Response error and processing biases in confidence judgment

Previous studies showed that random error can explain overconfidence effects typically observed in the literature. One of these studies concluded that, after accounting for random error effects in the data, there is little support for cognitive‐processing biases in confidence elicitation. In this paper, we investigate more closely the random error explanation for overconfidence. We generated data from four models of confidence and then estimated the magnitude of random error in the data. Our results show that, in addition to the true magnitude of random error specified in the simulations, the error estimates are influenced by important cognitive‐processing biases in the confidence elicitation process. We found that random error in the response process can account for the degree of overconfidence found in calibration studies, even when that overconfidence is actually caused by other factors. Thus, the error models say little about whether cognitive biases are present in the confidence elicitation process. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Motivation and anxiety for dental treatment and dental attendance: The roles of the locus of causality personality and treatment styles

The purpose of the present study was to test a self-determination theory model with the following hypotheses: (1) Patients’ autonomous causality personality orientation and oral health care professionals’ autonomy-supportive treatment styles, as perceived by patients, would both be positively indirectly associated with dental attendance through patients’ autonomous motivation for dental treatment. (2) Patients’ controlled causality personality orientation and oral health care professionals’ controlling treatment styles, as perceived by patients, would both be positively indirectly associated with avoidance of making a dental clinic appointment through patients’ anxiety for dental treatment. A sample size of about 200 patients was estimated to be acceptable in detecting moderate effect sizes (independent variables: 5–6; power: .80; p < .05). Student patients (N = 226) responded to a survey with validated questionnaires. Using LISREL, both hypotheses were supported. In addition, patients’ perception of a controlling treatment style moderated the controlled personality—dental anxiety relation, so that a lower controlling treatment style mitigated dental anxiety substantially among patients with a high control orientation. Effect sizes were moderate to large. Analyses (Z-scores) also revealed that the autonomous personality is more strongly linked to situational autonomous motivation than situational autonomy support, whereas a controlled personality and a perceived controlling treatment style are equally and significantly associated to dental anxiety. Both patient personalities and oral health care professionals’ treatment styles are substantially linked to autonomous motivation and anxiety for dental treatment, which are relatively strongly associated with dental attendance and avoiding dental clinic appointments, respectively.     

Social influence, marriage, and the heart: cardiovascular consequences of interpersonal control in husbands and wives.

Human and experimental animal research suggests that social stress in general--and chronic, effortful attempts to exert social control in particular--may contribute to cardiovascular disease. We examined the effects of exerting social influence or control on cardiovascular responses in married couples. Compared to husbands discussing a problem with their wives, husbands attempting to influence or persuade their wives displayed larger increases in systolic blood pressure (SBP) before and during the discussion. Furthermore, these physiological effects were accompanied by increases in anger and a more hostile and coldly assertive interpersonal style. Although wives who engaged in social influence attempts displayed generally similar behavior, they did not show the elevated SBP response or anger. We discuss the results in terms of the social context of cardiovascular reactivity and potential marital factors in cardiovascular health.     

Cognitive slowing in decision tasks in early and advanced Parkinson's disease.

Ten untreated patients with recently diagnosed Parkinson's disease (PD), 9 treated patients with more advanced pathology, and 17 matched normal controls were investigated with three reaction tasks with increasing cognitive load but identical motor requirements: simple reaction, choice reaction with indicative stimuli, and choice reaction with ambiguous stimuli. Times required until a home key was released (= reaction time) and from then until a response key was pressed (= movement time) were recorded. Estimates of pure decision time (overall response time minus movement time in a simple reaction time task) revealed a difference between advanced and early PD patients. Advanced PD patients showed an overall slowing of decision time in the reaction time tasks, but the effect of the cognitive load of the tasks on the decision time was comparable to a control group. The untreated early PD patients performed quite normally in the more simple decision tasks but showed a disproportionate slowing of decision time in tasks with higher cognitive load.     

HOW TO TALK TO YOURSELF OR KRIPKE's WITTGENSTEIN's SOLITARY LANGUAGE ARGUMENT AND WHY IT FAILS

Abstract: In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Kripke's Wittgenstein argues that it is possible for individuals in communities to speak a language and otherwise follow rules, but impossible for a single, conceptually isolated individual to do so. I show that the roots of the argument lie in his general account of the legitimacy of practices, and that he actually argues for two distinct conclusions: (a) solitary individuals cannot have useful practices of rule‐following and (b) solitary individuals cannot place substantive restrictions on their own behavior. I show that if it is, in fact, possible for individuals in communities to use language and follow rules, then both of Kripke's Wittgenstein's anti‐solitary language arguments fails; and, furthermore, that his general account not only fails to exclude the possibility of solitary language‐use and rule‐following, it actually guarantees their possibility.