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TORBJÖRN TÄNNSJÖ 《Journal of Happiness Studies》2007,8(1):79-98
Narrow hedonism is defined and defended, as a view according to which pleasurable states are individuated as concrete and
total experiential situations of a sentient being at a time. Typical of such situations is that, when we are in them, we are
at a certain hedonic level. They feel in a certain way for the creature in them. On this understanding of narrow hedonism,
which is the only one making good sense of the theory and which was probably also intended by classical hedonists such as
Bentham and Edgeworth, standard objections to hedonism, based on the claim that different pleasures have nothing in common,
can be set to one side as misplaced and irrelevant. It is also hard to see how this kind of hedonism can be refined, or revised,
in the direction indicated by J.S. Mill, when he wants to distinguish “higher” pleasures from “lower” ones. On this understanding
of hedonism, we must claim that, those who want to follow Mill will have to rely on non-hedonistic intuitions and thus desert
the hedonist camp altogether. 相似文献
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