COMPOSITION AS A SECONDARY QUALITY

Abstract: The ‘special composition question’ is this: given objects O₁, . . . , O_n, under what conditions is there an object O, such that O₁, . . . , O_n compose O? This paper explores a heterodox answer to this question, one that casts composition as a secondary quality. According to the approach I want to consider, there is an O that O₁, . . . , O_n compose (roughly) just in case a normal intuiter would, under normal conditions, intuit that there is.     

Naturalizing Subjective Character

When I have a conscious experience of the sky, there is a bluish way it is like for me to have that experience. We may distinguish two aspects of this “bluish way it is like for me”: (i) the bluish aspect and (ii) the for‐me aspect. Let us call the bluish aspect of the experience its qualitative character and the for‐me aspect its subjective character. What is this elusive for‐me‐ness, or subjective character, of conscious experience? In this paper, I examine six different attempts to account for subjective character in terms of the functional and representational properties of conscious experiences. After arguing against the first five, I defend the sixth.     

Consciousness and the Moral Permissibility of Infanticide1

abstract In this paper, we present a conditional argument for the moral permissibility of some kinds of infanticide. The argument is based on a certain view of consciousness and the claim that there is an intimate connection between consciousness and infanticide. In bare outline, the argument is this: it is impermissible to intentionally kill a creature only if the creature is conscious; it is reasonable to believe that there is some time at which human infants are not conscious; therefore, it is reasonable to believe that it is permissible to intentionally kill some human infants.