The anchoring bias reflects rational use of cognitive resources |
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| Authors: | Falk Lieder Thomas L. Griffiths Quentin J. M. Huys Noah D. Goodman |
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| Affiliation: | 1.Helen Wills Neuroscience Institute,University of California,Berkeley,USA;2.Translational Neuromodeling Unit, Institute for Biomedical Engineering,University of Zürich and Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH),Zürich,Switzerland;3.Department of Psychology,Stanford University,Stanford,USA;4.Department of Psychiatry, Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics, Hospital of Psychiatry,University of Zürich,Zürich,Switzerland;5.Department of Psychology,University of California,Berkeley,USA |
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| Abstract: | ![]()
Cognitive biases, such as the anchoring bias, pose a serious challenge to rational accounts of human cognition. We investigate whether rational theories can meet this challenge by taking into account the mind’s bounded cognitive resources. We asked what reasoning under uncertainty would look like if people made rational use of their finite time and limited cognitive resources. To answer this question, we applied a mathematical theory of bounded rationality to the problem of numerical estimation. Our analysis led to a rational process model that can be interpreted in terms of anchoring-and-adjustment. This model provided a unifying explanation for ten anchoring phenomena including the differential effect of accuracy motivation on the bias towards provided versus self-generated anchors. Our results illustrate the potential of resource-rational analysis to provide formal theories that can unify a wide range of empirical results and reconcile the impressive capacities of the human mind with its apparently irrational cognitive biases. |
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