy |
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| Authors: | Johan E. Gustafsson |
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| Affiliation: | University of York |
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| Abstract: | In an alleged counter‐example to the completeness of rational preferences, a career as a clarinettist is compared with a career in law. It seems reasonable to neither want to judge that the law career is at least as preferred as the clarinet career nor want to judge that the clarinet career is at least as preferred as the law career. The two standard interpretations of examples of this kind are, first, that the examples show that preferences are rationally permitted to be incomplete and, second, that the examples show that preferences are rationally permitted to be indeterminate. In this paper, I shall argue that the difference between these interpretations is crucial for the money‐pump argument for transitivity, which is the standard argument that rational preferences are transitive. I shall argue that the money‐pump argument for transitivity fails if preferences are rationally permitted to be incomplete but that it works if preferences are rationally permitted to be indeterminate and rationally required to be complete. |
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