Does it help to feel your body? Evidence is inconclusive that interoceptive accuracy and sensibility help cope with negative experiences

ABSTRACT

In four studies (total N?=?534), we examined the moderating impact of Interoceptive Accuracy (i.e. IAcc, as measured with the heartbeat counting task) and Interoceptive Sensibility (IS, assessed via questionnaire) on negative affect, following social exclusion or after receiving negative feedback. Results from an integrative data analysis combining the four studies confirmed that the manipulations were successful at inducing negative affect. However, no significant interaction between mood induction (control versus negative affect induction) and interoception on mood measures was observed, and this was true both for objective (i.e. IAcc) and subjective (i.e. IS) measures of interoception. Hence, previous conclusions on the moderating impact of interoception in the relationship between mood induction and self-reported mood were neither replicated nor generalised to this larger sample. We discuss these findings in light of theories of emotion regulation as well as recent concerns raised about the validity of the heartbeat counting task.     

Epistemic Injustice The Third Way?

In response to Miranda Fricker's advocacy of a virtue of 'reflexive critical openness', I emphasise the importance of other virtues, such as loyalty, in evaluating an agent's response to testimony, and I query Fricker's claim that in certain circumstances agents can lack a means to correct their faulty evaluations of another's testimony     

Finding common ground between evolutionary biology and continental philosophy

This article identifies already existing theoretical and methodological commonalities between evolutionary biology and phenomenology, concentrating specifically on their common pursuit of origins. It identifies in passing theoretical support from evolutionary biology for present-day concerns in philosophy, singling out Sartre’s conception of fraternity as an example. It anchors its analysis of the common pursuit of origins in Husserl’s consistent recognition of the grounding significance of Nature and in his consistent recognition of animate forms of life other than human. It enumerates and exemplifies five basic errors of continental philosophers with respect to Nature, errors testifying to a philosophical fundamentalism that distorts the intricate interconnections and relationships of Nature in favor of a preferred knowledge rooted in ontological reductionism. It shows that to discover and appreciate the common ground, one must indeed study “the things themselves.”

Drone affect: Folded points of view as a co-affection method for empathy and care

Drone usage in fieldwork and participatory processes entails direct sensations that fold the pilot/planner and audience into one. Footage from drone filming entails direct kinesthetic and synesthetic effects that occur while one edits the film material, giving rise to affective responses. Through one experimental drone postproduction film, this article discusses how the interplay of vision, motion, and sound works as a set of gestures that comprise sensation as a (self- and co-) affection modus of immediation when one engages with moving images on-screen during drone filming, editing, and screening. The article builds upon Merleau-Ponty's film writings and Puig de la Bellacasa's touch/care perspectives. Specifically, it asks what constitutive aspects characterize the folding of the drone's/pilot's point of view (POV) in relation to the perceiver's POV during postediting, and to the conceiver's POV during subsequent viewings. The article's original contribution is to show how affective experiences are transposed as haptic touch via the same images and folded POVs. It also addresses a research methodological perspective on filmic mediations and written accounts. The article concludes by speculating about how the co-affective potential of the folding of POVs through drone imagery might inform fieldwork and participatory processes from perspectives of care and empathy.     

从认知发展看思维和逻辑的基本类型

人类和个人对事物的认知发展过程可分为感性认知和理性认知两大阶段。思维即理性认知。思维按其意识和复杂性程度可分为直觉思维、形象思维、抽象思维和辩证思维四种基本类型。逻辑学是描述思维的产物即思想的形式结构与其规律的科学,也是为思维提供思维形式与其变形规则的模规范性科学。当代逻辑学按其产生和适用的主要思维领域不同,可分为准逻辑、形象逻辑、形式逻辑和辩证逻辑四种基本类型。     

Epistemic Justice and a Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing

The dual aim of this article is to reveal and explain a certain phenomenon of epistemic injustice as manifested in testimonial practice, and to arrive at a characterisation of the anti–prejudicial intellectual virtue that is such as to counteract it. This sort of injustice occurs when prejudice on the part of the hearer leads to the speaker receiving less credibility than he or she deserves. It is suggested that where this phenomenon is systematic it constitutes an important form of oppression.     

中小学生学业责任心的调查研究

目的：自编量表考察中小学生学业责任心状况。被试：徐州、盐城、镇江三个地区的小学、初中、高中的学生1678名,分析时删除未填写性别的72名被试,对1606名被试数据进行统计分析。结论：1．小学、初中和高中三个年级之间的学生的学业责任心水平存在显著差异：小学生的学业责任心水平显著高于高中生,初中生的学业责任心水平显著高于高中生;2．女生的学业责任心水平显著高于男生;3．初中阶段,镇江地区学生比盐城地区学生的学业责任心水平高;4．高中阶段,徐州地区学生比镇江地区学生学业责任心水平高,盐城地区学生比镇江地区学生学业责任心水平高;5．镇江地区,初中学生的学业责任心水平显著高于高中学生,小学生的学业责任心水平显著高于高中学生。     

Epistemic Injustice The Third Way?

In response to Miranda Fricker's advocacy of a virtue of 'reflexive critical openness', I emphasise the importance of other virtues, such as loyalty, in evaluating an agent's response to testimony, and I query Fricker's claim that in certain circumstances agents can lack a means to correct their faulty evaluations of another's testimony     

疾病疼痛与人文关怀

几乎任何疾病都可能引起疼痛。在临床上和日常生活中,疼痛问题常常被人忽视,而疼痛的敏感性问题也常被人们误认为是耐受性问题。人类的出现,赋予了疼痛以人文意义。随着社会的进步,应该对疼痛问题给予足够的重视。对病人的疼痛,我们有必要给予足够的人文关怀。     

Ethical Phenomenology and Metaethics

In recent times, comments have been made and arguments advanced in support of metaethical positions based on the phenomenology of ethical experience – in other words, the feel that accompanies our ethical experiences. In this paper I cast doubt on whether ethical phenomenology supports metaethical positions to any great extent and try to tease out what is involved in giving a phenomenological argument. I consider three such positions: independent moral realism (IMR), another type of moral realism – sensibility theory – and noncognitivism. Phenomenological arguments have been used in support of the first two positions, but my general claim is that ethical phenomenology supports no metaethical position over any other.I discuss two types of phenomenological argument that might be offered in support of different types of moral realism, although I couch my debate in terms of IMR. The first argument asserts that ethical properties are not experienced in the way that rivals to IMR say we experience them. Against this I claim that it is odd to think that one could experience ethical properties as any metaethical theory characterizes them. The second argument is more complicated: the general thought is that an adequate metaethical theory should not distort our ethical experience unduly. I consider one aspect of our ethical experience – that there is some ethical authority to which our judgements answer – in order to illustrate this idea. I discuss why IMRealists might think that this phenomenon supports their position. Against them I claim that other metaethical positions might be able to accommodate the phenomenon of ethical authority. Even if they cannot, then, secondly, I argue that there are other aspects of our ethical experience that sit more naturally with other metaethical positions. Hence, one cannot argue that ethical phenomenology as a whole supports one theory over any others.