Why the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is not contingently true either

Faced with strong arguments to the effect that Leibniz'sPrinciple of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) is not a necessary truth, many supporters of the Principle have staged a strategic retreat to the claim that it is contingently true in this, the actual, world. The purpose of this paper is to examine the status of the various forms of PII in both classical and quantum physics, and it is concluded that this latter view is at best doubtful, at worst, simply wrong.I would like to thank Michael Redhead and an anonymous referee for several useful suggestions and criticisms relating to the earlier version of this paper. I must also acknowledge the support given by the Centre of Logic, Epistemology and History of Science of the University of Campinas and the Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technological Development in the later stages of the preparation of this work.