The impact of stereotype-incongruent information on perceived group variability and stereotype change

Three experiments showed increases in the perceived variability of social groups after perceivers received stereotype-incongruent information about group members. In Experiment 1, participants generated flatter distributions after exposure to incongruent information, compared with equally deviant congruent information, in the form of typical verbal materials. Experiment 2 indicated similar changes in dispersion after the presentation of numeric information about a single group member. In Experiment 3, the authors manipulated cognitive load at encoding or at the time group judgments were requested. Under conditions of cognitive constraint, stereotype-incongruent information ceased to promote more dispersed group representations. These results are consistent with the idea that incongruent information triggers more deliberative and comprehensive retrieval and generation of exemplars. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for stereotype change.     

Enhancing the comparability between part-list cueing and collaborative recall: a gradual part-list cueing paradigm

The effects of part-list cueing and of collaborative recall in memory performance have been recently addressed as parallel phenomena. Notably they both impair recall (and boost frequency estimates) and they have been explained by the same underlying mechanisms. However, the comparability between the two paradigms is hindered by a number of procedural differences. The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of a new paradigm that makes standard part-list cueing and collaborative recall more comparable. In our study we compared free recall and frequency estimates of participants in a non-cueing condition with the same performance in a standard part-list cueing condition and in a condition in which part-list cues were gradually presented during recall (as it occurs in collaborative recall). Results indicate that the effects of part-list cueing continued to be reliable in both cueing conditions. Namely, recall was impaired and frequency estimates were boosted relatively to a non-cueing condition. The results obtained with this new method that enhances the direct comparability of the two paradigms provide further evidence for the parallel between the two effects.     

The future is now: the impact of present fluency in judgments about the future

Recent research has emphasised the role of episodic memory in both remembering past events and in envisaging future events. On the other hand, it has been repeatedly shown that judgments about past events are affected by the fluency with which retrieval cues are processed. In this paper we investigate whether perceptual fluency also plays a role in judgments about future events. For this purpose we conducted four experiments. The first experiment replicated recent findings showing that stimuli that are processed fluently tend to be wrongly recognised as having been encountered in the past outside the laboratory walls [Brown, A. S., & Marsh, E. J. (2009). Creating illusions of past encounter through brief exposure. Psychological Science, 20, 534–538. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02337.x]. Two follow-up experiments using Brown and Marsh’s [(2009). Creating illusions of past encounter through brief exposure. Psychological Science, 20, 534–538. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02337] task tested the influence of perceptual fluency on future judgments. The fourth and last experiment was designed to rule out a potential confounding factor in the two previous experiments. Across experiments, we found that people rely on fluency when making judgments about events that are yet to come. These results suggest that fluency is an equally valid cue for past and future judgments.     

Adapting to test structure: Letting testing teach what to learn

We propose that we encode and store information as a function of the particular ways we have used similar information in the past. More specifically, we contend that the experience of retrieval can serve as a powerful cue to the most effective ways to encode similar information in comparable future learning episodes. To explore these ideas, we did two studies in which all participants went through study–test cycles of single category lists while we manipulated the nature of the recognition tests. The recognition tests either included only same-category lures or only different-category lures. The experience of repeated testing leads participants to avoid conceptual-based strategies but only when conceptual knowledge was poorly diagnostic for recognition (i.e., in the same-category lures condition). In a second study with a similar manipulation, we showed that repeated testing with lures from the same category as study items improved performance in a final recall surprise test compared to conditions in which different-category lures were used. Such a difference is akin to the one obtained when encoding instructions focus on distinctive item features compared to cases in which the focus is on relational processing. We suggest that testing requirements lead to adaptive changes at encoding.     

Dominance and competence face to face: Dissociations obtained with a reverse correlation approach

The article explores whether the traits representing the dimensions underlying the structure of facial and non-facial impressions are similarly mapped in the face space. Two studies examine whether the trustworthiness-by-dominance and the warmth-by-competence two-dimensional models overlap in face perception. In Study 1 (N = 200), we used a reverse-correlation task to obtain classification images (CIs) reflecting how each dimension is mapped onto a face. Results show that the similarity between CIs was higher between warmth and trustworthiness than between competence and dominance. In Study 2 (N = 31) the evaluations of each CI on each social dimension show a higher dissociation between dominance and competence than between trustworthiness and warmth. These results, obtained at both perceptual and judgment levels, suggest that there is only a partial correspondence between the two models that seems to be driven by the relationship that the competence and dominance dimensions establish with valence.     

“To‐be‐forgotten” statements become less true: Memory processes involved in selection and forgetting lead to truthfulness changes of ambiguous sentences

What happens when people try to forget something? What are the consequences of instructing people to intentionally forget a sentence? Recent studies employing the item‐method directed forgetting paradigm have shown that to‐be‐forgotten (TBF) items are, in a subsequent task, emotionally devaluated relative to to‐be‐remembered (TBR) items, an aftereffect of memory selection (Vivas, Marful, Panagiotidou & Bajo, 2016). As such, distractor devaluation by attentional selection generalizes to memory selection. In this study, we use the item‐method directed forgetting paradigm to test the effects of memory selection and inhibition on truth judgments of ambiguous sentences. We expected the relative standing of an item in the task (i.e., whether it was instructed to be remembered or forgotten) to affect the truthfulness value of that item, making TBF items less valid/truthful than TBR items. As predicted, ambiguous sentences associated with a “Forget” cue were subsequently judged as less true than sentences associated with a “Remember” cue, suggesting that instructions to intentionally forget a statement can produce changes in the validity/truthfulness of that statement. To our knowledge, this is the first study to show an influence of memory processes involved in selection and forgetting on the perceived truthfulness of sentences.     

Familiarity can increase stereotyping

Two experiments show that repeated exposure to information about a target person reduces individuation and thereby increases stereotyping of the target person based on social group memberships. The effect is not due to familiarity-induced liking (the mere exposure effect), nor is it mediated by increased accessibility of the target’s social category, nor by increases in perceived social judgeability. The results are most consistent with the use of feelings of familiarity as a regulator of processing mode, such that familiar objects receive less systematic or analytic processing. In everyday life, frequent exposure to another person ordinarily produces not only familiarity but also liking, individuated knowledge, and friendship, factors that may effectively limit stereotyping. But when previous exposure is unconfounded from these other factors, its effect can be to increase stereotyping.     

Positivity can cue familiarity

Given that familiarity is closely associated with positivity, the authors sought evidence for the idea that positivity would increase perceived familiarity. In Experiment 1, smiling and thus positively perceived novel faces were significantly more likely to be incorrectly judged as familiar than novel faces with neutral expressions. In Experiment 2, subliminal association with positive affect (a positively valenced prime) led to false recognition of novel words as familiar. In Experiment 3, validity judgments, known to be influenced by familiarity, were more likely to occur if participants were in happy mood states than neutral mood states. Despite their different paradigms and approaches, the results of these three studies converge on the idea that, at least under certain circumstances, the experience of positivity itself can signal familiarity, perhaps because the experience of familiarity is typically positive.