Echoic memory processes in good and poor readers

Four experiments were conducted to determine whether echoic memory plays a role in differences between good and poor readers. The first two experiments used a suffix procedure in which the subject is read a list of digits with either a tone control or the word go appended to the list. For lists that exceeded the length of the subjects memory span by one digit (i.e., that avoided ceiling effects), the poor readers showed a larger decrement in the suffix condition than did the good readers. The third experiment was directed at the question of whether the duration of echoic memory is different for good and poor readers. Children shadowed words presented to one ear at a rate determined to give 75-85% shadowing accuracy. The items presented to the nonattended ear were words and an occasional digit. At various intervals after the presentation of the digit, a light signaled that the subject was to cease shadowing and attempt to recall any digit that had occurred in the nonattended ear recently. Whereas good and poor readers recalled the digit equally if tested immediately after presentation, the poor readers showed a faster decline in recall of the digit as retention interval increased. A fourth experiment was conducted to determine whether the differences in echoic memory were specific to speech stimuli or occurred at a more basic level of aural persistence. Bursts of white noise were separated by 9-400 ms of silence and the subject was to say whether there were one or two sounds presented. There were no differences in detectability functions for good and poor readers.     

Does inconsistency always lead to negative affect? The influence of need for closure on affective reactions to cognitive inconsistency

We present an experiment showing that need for closure (NFC)—defined as the epistemic desire for certainty—can moderate individuals' affective reactions to cognitive inconsistency. Informed by Kruglanski and colleagues' new theory, that cognitive inconsistency elicits negative affect particularly under certain circumstances, we find that NFC (i.e. the desire for certain, stable and unambiguous knowledge) influences the strength of consistency effects and resulting negative affect. More specifically, we find that individuals who are high on NFC experience more negative affect upon encountering an inconsistent (vs. consistent) cognition. However, when individuals are low on NFC, inconsistency is irrelevant, and their affect depends on whether the ultimate outcome of the cognition is positive or negative. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this research.