Analog and digital,continuous and discrete |
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Authors: | Corey J Maley |
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Institution: | (1) Department of Philosophy, Princeton University, 1879 Hall, Room 212, Princeton, NJ 08540, USA |
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Abstract: | Representation is central to contemporary theories regarding the mind/brain. But the nature of representation—both in the
mind/brain and more generally—is a source of ongoing controversy. One way of categorizing representational types is to distinguish
between the analog and the digital: the received view is that analog representations vary smoothly, while digital representations
vary in a step-wise manner. In other words, ‘digital’ is synonymous with ‘discrete’, while ‘analog’ is synonymous with ‘continuous’.
I argue that this characterization is inadequate to account for the ways in which representation is (and should be) used in
cognitive science; in its place, I suggest an alternative taxonomy. I will defend and extend David Lewis’s account of analog
and digital representation, distinguishing analog from continuous representation, as well as digital from discrete representation.
I will argue that the distinctions available in this fourfold account better accord with representational features of interest
in cognitive science than the received analog/digital dichotomy. |
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