Observing one's hand become anarchic: an fMRI study of action identification

The self seems to be a unitary entity remaining stable across time. Nevertheless, current theorizing conceptualizes the self as a number of interacting sub-systems involving perception, intention and action (self-model). One important function of such a self-model is to distinguish between events occurring as a result of one’s own actions and events occurring as the result of somebody else’s actions. We conducted an fMRI experiment that compared brain activation after an abrupt mismatch between one’s own movement and its visual consequences with an abrupt mismatch between one’s own movement and somebody else’s visually perceived hand movement. A right fronto-parietal network was selectively active during a sudden mismatch between one’s own observed and performed hand action.     

The specificity of learned parallelism in dual-memory retrieval

Retrieval of two responses from one visually presented cue occurs sequentially at the outset of dual-retrieval practice. Exclusively for subjects who adopt a mode of grouping (i.e., synchronizing) their response execution, however, reaction times after dual-retrieval practice indicate a shift to learned retrieval parallelism (e.g., Nino & Rickard, in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 29, 373–388, 2003). In the present study, we investigated how this learned parallelism is achieved and why it appears to occur only for subjects who group their responses. Two main accounts were considered: a task-level versus a cue-level account. The task-level account assumes that learned retrieval parallelism occurs at the level of the task as a whole and is not limited to practiced cues. Grouping response execution may thus promote a general shift to parallel retrieval following practice. The cue-level account states that learned retrieval parallelism is specific to practiced cues. This type of parallelism may result from cue-specific response chunking that occurs uniquely as a consequence of grouped response execution. The results of two experiments favored the second account and were best interpreted in terms of a structural bottleneck model.     

On methodological standards in training and transfer experiments

The past two decades have seen a tremendous surge in scientific interest in the extent to which certain types of training—be it aerobic, athletic, musical, video game, or brain trainer—can result in general enhancements in cognitive function. While there are certainly active debates regarding the results in these domains, what is perhaps more pressing is the fact that key aspects of methodology remain unsettled. Here we discuss a few of these areas including expectation effects, test–retest effects, the size of the cognitive test battery, the selection of control groups, group assignment methods, difficulties in comparing results across studies, and in interpreting null results. Specifically, our goal is to highlight points of contention as well as areas where the most commonly utilized methods could be improved upon. Furthermore, because each of the sub-areas above (aerobic training through brain training) share strong similarities in goal, theoretical framework, and experimental approach, we seek to discuss these issues from a general perspective that considers each as members of the same broad “training” domain.     

Motivational and cognitive determinants of control during conflict processing

Previous studies suggest that both reward anticipation and expected or experienced conflicts activate cognitive control. The present study investigated how these factors interact during conflict processing. In two experiments, participants performed a variant of the Stroop task, receiving performance-dependent monetary rewards in some blocks. In addition, we manipulated the level of conflict-triggered reactive and expectancy-driven proactive control: In Experiment 1, we compared the Stroop effect after previously congruent and incongruent trials to examine the conflict adaptation effect (reactive control). We found that the level of motivation did not interact with conflict adaptation. In Experiment 2, we varied the proportion of congruent and incongruent trials to manipulate conflict expectancy (proactive control). The data suggest the effects of motivation to be less pronounced under conditions of high conflict expectancy. We conclude that the interaction of motivation with cognitive determinants of control depends on whether these activate proactive or reactive control processes.     

The precuneus and the insula in self-attributional processes

Attributions are constantly assigned in everyday life. A well-known phenomenon is the self-serving bias: that is, people’s tendency to attribute positive events to internal causes (themselves) and negative events to external causes (other persons/circumstances). Here, we investigated the neural correlates of the cognitive processes implicated in self-serving attributions using social situations that differed in their emotional saliences. We administered an attributional bias task during fMRI scanning in a large sample of healthy subjects (n = 71). Eighty sentences describing positive or negative social situations were presented, and subjects decided via buttonpress whether the situation had been caused by themselves or by the other person involved. Comparing positive with negative sentences revealed activations of the bilateral posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). Self-attribution correlated with activation of the posterior portion of the precuneus. However, self-attributed positive versus negative sentences showed activation of the anterior portion of the precuneus, and self-attributed negative versus positive sentences demonstrated activation of the bilateral insular cortex. All significant activations were reported with a statistical threshold of p ≤ .001, uncorrected. In addition, a comparison of our fMRI task with data from the Internal, Personal and Situational Attributions Questionnaire, Revised German Version, demonstrated convergent validity. Our findings suggest that the precuneus and the PCC are involved in the evaluation of social events with particular regional specificities: The PCC is activated during emotional evaluation, the posterior precuneus during attributional evaluation, and the anterior precuneus during self-serving processes. Furthermore, we assume that insula activation is a correlate of awareness of personal agency in negative situations.     

Effects of extensive dual-task practice on processing stages in simultaneous choice tasks

Schumacher et al. Psychological Science 12:101–108, (2001) demonstrated the elimination of most dual-task costs (“perfect time-sharing”) after extensive dual-task practice of a visual and an auditory task in combination. For the present research, we used a transfer methodology to examine this practice effect in more detail, asking what task-processing stages were sped up by this dual-task practice. Such research will be essential to specify mechanisms associated with the practice-related elimination of dual-task costs. In three experiments, we introduced postpractice transfer probes focusing on the perception, central response-selection, and final motor-response stages. The results indicated that the major change achieved by dual-task practice was a speed-up in the central response-selection stages of both tasks. Additionally, perceptual-stage shortening of the auditory task was found to contribute to the improvements in time-sharing. For a better understanding of such time-sharing, we discuss the contributions of the present findings in relation to models of practiced dual-task performance.     

Laterality in metaphor processing: lack of evidence from functional magnetic resonance imaging for the right hemisphere theory

We investigated processing of metaphoric sentences using event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Seventeen healthy subjects (6 female, 11 male) read 60 novel short German sentence pairs with either metaphoric or literal meaning and performed two different tasks: judging the metaphoric content and judging whether the sentence has a positive or negative connotation. Laterality indices for 8 regions of interest were calculated: Inferior frontal gyrus (opercular part and triangular part), superior, middle, and inferior temporal gyrus, precuneus, temporal pole, and hippocampus. A left lateralised network was activated with no significant differences in laterality between the two tasks. The lowest degree of laterality was found in the temporal pole. Other factors than metaphoricity per se might trigger right hemisphere recruitment. Results are discussed in the context of lesion and hemifield studies.     

Elevation in Response to Entertainment Portrayals of Moral Virtue

Media psychologists have long puzzled over how individuals can experience enjoyment from entertainment such as tragedies that often elicit profound feelings of sadness. The present research examines the idea that a focus on “meaningful” entertainment and affective responses identified as “elevation” may provide a framework for understanding many examples of sad or dramatic entertainment. The results of this study suggest that many types of meaningful cinematic entertainment feature portrayals of moral virtues (e.g., altruism). These portrayals, in turn, elicit feelings of elevation (e.g., inspiration) that are signified in terms of mixed affect and unique physical responses (e.g., lump in throat). Ultimately, elevation also gives rise to motivations to embody moral virtues, such as being a better person or helping others.     

Processing order in dual-task situations: The “first-come,first-served” principle and the impact of task order instructions

When two overlapping tasks are processed, they hit a bottleneck at a central processing stage that prevents simultaneous processing of the two tasks. Thus far, however, the factors determining the processing order of the tasks at the bottleneck are unknown. The present study was designed to (re)investigate whether the arrival times of the two tasks at the central bottleneck are a key determinant of the processing order (cf. Sigman & Dehaene, 2006). To this end, we implemented a visual–auditory dual task with a random stimulus order, in which we manipulated arrival time by prolonging the initial, perceptual processing stage (stimulus analysis) of the visual task and compared the effects of this manipulation with those of one impacting the central bottleneck stage of the visual task. Additionally, we implemented two instruction conditions: Participants were told to respond either in the order of stimulus presentation or in the order they preferred. The manipulation of the visual perception stage led to an increase in task response reversals (i.e., the response order was different from the order of stimulus presentation), whereas there was no such increase when the bottleneck stage was manipulated. This pattern provides conclusive evidence that the processing order at the bottleneck is (at least in part) determined by the arrival times of the tasks at that point. Reaction time differences between the two instruction conditions indicated that additional control processes are engaged in determining task processing order when the participants are expressly told to respond in the order of stimulus presentation.     

Deceiving oneself about being in control: conscious detection of changes in visuomotor coupling

Previous research has demonstrated that compensatory movements for changes in visuomotor coupling often are not consciously detected. But what factors affect the conscious detection of such changes? This issue was addressed in 4 experiments. Participants carried out a drawing task in which the relative velocity between the actual movement and its visual consequences was perturbed. Unconscious compensatory movements and conscious detection rates were simultaneously recorded. There was an invariant relationship between the extent of the change and its conscious detection that was proportional to the initial drawing velocity. This suggests that conscious change detection relies on a system that integrates visual and motor information-as, for instance, suggested by the internal model theory of motor control. Figural discrepancies increased the detection rates, indicating that additional cues for the what system facilitate conscious change detection.