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IN DEFENCE OF METAPHYSICAL ANALYTICITY |
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| Authors: | Frank Hofmann Joachim Horvath |
| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Philosophy and History University of Tübingen 72070 Tübingen, Germany f.hofmann@uni‐tuebingen.de;2. Philosophy Department University of Cologne 50923 Cologne, Germany joachim.horvath@uni‐koeln.de |
| Abstract: | According to the so‐called metaphysical conception of analyticity, analytic truths are true in virtue of meaning (or content) alone and independently of (extralinguistic) facts. Quine and Boghossian have tried to present a conclusive argument against the metaphysical conception of analyticity. In effect, they tried to show that the metaphysical conception inevitably leads into a highly implausible view about the truthmakers of analytic truths. We would like to show that their argument fails, since it relies on an ambiguity of the notion of ‘independence of (extralinguistic) facts’. If one distinguishes between variation independence and existence independence, the unwelcome view about the truthmakers of analytic truths no longer follows. Thus, there is at best a challenge, but no conclusive argument. The door to the metaphysical conception of analyticity is still open. 1 |
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