| Abstract: | Subjects read paragraphs suggesting that a fictitious person (O) either did or did not possess an attribute X. Then, they reported their beliefs that they would like O (PL), that O possessed X (PX), that O was intelligent (PI) and that O was sarcastic (Ps). Other beliefs necessary to test the predictive accuracy of Wyer's subjective probability model of cognitive organization were also reported. The model accurately predicted PL on the basis of beliefs about X (the attribute to which information about O directly pertained); this accuracy was greater than that obtained in an earlier study in which real persons were evaluated, and did not depend upon the favorableness of X. However, predictions of PL based upon beliefs about O's intelligence overestimated obtained values, while predictions based upon beliefs about O's sarcasm underestimated these values; moreover, PI and PS were underestimated and overestimated, respectively, by beliefs about X. It was speculated that these discrepancies were due to temporary inconsistencies among beliefs resulting from the information presented which did not have time to be resolved before beliefs were reported. Changes in PL, PI, and PS resulting from additional information about X were accurately predicted in all cases. Implications of the model for other formulations of social evaluation processes are noted. |
