Simultaneous conditioning in honeybees (Apis mellifera).

Honeybees (Apis mellifera) were classically conditioned with odor as conditioned stimulus (CS), sucrose as unconditioned stimulus (US), and proboscis extension as response. The purpose of Experiment 1 (Ns = 26 and 27) was to look for facilitation of forward conditioning by CS-US overlap, but rapid conditioning without overlap left little room for improvement. In 2 further experiments, CS and US were simultaneous, and response to odor alone was measured in subsequent tests. In Experiment 2, a Simultaneous group (N = 25) responded more to the training odor than did an Unpaired control group (N = 25). In Experiment 3, a differentially conditioned Simultaneous group (N = 29) responded more to an odor paired with sucrose in training (S+) than to an odor presented alone (S-). The implications of the results for the problem of the role of amount of reward in honeybee learning are considered.     

A simple infrared photocell device and its interface to an Apple computer

This paper describes a simple infrared photocell circuit that is inexpensive and easy to construct. The light source and detector are housed inexpensively and are focused so the light and detector may be separated over significant distances. The circuit may be used in a variety of conditions, including total darkness and bright fluorescent lighting, without having to readjust or recalibrate the circuitry. Output from the circuit may be used to drive other transistors or electromechanical relays. With minimal additional circuitry and hardware the signal may be interfaced with an Apple computer.     

Lithium-mediated disruptions of latent inhibition: Overshadowing by the unconditioned stimulus in flavor conditioning

In a series of experiments, the ability of a single lithium preexposure to disrupt CS effectiveness was assessed using a latent inhibition procedure. Lithium preexposure administered proximal (90 min) to a saccharin familiarization trial reduced latent inhibition whereas a similar administration more distal (360 min) to flavor familiarization failed to do so. Additional experiments demonstrated that this socalled “US overshadowing” effect was not attributable to sensitization (Experiment 2), excitatory backward conditioning (Experiment 3), or state dependency (Experiment 4). The implications of US overshadowing for proximal US-preexposure effects are discussed.     

Drug-preexposure effects in flavor-aversion learning: associative interference by conditioned environmental stimuli

Previous research has documented that exposure to a drug reduces the ability of the drug to support subsequent flavor-aversion learning. The four experiments reported here examined the hypothesis that this drug-preexposure effect is due to associative interference from environmental stimuli associated with the drug effects during preexposure. When distinctive environmental stimuli (confinement in a black compartment) were present during drug preexposure, these stimuli significantly disrupted subsequent flavor-aversion learning. Furthermore, flavor conditioning was not significantly disrupted when drug preexposure occurred in the absence of salient environmental stimuli or when the previously conditioned environmental stimuli were extinguished prior to flavor conditioning. It is significant, and in contrast to other published research, that flavor conditioning was not disrupted when the distinctive cues paired with the drug during preexposure were absent at the time of the flavor-drug pairing. These results are thus consistent with results from conventional studies of stimulus blocking and suggest that associative processes can play a major role in the drug-preexposure effect.     

"... As you would have them do unto you": Does imagining yourself in the other's place stimulate moral action?

Philosophers, psychologists, and religious teachers have suggested that imagining yourself in another's place will stimulate moral action. The authors tested this idea in two different situations. In Experiment 1, participants had the opportunity to assign themselves and another research participant to tasks, with one task clearly more desirable than the other. Imagining oneself in the other's place did little to increase the morality (fairness) of the decision. A different form of perspective taking, imagining the other's feelings, increased direct assignment of the other to the desirable task, apparently due to increased empathy. In Experiment 2, participants confronted a different decision: either accept an initial task assignment that would give them highly positive consequences and the other participant nothing or change the assignment so they and the other would each receive moderately positive consequences. In this situation, imagining oneself in the other's place did significantly increase moral action.     

Augmentation of taste conditioning by a preconditioned odor.

Five experiments explored facilitated taste-aversion conditioning (odor-mediated taste augmentation), using rats that experienced odor (A) and taste (X) in an A+/AX+ design. Augmentation occurred when the stimuli were presented simultaneously during AX+ conditioning, and significantly weaker conditioning occurred after a sequential presentation (Experiment 1). Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrated that augmented conditioning decreased if the odor aversion was reduced through preexposure or extinction following A+ conditioning. A second-order conditioning explanation was not supported by the results of Experiment 4. Experiment 5 showed that extinction of the odor aversion after AX+ conditioning did not alter the strength of the augmented taste aversion. Odor-mediated taste augmentation is similar to potentiation, in which odor and taste cues operate in a synergistic, not competitive, manner.     

Anger at unfairness: is it moral outrage?

Anger at unfair treatment has been called moral outrage. However, moral outrage—anger at the violation of a moral standard—should be distinguished from personal anger at being harmed and empathic anger at seeing another for whom one cares harmed. Across a preliminary experiment and a main experiment, both designed to manipulate the appraisal conditions for these three forms of anger, we found evidence of personal anger and empathic anger, but little evidence of moral outrage. Participants perceived unfair treatment of another, even another for whom they had not been induced to feel empathy, to be as unfair as participants perceived unfair treatment of themselves. But the appraisal conditions that evoked anger were unfair treatment of self and unfair treatment of a cared-for other, not unfairness per se. In the absence of empathic concern, unfair treatment of another evoked little anger. Possible implications for understanding moral emotion and moral motivation are suggested. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Multisensory perceptual learning reshapes both fast and slow mechanisms of crossmodal processing

Previous research has shown that sounds facilitate perception of visual patterns appearing immediately after the sound but impair perception of patterns appearing after some delay. Here we examined the spatial gradient of the fast crossmodal facilitation effect and the slow inhibition effect in order to test whether they reflect separate mechanisms. We found that crossmodal facilitation is only observed at visual field locations overlapping with the sound, whereas crossmodal inhibition affects the whole hemifield. Furthermore, we tested whether multisensory perceptual learning with misaligned audio-visual stimuli reshapes crossmodal facilitation and inhibition. We found that training shifts crossmodal facilitation towards the trained location without changing its range. By contrast, training narrows the range of inhibition without shifting its position. Our results suggest that crossmodal facilitation and inhibition reflect separate mechanisms that can both be reshaped by multisensory experience even in adult humans. Multisensory links seem to be more plastic than previously thought.     

Empathy‐induced altruism in a prisoner's dilemma II: what if the target of empathy has defected?

What if participants in a one‐trial prisoner's dilemma know before making their decision that the other person has already defected? From the perspective of classic game theory, a dilemma no longer exists. It is clearly in their best interest to defect too. The empathy‐altruism hypothesis predicts, however, that if they feel empathy for the other, then a dilemma remains: self‐interest counsels defection; empathy‐induced altruism counsels not. This motivational conflict should lead at least some empathically aroused individuals not to defect. To test this prediction, we placed 60 undergraduate women in a one‐trial prisoner's dilemma in which they knew the other had already defected. Among those not induced to feel empathy, very few (0.05) did not defect in return. Among those induced to feel empathy for the other, almost half (0.45) did not defect. These results underscore the power of empathy‐induced altruism to affect responses in a prisoner's dilemma. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.