On not knowing what or who one is: Reflections on the intelligibility of dualism

Beginning with Descartes' caution not imprudently to take some other object in place of myself, I consider first the problems of self-identification confronted by variousamnesiacs, both ordinary and Cartesian. Noting thatcogitationes as such do not individuate, I proceed to examine conclusions drawn from certain sorts of body-switching thought experiments. This, in turn, gives rise to a general critique of psychological connectedness or unity of consciousness as a candidate criterion of personal identity. I conclude that our ability to apply any notion of personal identity is parasitic upon the existence of a conceptual apparatus for individuating, identifying, and reidentifying objects. Finally, I argue that, if person is a proper sortal predicate to begin with, Descartes'res cogitans cannot be understood as a species of the (metaphysical) genusres, distinct fromres extensa and only problematically in interaction with it. Cartesian dualism is a multiply untenable doctrine.