Neonatal seizures: early-onset seizure syndromes and their consequences for development

The determination of the developmental consequences of seizure syndromes in the neonate is based upon a number of factors which include: understanding of the clinical and electroencephalographic (EEG) features of neonatal seizures; current theories of the mechanisms by which neonatal seizures are generated; a current classification of neonatal seizures; potential etiologic and risk factors for seizures; and therapies. In addition, different seizure types, mechanisms of generation and etiologies of cerebral dysfunction may vary with conceptional age of the infant. There are a few distinct neonatal epileptic syndromes, which are rare, have been well described: benign neonatal convulsions; benign neonatal familial convulsions; early myoclonic encephalopathy and early infantile epileptic encephalopathy. The prognosis for the first two is relatively good while the outcome for the other two with encephalopathy is catastrophic. However, the majority of neonatal seizures occur as acute, reactive events in association with a wide range of etiologic factors. These etiologic factors, as well as those of the more traditionally defined syndromes, are the main determinants of eventual developmental outcome of neonates who experience seizures. Although experimental data suggests that some epileptic seizures eventually may have physiological, histological, metabolic, or behavioral consequences, there is yet direct evidence in humans to suggest that the occurrence of seizures themselves in the neonate is the main determinant of long-term outcome.     

Idealizations and scientific understanding

In this paper, I propose that the debate in epistemology concerning the nature and value of understanding can shed light on the role of scientific idealizations in producing scientific understanding. In philosophy of science, the received view seems to be that understanding is a species of knowledge. On this view, understanding is factive just as knowledge is, i.e., if S knows that p, then p is true. Epistemologists, however, distinguish between different kinds of understanding. Among epistemologists, there are those who think that a certain kind of understanding??objectual understanding??is not factive, and those who think that objectual understanding is quasi-factive. Those who think that understanding is not factive argue that scientific idealizations constitute cognitive success, which we then consider as instances of understanding, and yet they are not true. This paper is an attempt to draw lessons from this debate as they pertain to the role of idealizations in producing scientific understanding. I argue that scientific understanding is quasi-factive.     

Does ‘Ought’ Imply ‘Can’ from an Epistemic Point of View?

In this paper, I argue that the ??Ought Implies Can?? (OIC) principle, as it is employed in epistemology, particularly in the literature on epistemic norms, is open to counterexamples. I present a counterexample to OIC and discuss several objections to it. If this counterexample works, then it shows that it is possible that S ought to believe that p, even though S cannot believe that p. If this is correct, then OIC, considered from an epistemic point of view, is false, since it is supposed to hold for any S and any p.     

Does Conceivability Entail Metaphysical Possibility?

In this paper, we argue that ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’, which is the view that ideal primary positive conceivability entails primary metaphysical possibility, is self‐defeating. To this end, we outline two reductio arguments against ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’. The first reductio shows that, from supposing that ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’ is true, it follows that conceivability both is and is not conclusive evidence for possibility. The second reductio shows that, from supposing that ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’ is true, it follows that it is possible that ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’ is necessarily false, and hence that ‘Weak Modal Rationalism’ is false. We then argue that adopting a weaker position according to which conceivability is merely prima facie evidence for possibility provides limited protection from our criticism of conceivability arguments. 1     

Three Arguments Against the Expertise Defense

Experimental philosophers have challenged friends of the expertise defense to show that (a) the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are different from the intuitive judgments of nonphilosophers, and (b) the intuitive judgments of professional philosophers are better than the intuitive judgments of nonphilosophers, in ways that are relevant to the truth or falsity of such judgments. Friends of the expertise defense have responded by arguing that the burden of proof lies with experimental philosophers. This article sketches three arguments which show that both (a) and (b) are probably false. If its arguments are cogent, then shifting the burden of proof is a futile move, since philosophical training makes no difference so far as making intuitive judgments in response to hypothetical cases is concerned.     

The Argument from Underconsideration and Relative Realism

In this article, through a critical examination of K. Brad Wray's version of the argument from underconsideration against scientific realism, I articulate a modest version of scientific realism. This modest realist position, which I call ‘relative realism’, preserves the scientific realist's optimism about science's ability to get closer to the truth while, at the same time, taking on board the antirealist's premise that theory evaluation is comparative, and thus that there are no good reasons to think that science's best theories are close to the truth.     

Show Me the Argument: Empirically Testing the Armchair Philosophy Picture

Many philosophers subscribe to the view that philosophy is a priori and in the business of discovering necessary truths from the armchair. This paper sets out to empirically test this picture. If this were the case, we would expect to see this reflected in philosophical practice. In particular, we would expect philosophers to advance mostly deductive, rather than inductive, arguments. The paper shows that the percentage of philosophy articles advancing deductive arguments is higher than those advancing inductive arguments, which is what we would expect from the vantage point of the armchair philosophy picture. The results also show, however, that the percentages of articles advancing deductive arguments and those advancing inductive arguments are converging over time and that the difference between inductive and deductive ratios is declining over time. This trend suggests that deductive arguments are gradually losing their status as the dominant form of argumentation in philosophy.     

Forecasting “friends forever”: A longitudinal investigation of sustained closeness between best friends

Using data collected across 19 years, the chief goal of this study was to discover predictors of continued relational closeness between best friends. Participants were same‐sex and cross‐sex best friend pairs recruited from a small Midwestern college. In 1983, participants completed several tests and activities designed to assess facets of intimacy, with follow‐up studies in 1987 and 2002 measuring relational closeness. Regression analysis indicates that both manifest similarity and months of closeness in 1983 are associated with relational closeness in 2002. These results suggest that the investment of resources in the friendship and similarity between friends facilitate friendship longevity and that Kelley et al.’s (1983) conceptualization of closeness as related to interdependence is empirically robust.     

The History of Science as a Graveyard of Theories: A Philosophers’ Myth?

According to the antirealist argument known as the pessimistic induction, the history of science is a graveyard of dead scientific theories and abandoned theoretical posits. Support for this pessimistic picture of the history of science usually comes from a few case histories, such as the demise of the phlogiston theory and the abandonment of caloric as the substance of heat. In this article, I wish to take a new approach to examining the ‘history of science as a graveyard of theories’ picture. Using JSTOR Data for Research and Springer Exemplar, I present new lines of evidence that are at odds with this pessimistic picture of the history of science. When rigorously tested against the historical record of science, I submit, the pessimistic picture of the history of science as a graveyard of dead theories and abandoned posits may turn out to be no more than a philosophers’ myth.