Childhood Characteristics of Adolescent Inpatients with Early-Onset and Adolescent-Onset Disruptive Behavior

Childhood characteristics are associated with life-course-persistent antisocial behavior in epidemiological studies in general population samples. The present study examines this association in an inpatient sample. The purpose is to identify easily measurable childhood characteristics that may guide choice of treatment for adolescent psychiatric inpatients with severe disruptive behavior. Patients (N?=?203) were divided into two groups with either early-onset (EO) or adolescent-onset (AO) disruptive behavior, based on ages at which professional care was used for disruptive behavior, referral to special education, and criminal offences. Both groups differed on several childhood characteristics. No gender differences in these characteristics were found. Logistic regression analysis indicated that individuals with grade retention in primary school, childhood impulsive behavior, and a history of physical abuse, had the highest probability of being member of the EO group. These characteristics are reasonably easy to identify, likely apply to other clinical samples as well, and may help clinicians to target their treatment.     

WISC-R subtest but no overall VIQ-PIQ difference in Dutch children with PDD-NOS

VIQ-PIQ differences have been studied in children with autism and Asperger syndrome but have not been studied in a separate group of children with PDD-NO, although, PDD-NOS has a much higher prevalence rate than autism and deficits in communication and social interaction are severe. The Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised (WISC-R) was administered to 100 children, aged 6-12 years, with PDD-NOS (n = 76), autism (n = 13), and Asperger syndrome (n = 11). PDD-NOS was diagnosed using explicit research criteria. No overall differences between VIQ and PIQ were found in PDD-NOS and autism. Peaks in the subtest scores on Information, Similarities, Picture Arrangement, and Mazes, and troughs in the subtest scores on Comprehension, Digit Span, and Coding were demonstrated in children with PDD-NOS. Their score on the Freedom from Distractibility factor was lower than the scores on the Verbal Comprehension factor and the Perceptual Organization factor. Children with PDD-NOS seemed to have a similar VIQ-PIQ profile as children with autism, and on the subtest level children with PDD-NOS showed some similarities to children with Asperger syndrome or autism. It was not possible to distinguish PDD-NOS from autism or Asperger syndrome by using IQ scores.     

WISC-R Subtest But No Overall VIQ–PIQ Difference in Dutch Children with PDD-NOS

VIQ–PIQ differences have been studied in children with autism and Asperger syndrome but have not been studied in a separate group of children with PDD-NO, although, PDD-NOS has a much higher prevalence rate than autism and deficits in communication and social interaction are severe. The Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Revised (WISC-R) was administered to 100 children, aged 6–12 years, with PDD-NOS (n = 76), autism (n = 13), and Asperger syndrome (n = 11). PDD-NOS was diagnosed using explicit research criteria. No overall differences between VIQ and PIQ were found in PDD-NOS and autism. Peaks in the subtest scores on Information, Similarities, Picture Arrangement, and Mazes, and troughs in the subtest scores on Comprehension, Digit Span, and Coding were demonstrated in children with PDD-NOS. Their score on the Freedom from Distractibility factor was lower than the scores on the Verbal Comprehension factor and the Perceptual Organization factor. Children with PDD-NOS seemed to have a similar VIQ–PIQ profile as children with autism, and on the subtest level children with PDD-NOS showed some similarities to children with Asperger syndrome or autism. It was not possible to distinguish PDD-NOS from autism or Asperger syndrome by using IQ scores.     

Solving a Murder Case by Asking Critical Questions: An Approach to Fact-Finding in Terms of Argumentation and Story Schemes

In this paper, we look at reasoning with evidence and facts in criminal cases. We show how this reasoning may be analysed in a dialectical way by means of critical questions that point to typical sources of doubt. We discuss critical questions about the evidential arguments adduced, about the narrative accounts of the facts considered, and about the way in which the arguments and narratives are connected in an analysis. Our treatment shows how two different types of knowledge, represented as schemes, play a role in reasoning with evidence: argumentation schemes and story schemes.