My Ordinary Anti-Sceptical Beliefs Are Not Insensitive |
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| Authors: | LAI Changsheng |
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| Affiliation: | School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, EH8 9AD, UK |
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| Abstract: | An orthodox sceptical hypothesis claims that one’s belief that “I am not a brain-in-a-vat (BIV)” (or any other ordinary anti-sceptical belief) is insensitive. A form of sensitivity-based scepticism, can thus be constructed by combining this orthodox hypothesis with the sensitivity principle and the closure principle. Unlike traditional solutions to the sensitivity-based sceptical problem, this paper will propose a new solution—one which does not reject either closure or sensitivity. Instead, I argue that sceptics’ assumption that one’s ordinary anti-sceptical beliefs are insensitive will give rise to self-contradiction. The orthodox sceptical hypothesis is thus revealed to be incoherent and arbitrary. Given that there is no coherent reason to presuppose our ordinary anti-sceptical beliefs to be insensitive, the argument for sensitivity-based scepticism can thus be blocked at a lower epistemological cost. |
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| Keywords: | sensitivity-based scepticism the sensitivity principle the closure principle sceptical hypothesis |
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