The relative unnaturalness of atheism: On why Geertz and Markússon are both right and wrong |
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Authors: | Justin L. Barrett |
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Affiliation: | Institute of Cognitive and Evolutionary Anthropology, Centre for Anthropology & Mind, University of Oxford, 64 Banbury Road, Oxford OX2 6PN, United Kingdom |
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Abstract: | ![]() Commonly scholars in the cognitive science of religion (CSR) have advanced the naturalness of religion thesis. That is, ordinary cognitive resources operating in ordinary human environments typically lead to some kind of belief in supernatural agency and perhaps other religious ideas. Special cultural scaffolding is unnecessary. Supernaturalism falls near a natural anchor point. In contrast, widespread conscious rejection of the supernatural as in atheism appears to require either special cultural conditions that upset ordinary function, cognitive effort, or a good degree of cultural scaffolding to move people away from their maturationally natural anchor-points. Geertz and Markússon (2009) identify ways to strengthen cognitive approaches to the study of religion and culture, including atheism, but fail to demonstrate that atheism is as natural in a comparable respect as theism. |
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Keywords: | Atheism Cognition Religion Cognitive science |
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