Disagreement behind the veil of ignorance |
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Authors: | Ryan Muldoon Chiara Lisciandra Mark Colyvan Carlo Martini Giacomo Sillari Jan Sprenger |
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Affiliation: | 1. Philosophy, Politics and Economics Program, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, 19104, USA 2. Department of Political and Economic Studies, Finnish Centre of Excellence in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, University of Helsinki, PO Box 24, 00014, Helsinki, Finland 3. Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney, A14 Main Quadrangle, Sydney, NSW, 2006, Australia 4. Department of Political Science, LUISS Guido Carli, Viale Romania 32, 00197, Rome, Italy 5. Tilburg Center for Logic, General Ethics and Philosophy of Science, Tilburg University, 5037 AB, Tilburg, The Netherlands
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Abstract: | In this paper we argue that there is a kind of moral disagreement that survives the Rawlsian veil of ignorance. While a veil of ignorance eliminates sources of disagreement stemming from self-interest, it does not do anything to eliminate deeper sources of disagreement. These disagreements not only persist, but transform their structure once behind the veil of ignorance. We consider formal frameworks for exploring these differences in structure between interested and disinterested disagreement, and argue that consensus models offer us a solution concept for disagreements behind the veil of ignorance. |
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