Resolving Disputes Over Frozen Embryos: A New Proposal

This paper proposes a principle for adjudicating conflicts between estranged couples over whether the frozen embryos they earlier created together ought to be gestated or destroyed. I argue that the fate of the embryos ought to be determined by the party who would be most harmed by having his or her preferences overruled. But I also claim that, when embryos are destroyed against the opposition of one of their co‐creators, the individual at whose behest this was done owes compensation to his disappointed opposite number, in an amount that reflects the harm accruing to the latter as a result of the termination of the procreative project.     

THE RECEPTION OF DIONYSIUS IN TWENTIETH‐CENTURY EASTERN ORTHODOXY

This essay surveys diverse interpretations of the CD by twentieth‐century Eastern Orthodox theologians. This essay argues that the evaluation of Dionysius' contribution crucially depends upon the master narrative within which the CD is considered. For example, for Vladimir Lossky, Dionysius' apophaticism was the “dogmatic ground” of Byzantine mystical theology, whereas according to John Meyendorff, Dionysius' theology was in need of a “Christological corrective” later provided in the theologies of Maximus the Confessor and Gregory Palamas. The points of contact and contrast between Dionysian mystical theology and Russian sophiology are also discussed. Finally, this essay argues that modern Orthodox readings of the CD are characterized by a profound irony: while they are in various degrees indebted to the Western intellectual tradition (as, for example, Christos Yannaras is to Heidegger), Orthodox theologians often use Dionysius to forge an anti‐Western Orthodox theological identity.     

VAGUE PARTS AND VAGUE IDENTITY

We discuss arguments against the thesis that the world itself can be vague. The first section of the paper distinguishes dialectically effective from ineffective arguments against metaphysical vagueness. The second section constructs an argument against metaphysical vagueness that promises to be of the dialectically effective sort: an argument against objects with vague parts. Firstly, cases of vague parthood commit one to cases of vague identity. But we argue that Evans' famous argument against will not on its own enable one to complete the reductio in the present context. We provide a metaphysical premise that would complete the reductio, but note that it seems deniable. We conclude by drawing general morals from our case study.