| Abstract: | The capacity to suffer, the vulnerability with respect to suffering, confers on all animals with that capacity (not just human beings) a prima facie right not to be caused suffering. Nurturing in order to stave off such suffering is the first act of the community toward the individual, primarily in infancy. Hence for Loewy, autonomy, the gradual growth of self-determination in individuals, is grounded in a broader moral commitment of the community, that of beneficence. This is the critical point in his argument, for it represents a wholesale critique of modern libertarianism. Libertarians, in contrast to Loewy's argument, seem to ground the nature of the community in the prima facie right of autonomy. For Loewy, the community not only has an obligation to refrain from harming individuals (nonmaleficence), but it also has an active duty to ameliorate and prevent, as far as possible, the suffering of its members. Thus, if there is a social contract, it is one of nurturing one another to overcome the vulnerability of suffering, not primarily one of protecting autonomy. This is most significant for clinical ethics as well. Once the primary obligation to ameliorate suffering is no longer necessary, when the individual loses or does not have the primary moral worth prompted by the capacity to suffer, then secondary and symbolic obligations emerge. Loewy is thereby able to suggest a "calculus" of moral worth, wherein our obligations to individuals in a permanent vegetative state or to anencephalics (almost always the individual will have lost the capacity to suffer through some cerebral event) must be weighed against other primary obligations. Although Loewy admits that grounding clinical ethics in the capacity to suffer might be "thin," it nevertheless prompts serious discussion about the nature of the "good" in good clinical ethics decisions. |
