Rigidity in children's drawings and its relation with representational change

Four studies tested the application of to the drawing domain. In particular, we tested her claim that young children are inhibited in their attempts at changing their graphic representations (representational change) due to being constrained by the order in which the elements of the representation are drawn (procedural rigidity). The first study required 60 children (4- to 6-year-olds and an older comparison group of 8-year-olds) to make three drawings of a familiar and novel topic. From these drawings each child was measured for procedural rigidity. In a further drawing the child was asked to modify their usual representation of each topic. Regression analyses revealed procedural rigidity levels were not predictive of manipulation performance. A second study, testing 75 4- to 6-year-olds and a third study, testing 30 3- to 4-year-olds, revealed that when young children were specifically asked to manipulate rigid sub-procedures on a familiar topic they were indeed able to do so. Finally, a fourth study (testing 40 5-year-olds and 40 8-year-olds) removed the notational trace in drawing (a possible aid for procedural interruption) but this still produced no evidence of a relation between procedural rigidity and representational change. We suggest how the concept of procedural rigidity might be re-interpreted for the drawing domain so that the RR model can remain as a domain-general theory of cognitive development. We also suggest the development of information processing may be crucial for flexibility in drawing.     

The over-generalization problem: predicates rigidly signifying the “unnatural”

According to the simple proposal, a predicate is rigid iff it signifies the same property across the different possible worlds. The simple proposal has been claimed to suffer from an over-generalization problem. Assume that one can make sense of predicates signifying properties, and assume that trivialization concerns, to the effect that the notion would cover any predicate whatsoever, can be overcome. Still, the proposal would over-generalize, the worry has it, by covering predicates for artifactual, social, or evaluative properties, such as ‘is a knife,’ ‘is a bachelor,’ or ‘is funny.’ In defense, it is argued that rigidity for predicates as characterized plays the appropriate theoretical role, and that the contention that “unnatural” properties are not to be rigidly signified is ungrounded.     

Interpersonal rigidity and complementarity

The relations among behavioral complementarity, interpersonal rigidity, as indicated by the Interpersonal Adjective Checklist (IAS, Wiggins, 1995) vector score, and interpersonal distress, as indicated by the Inventory of Interpersonal Problems (IIP, Horowitz, Rosenberg, Baer, Ureno, & Villasenor, 1988), were examined in two studies. In Study 1, 214 undergraduates viewed videotapes depicting different interactions and then provided their responses. In Study 2, 122 undergraduates interacted in randomly paired dyads on a mutual task. These interactions were videotaped and the interchanges were rated using the Interpersonal Communication Ratings Scale (ICRS, Strong, Hills, & Nelson, 1988). The extent to which each participant demonstrated complementary behavior was determined. Results of the studies demonstrated support for interpersonal rigidity as related to complementarity and as a moderator of the adaptability of behavior. Further complementarity was a mediator in the behavioral rigidity–interpersonal distress relation.     

On the minimal relative motion principle—the oscillating tilted bar

Beghi, Xausa, Tomat, and Zanforlin (J. Math. Psychol. 41(1997) 11) present a visual stereokinetic illusion. In the image plane, one end of an oblique bar moves horizontally back and forth, while the other end is stationary. Perceptually, this becomes a bar of a constant length rotating in depth around a vertical axis that passes through the stationary end of the bar. Beghi et al. (1997) provide a mathematical model of minimal relative motion to account for this percept. Here we show that the minimal relative motion principle cannot explain the perceptual phenomenon. Specifically, we raise two objections. (1) It is necessary to consider not only the length, but also the direction, of a vector when comparing vector fields. In fact, when directions are taken into consideration, Beghi et al.'s mathematical result diverges from their perceptual experimental result. (2) There is a mathematical inconsistency in Beghi et al. (1997): mixing absolute and relative velocities in their minimization is unwarranted, and does not lead to correct minimization.     

The role of dichotomous thinking and rigidity in perfectionism

Perfectionism is a complex psychological construct that has been defined in many different ways. Recent conceptualisations of perfectionism have involved dividing the construct into positive and negative components. Negative perfectionism is associated with high emotional distress whereas positive perfectionism is associated with positive affect and lower levels of distress. Although these distinctions have been made it remains unclear as to how distinct the two aspects of perfectionism are particularly in terms of their cognitive profiles. This study investigated two cognitive constructs that have been theoretically linked to perfectionism. Dichotomous thinking and rigidity were examined in three samples (40 clinical participants, 111 athletes, 101 students). As hypothesised, the clinical sample had the highest score on negative perfectionism, however, no differences were observed between groups on positive perfectionism. Dichotomous thinking emerged as the variable most predictive of negative perfectionism, and was less strongly related to positive perfectionism. These results highlight the importance of dichotomous thinking as a cognitive construct worthy of further research to understand negative perfectionism. Implications for the development of cognitive therapy interventions for negative perfectionism are discussed.     

Explaining Rigidity and Pragmatism in Political Leaders: A General Theory and a Plausibility Test from the Reagan Presidency

Classic studies of a few extreme, almost pathological cases of rigidity in political leaders (e.g., Woodrow Wilson's League of Nations debacle) have tended to obscure the fact that virtually all leaders alternate between periods of pragmatic flexibility and rigid intransigence in the face of political opposition or unpleasant facts. This study develops a general theoretical framework for explaining rigidity and flexibility in political leaders by extending insights from classic studies of extreme cases to everyday policymaking and by integrating these findings with more recent theoretical and empirical work in political psychology. The plausibility of hypotheses derived from this framework is investigated by examining the conditions associated with pragmatism and rigidity in 15 cases from the presidency of Ronald Reagan. The results are generally consistent with the proposed model, which stresses person-situation interaction and traces rigidity to the arousal of leaders' sources of self-validation in a particular policy context. I conclude by evaluating the implications of this new framework for other areas of theory and research.     

Baumann on the Monty Hall problem and single-case probabilities

Peter Baumann uses the Monty Hall game to demonstrate that probabilities cannot be meaningfully applied to individual games. Baumann draws from this first conclusion a second: in a single game, it is not necessarily rational to switch from the door that I have initially chosen to the door that Monty Hall did not open. After challenging Baumann’s particular arguments for these conclusions, I argue that there is a deeper problem with his position: it rests on the false assumption that what justifies the switching strategy is its leading me to win a greater percentage of the time. In fact, what justifies the switching strategy is not any statistical result over the long run but rather the “causal structure” intrinsic to each individual game itself. Finally, I argue that an argument by Hilary Putnam will not help to save Baumann’s second conclusion above. See Moser and Mulder (1994, pp. 115–116, 118).     

Laterality of repetitive finger movement performance and clinical features of Parkinson’s disease

Impairments in acoustically cued repetitive finger movement often emerge at rates near to and above 2 Hz in persons with Parkinson’s Disease (PD) in which some patients move faster (hastening) and others move slower (bradykinetic). The clinical features impacting this differential performance of repetitive finger movement remain unknown. The purpose of this study was to compare repetitive finger movement performance between the more and less affected side, and the difference in clinical ratings among performance groups. Forty-one participants diagnosed with idiopathic PD completed an acoustically cued repetitive finger movement task while “on” medication. Eighteen participants moved faster, 10 moved slower, and 13 were able to maintain the appropriate rate at rates above 2 Hz. Clinical measures of laterality, disease severity, and the UPDRS were obtained. There were no significant differences between the more and less affected sides regardless of performance group. Comparison of disease severity, tremor, and rigidity among performance groups revealed no significant differences. Comparison of posture and postural instability scores revealed that the participants that demonstrated hastening had worse posture and postural instability scores. Consideration of movement rate during the clinical evaluation of repetitive finger movement may provide additional insight into varying disease features in persons with PD.     

On the minimal relative motion principle—lateral displacement of a contracting bar

Xausa, Beghi, and Zanforlin (J. Math. Psychol. 45(4) (2001) 635) provide an account of perceptual organization based on their ‘minimal relative motion’ principle. They claim that this principle can account for the percept generated by a contracting bar that is simultaneously translating laterally. We critique the mathematical analysis provided in the aforementioned paper. We conclude that the ‘minimal relative motion’ principle, in the form presented, cannot adequately explain the percept reported by observers.