Why Freedom Implies Equality

ABSTRACT Equality and freedom have been represented as conflicting values. In this paper, I propose to argue that the idea of freedom has clear egalitarian implications.
Freedom is commonly represented as being negative or positive, but it has both senses in ordinary usage, and the distinction fails adequately to explain the relationship between views on freedom and poverty. An alternative representation of the concept distinguishes individual freedom, based on the autonomous individual, from social freedom, which sees freedom as a social relationship.
Equality implies the elimination of disadvantage. Freedom is a redistributive idea, implying that the freedom of some must be restricted to increase the freedom of others. Although the individual concept of freedom is restrictive, equal treatment and equality of opportunity are largely compatible with it, and even equality of outcome can be reconciled with it to some degree. The social concept of freedom is broader, extending the scope of redistribution to all forms of social disadvantage. This demands a high degree of equality; it also defines the boundaries of the pursuit of equality, which is justifiable in so far as it increases freedom.
Freedom is not, therefore, in conflict with equality. Certain egalitarian assumptions are part of its normative base, and it actively requires a degree of redistribution.     

ARGUMENT TO BLISS: THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE

The essay examines intellectual virtue in the Summa theologiae, taking it as an interpretative key to the epistemology of the Summa theologiae as a whole. Because Aquinas blurs the line between the acquired and the theological virtues, and between virtues and the gifts of the Spirit, it becomes impossible to maintain the distinction between the realms of nature and grace, or between natural reason and revealed truth: grace permeates the most ordinary activities of human reasoning. This reading of the Summa theologiae raises questions about many contemporary debates, particularly those concerning natural law.     

Just War: theory and application

ABSTRACT How should just war theory be applied to assess a community's claim to defend itself? The IRA's claim to be fighting a just war to end British rule in Northern Ireland is upheld against the objection (e.g. by Simpson in this Journal, 1986) that they have a right only to self-defence against indigenous tyranny. Under just war theory no unclarity concerning the alien status of British rule could render the IRA claim unjustifiable: only the well-grounded denial of its alien status might serve (though this is doubtful). But if that denial is argued for by identifying a separate British community in Ireland then the IRA must be granted a right to repel alien occupation of nationalist areas. However the IRA's rejection of the ‘two communities’ view can be defended; for what constitutes a single community is subject to moral considerations. Accordingly a genuine community's claim to self-defence is against being wronged, rather than harmed. It is concluded that just war theory cannot be applied without antecedent moral judgements identifying the community potentially wronged.     

A new objectively scored version of the Defence Mechanism Test

Kragh's Defence Mechanism Test has proved its worth in a number of applied settings but has hitherto required skilled time-consuming interpretation. Two studies are reported which validate an "objectively scored" version of the test developed using G-analysis. In the first, it was found that this version of the test could successfully predict the performance of trainee pilots. The second study examined the construct validity of this version of the test. It was found that the predictive factor from Study I re-emerged within a sample of students, where it correlated positively with scores on a test of perceptual defence and the Shrewdness (N) scale of the 16PF, and negatively with two of the identification scales of the Defence Mechanism Test. This factor was tentatively identified as one of general defensiveness. It is concluded that this form of the test deserves consideration when selecting individuals for stressful occupations.     

Sex stereotypes in Norway revisited: 1977–87

In 1977 sex-trait stereotypes in Norway were measured at the young adult level and at the level of five-year-olds. At the young adult level the Adjective Check List was used, and the results were analysed according to an affective meaning scoring system, and a scoring system based on Transactional Analysis. The instrument used for children was a picture-story technique (Sex Stereotype Measure II). Persistence and change in sex-trait stereotypes were examined by replicating the study in 1987. Quantitatively, young adults' sex-trait stereotypes seemed to have changed little during the last decade, but qualitative analyses indicated that stereotypes have changed in the direction of greater favourability, activity and strength towards women and in the reverse direction towards men. The children in the 1987 sample expressed less stereotype knowledge than children in the 1977 sample concerning traits which traditionally have been ascribed to men.