Eye movements disrupt spatial but not visual mental imagery

It has long been known that eye movements are functionally involved in the generation and maintenance of mental images. Indeed, a number of studies demonstrated that voluntary eye movements interfere with mental imagery tasks (e.g., Laeng and Teodorescu in Cogn Sci 26:207–231, 2002). However, mental imagery is conceived as a multifarious cognitive function with at least two components, a spatial component and a visual component. The present study investigated the question of whether eye movements disrupt mental imagery in general or only its spatial component. We present data on healthy young adults, who performed visual and spatial imagery tasks concurrently with a smooth pursuit. In line with previous literature, results revealed that eye movements had a strong disruptive effect on spatial imagery. Moreover, we crucially demonstrated that eye movements had no disruptive effect when participants visualized the depictive aspects of an object. Therefore, we suggest that eye movements serve to a greater extent the spatial than the visual component of mental imagery.     

The grim reasoner: Analytical reasoning under mortality salience

The human species enjoys uniquely developed capacities for analytical reasoning and rational decision making, but these capacities come with a price: They make us aware of our inevitable physical death. Drawing on terror management theory and dual-process theories of cognition, we investigate the impact of mortality awareness on analytical reasoning. Two experiments show that experimentally induced thoughts of death impair analytical reasoning performance, just as cognitive load would. When made aware of their own mortality, reasoners allocate their executive resources to the suppression of this disturbing thought, therefore impairing their performance on syllogisms that require analytic thought. This finding has consequences for all aspects of rational thinking that draw on executive resources, and calls for an integrated approach to existential psychology and the psychology of rational thought.     

“值”在中国人的假设思维中的角色

先前的研究表明, 东西方在假设思维上不存在差异, 或者只是存在于特殊范围内(domain-specific)。本文在中国人的“值”的概念基础上界定一个存在于东西方的假设思维上的新差异。实验1显示了在假设思维概念里, 中国人的“值”是由决策理由的大小和后果的严重程度大小决定的, 同时“值”被证实是中国人假设思维的中介变量。实验2比较了中、法两国被试的假设思维, 结果再次证明了中国被试的假设思维是由“值”概念决定, 相比而言法国被试是由“成本－收益”概念决定的。     

教条悖论：行为心理学家的新挑战

在各种专业或私人情境中, 人们经常需要整合不同的意见来判断某一观点的对错。当观点的形式类似于将多个论点组合而成的逻辑公式(使用“且”、“或”等逻辑连接词)时, 容易产生教条悖论(doctrinal paradox)。即, 虽然整体意见支持该观点是正确的(或错误的), 但是分析这些整体意见中所包含的各个论点, 却会得到相反的结论。教条悖论是判断整合研究中关注的重要问题, 已在各科学领域引发大量的规范性研究。行为心理学家需在这个重要问题上开展系统研究。本文简要介绍了教条悖论及其过往研究, 总结已有的行为数据, 并指出未来行为研究的方向和视角。     

关于实验心理学中推理的现代心理测量方法(英文)

推理测验与推理实验不同。推理测验用来衡量智商;而推理实验则用来研究推理的心理过程。测验旨在找出能力的个体差异;而实验则意在突出所有个体的一般性心理过程。近年来,心理学中的推理已经发生了变化,我们在理论进化方面简要地总结了如下这些变化:关注点从推理任务中的反应过程变为个体对不同任务做反应时的差异和其中稳定的反应模式,开始考虑不同推理者的组织差异和数量差异(犹如不同游泳运动员的游泳动作和肌肉数量)。然而,这些理论创新必须有精确的建模技术的支持。我们将以条件推理材料为例,展示了现代心理测量方法可以帮我们解决理论创新中产生的三类主要的研究问题。     

Utilitarian relevance and face management in the interpretation of ambiguous question/request statements

Often, requests are made in an indirect manner and phrased in such a way that they can also be construed as questions. For example, the sentence “Is there any coffee left?” can be construed either as a question about coffee or as a request for coffee. This article offers a combined test of some key predictions of two approaches to the disambiguation of question/request statements: (1) the face management approach, which gives a prominent role to variables such as status and potential loss of face; and (2) the utilitarian relevance approach, which gives a prominent role to the goals pursued by the speaker at the time he or she issues the statement. Ambiguous question/request statements provide a natural test bed for the latter approach in particular. A board game paradigm is developed to allow for a clean, orthogonal manipulation of all variables. The results wholly support the utilitarian relevance approach and offer new perspectives on the face management approach.     

When some is actually all: Scalar inferences in face-threatening contexts

Accounts of the scalar inference from ‘some X-ed’ to ‘not all X-ed’ are central to the debate between contemporary theories of conversational pragmatics. An important contribution to this debate is to identify contexts that decrease the endorsement rate of the inference. We suggest that the inference is endorsed less often in face-threatening contexts, i.e., when X implies a loss of face for the listener. This claim is successfully tested in Experiment 1. Experiment 2 rules out a possible confound between face-threatening contexts and lower-bound contexts. Experiment 3 shows that whilst saying ‘some X-ed’ when one knew for a fact that all X-ed is always perceived as an underinformative utterance, it is also seen as a nice and polite thing to do when X threatens the face of the listener. These findings are considered from the perspective of Relevance Theory as well as that of the Generalized Conversational Inference approach.     

Anxiety-induced miscalculations,more than differential inhibition of intuition,explain the gender gap in cognitive reflection

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is among the most common and well-known instruments for measuring the propensity to engage reflective processing, in the context of the dual-process theory of high-level cognition. There is robust evidence that men perform better than women on this test—but we should be wary to conclude that men are more likely to engage in reflective processing than women. We consider several possible loci for the gender difference in CRT performance, and use mathematical modeling to show, across two studies, that the gender difference in CRT performance is more likely due to women making more mathematical mistakes (partially explained by their greater mathematics anxiety) than due to women being less likely to engage reflective processing. As a result, we argue that we need to use gender-equivalent variants of the CRT, both to improve the quality of our instruments and to fulfill our social responsibility as scientists.     

Consequential conditionals: invited and suppressed inferences from valued outcomes

Consequential conditionals are defined as "if P then Q" statements, where P is an action, and Q a predicted outcome of this action, which is either desirable or undesirable to the agent. Experiment 1 shows that desirable (viz. undesirable) outcomes invite an inference to the truth (viz. falsity) of their antecedent. Experiment 2 shows that the more extreme the outcome is, the stronger the invited inference is. Experiment 3 shows that modus ponens from premises "If A then C, A" can be suppressed with the introduction of a consequential conditional, "If C then Q," where Q is an undesirable outcome. Experiment 4 shows that the more undesirable Q is, the larger the suppression is. The authors discuss how these results can enrich current approaches of conditional inference on the basis of mental models, complementary necessary conditions, and conditional probabilities.