The precaution adoption process

This article presents a critique of current models of preventive behavior. It discusses a variety of factors that are usually overlooked-including the appearance of costs and benefits over time, the role of cues to action, the problem of competing life demands, and the ways that actual decision behavior differs from the rational ideal implicit in expectancy-value and utility theories. Such considerations suggest that the adoption of new precautions should be viewed as a dynamic process with many determinants. The framework of a model that is able to accommodate these additional factors is described. This alternative model portrays the precaution adoption process as an orderly sequence of qualitatively different cognitive stages. Data illustrating a few of the suggestions made in the article are presented, and implications for prevention programs are discussed.     

Effects of personal experience on self-protective behavior

This article seeks to further our understanding of self-protective behavior by examining the effects of a particularly powerful stimulus to action: personal experience. It reviews the effects of automobile accidents on seat belt use, criminal victimization other than rape on individual crime prevention efforts, natural hazards experience on both natural hazards preparedness and compliance with evacuation warnings, and myocardial infarction on smoking. Theories suggesting mechanisms that could link personal experience to behavior are described, and data concerning the effects of experience on some key variables in these theories are discussed. Tentative propositions are offered to resolve the many apparent discrepancies in this literature. These propositions concern the effects of experience on risk perceptions, the influence of experience on risk salience, the specificity of responses to victimization, and the duration of experience effects.     

Social learning and collective choice

To be pertinent to democratic practice, collective choice functions need not apply to all possible constellations of individual preference, but only to those that are humanly possible in an appropriate sense. The present paper develops a theory of humanly possible preference within the context of the mathematical theory of learning. The theory of preference is then exploited in an attempt to resolve Arrow's voting paradox through restriction of the domain of majoritarian choice functions.     

Carbon dioxide as a reinforcer in escape conditioning

The effects of varying CO₂ concentration, and intervals between CO₂ presentations, were determined from the performance by five pigeons of a learned motor act which eliminates CO₂ from the inspired air. The length of time from the onset of an externally-produced increase in inspired CO₂ to the performance of the learned motor response terminating the CO₂ presentation was inversely related to the CO₂ concentration presented (3 per cent and 5 per cent) and directly related to the inter-trial interval (3 minutes and 1.5 minutes). Chemoreceptors on the ventrolateral surfaces of the medulla are postulated to be the initial site of stimulation in the chain of events leading to the behavioral bioregulation of inspired CO₂ concentration.     

Relevant consequence and empirical inquiry

A criterion of adequacy is proposed for theories of relevant consequence. According to the criterion, scientists whose deductive reasoning is limited to some proposed subset of the standard consequence relation must not thereby suffer a reduction in scientific competence. A simple theory of relevant consequence is introduced and shown to satisfy the criterion with respect to a formally defined paradigm of empirical inquiry.Research support was provided by the Office of Naval Research under contract No. N00014-89-J-1725 to Osherson and Weinstein, Swiss National Science Foundation under contract No. 21-32399.91 and by a Siemens Corporation grant to Osherson.     

A reason for theoretical terms

The presence of nonobservational vocabulary is shown to be necessary for wide application of a conservative principle of theory revision.Support for this research was provided by the Office of Naval Research under contract No. N00014-87-K-0401. We thank Daniel Andler and Clark Glymour for helpful discussion.     

Undermind

David Albert and Barry Loewer have proposed a new interpretation of quantum mechanics which they call the Many Minds interpretation, according to which there are infinitely many minds associated with a given (physical) state of a brain. This interpretation is related to the family of many worlds interpretations insofar as it assumes strictly unitary (Schrödinger) time-evolution of quantum-mechanical systems (no reduction of the wave-packet). The Many Minds interpretation itself is principally motivated by an argument which purports to show that the assumption of unitary evolution, along with some common sense assumptions about mental states (specifically, beliefs) leads to a certain nonphysicalism, in which there is a many-to-one correspondence between minds and brains. In this paper, I critically examine this motivating argument, and show that it depends on a mistaken assumption regarding the correspondence between projection operators and yes/no questions.Thanks to David Albert, Arthur Fine, Martin Jones, and the two anonymous referees for their comments on an earlier version of this paper, and thanks to Jeremy Butterfield, Rob Clifton, Meir Hemmo and David Malament for comments on a revised version. Special thanks to Arthur for several helpful discussions.