Linda问题：“齐当别”抉择模型的解释

大量有关人类归因判断的研究表明，人类经常违反理性概率公理。Tversky和Kahneman（1983）使用Linda问题等特定场景的研究发现，人们系统性地表现出违反理性推断标准，判断合取事件发生概率大于其组成事件发生概率，称之为合取谬误，并用人们使用代表性启发式判断概率来解释该现象产生的原因。然而使用启发式观点对合取谬误现象进行解释过于模糊不清。该文首先介绍了合取谬误现象及其解释模型，然后应用Li（1994，2004）提出的不确定情形下决策理论——“齐当别”抉择模型对Linda问题中合取谬误产生的原因进行了新的解释

The Linda Problem: The Equate-to-differentiate Interpretation

Numerous studies on how people reason with statistical data suggest that human judgment often fails to approximate rational probabilistic (Bayesian) norms. Tversky and Kahneman (1983) studied people’s probabilistic inference under uncertainty using the Linda problem and several particular scenarios. According to the empirical results, in some situations when subjects are asked to assign the likelihood of several alternatives, including single and joint events, they tend to rate a probability to a conjunction of two events larger than that they assign to one of the constituent events, which anomalous phenomenon is called “conjunction fallacy”, and such fallacious behavior on conjunctive probability judgment was explained in terms of the “representativeness heuristic”. However, the heuristic has been criticized heavily as being too vague to account for explanations. In this paper, the phenomenon and several explanations on the conjunction fallacy were briefly reviewed, and a new exposition that people apply equate-to-differentiate decision rule (Li, 1994, 2004) to judge in the Linda problem was proposed to interpret this anomalous phenomenon