Projection of Own on Others' Job Characteristics: Evidence for the False Consensus Effect in Job Characteristics Information

The present study is an examination of the influence of rater characteristics as a source of bias in job characteristics information, as gleaned from the Job Diagnostic Survey (JDS). Participants (N=133) completed an initial JDS for own job characteristics. Non‐incumbents (n=104) then completed a secondary JDS in order to rate incumbents' job characteristics. Non‐incumbents' personality dimensions, own job characteristics, job satisfaction level, and incumbent satisfaction level were hypothesized as predictors of ratings of job characteristics of incumbents. Results indicate that two characteristics, job autonomy and dealing with others, were influenced by non‐incumbents standing on these characteristics, and demonstrated evidence of the false consensus effect. Limitations and implications for interpreting job information are discussed.     

Does Happiness Predict Medication Adherence among African Americans with Hypertension?

Poor medication adherence is a leading cause of excessive cardiovascular morbidity among African Americans. Many adherence-promoting interventions have addressed economic barriers, improved the patient-provider relationship, simplified regimens, and used reminder systems; however, the problem of low adherence remains intractable. Meanwhile, positive psychological attributes that might serve to promote medication adherence have not been fully explored. To address this gap, we examined the association between happiness and medication adherence among low-income African Americans with hypertension treated in a safety-net setting. Data were obtained from the Alabama Collaboration for Cardiovascular Equality, 2007?C2008. Happiness was measured using the 4-item scale of Lyubomirsky and Lepper; low, moderate, and high happiness were defined by tertiles because of the non-normal distribution. Medication adherence was assessed with the Morisky Medication Adherence Scale. Associations were quantified with ordinal logistic regression. Our sample of 573 African Americans was 71.6?% female and had an average age?±?SD of 53.6?±?9.7?years and a median happiness score of 5.2. Compared to participants with low happiness, the odds (OR; 95?% CI) of being in a better medication adherence category were greater for those with moderate (1.53; 1.02?C2.27) and high (2.26; 1.52-3.37) happiness, after adjusting for age, sex, income, education, and difficulty paying for medical care. Within this cohort of low-income African Americans with hypertension, participants with greater happiness exhibited better medication adherence. Although one interpretation of our study is that more adherent patients are naturally happier, our findings raise the possibility that adding happiness-boosting components may increase the effectiveness of more traditional adherence interventions.     

Vom allm?hlichen Verschwinden der Gruppenverfahren

The prominence of the different methods of working in and with groups, especially group analysis, group dynamics and psychodrama, came to a peak during the cultural changes of the 1960s and 1970s. This applied both to the therapeutic and educational fields and then more and more also to business and administration but since then is slowly fading in all fields. The reasons for this development, specifically in the German speaking countries, are discussed in six theses. The arguments relate to: 1) the differentiation of the psychosocial field, 2) the (successful) diffusion of these methods, 3) the intermezzo character of their success, 4) the inability to modernize, 5) the ambivalent consequences of modernization and 6) the changes in the cultural significance of the group.     

Zur Protophysik der Zeit: Antwort auf die Vorgebliche Widerlegung von H. Andreas nebst einer Anmerkung über die Tragweite protophysikalischer Begründungsansprüche

On the Protophysics of time. Reply to H. Andreas’ critique along with a remark on the scope of operational foundations of measurement. In 2004, H. Andreas presented in this journal a refutation of Janich’s operational foundation of time measurement. Pursuing suggestions made by F. Mühlhölzer in 1981, Andreas intends to show that Janich’s proof of the uniqueness of the operationalization that he suggested fails. It is shown that Andreas’ arguments, like Mühlhölzer’s, are mistaken and do not challenge Janich’s theory. Some remarks on the scope of Protophysics are added, which may lead to a more substantial discussion of the merits of Janich’s approach.     

Kant's Conception of Inner Value

Abstract: This article addresses a foundational issue in Kant's moral philosophy, the question of the relation of the Categorical Imperative to value. There is an important movement in current Kant scholarship that argues that there is a value underlying the Categorical Imperative. However, some scholars have raised doubts as to whether Kant has a conception of value that could ground the Categorical Imperative. In this paper I seek to add to these doubts by arguing, first, that value would have to be of a particular kind in order to be the foundation of Kant's moral philosophy. Second, I argue that Kant does not have such a conception of value, and that his arguments rule out that value could ground his moral philosophy. I then outline an alternative reading of how Kant uses ‘inner value’. My conclusion will be that Kant does not derive the Categorical Imperative from an underlying value. While some of his passages could also be read as if value were foundational for Kant, a close look at these passages and his arguments point away from this conclusion.     

“Of course I will ...”: The combined effect of certainty and level of expectancies on persistence and performance

The importance of performance expectancies for the prediction of regulation of behavior and actual performance has long been established. Building on theories from the field of social cognition, we suggest that the level of performance expectancies, as well as the certainty of the expectancy, have a joint influence on an individual’s beliefs and behavior. In two studies (one cross sectional using a sample of secondary school students and one longitudinal using a sample of university students) we found that expectancies more strongly predicted persistence, and subsequent performance, the more certain the expectancy was. This pattern was found even if prior performance was controlled, as in Study 2. The data give an indication that it may be useful to include certainty as an additional variable in expectancy models.     

The effect of induced anxiety on cognition: threat of shock enhances aversive processing in healthy individuals

Individuals with anxiety disorders demonstrate altered cognitive performance including (1) cognitive biases towards negative stimuli (affective biases) and (2) increased cognitive rigidity (e.g., impaired conflict adaptation) on affective Stroop tasks. Threat of electric shock is frequently used to induce anxiety in healthy individuals, but the extent to which this manipulation mimics the cognitive impairment seen in anxiety disorders is unclear. In this study, 31 healthy individuals completed an affective Stroop task under safe and threat-of-shock conditions. We showed that threat (1) enhanced aversive processing and abolished a positive affective bias but (2) had no effect on conflict adaptation. Threat of shock thus partially models the effects of anxiety disorders on affective Stroop tasks. We suggest that the affective state of anxiety—which is common to both threat and anxiety disorders—modulates the neural inhibition of subcortical aversive processing, whilst pathologies unique to anxiety disorders modulate conflict adaptation.     

Skeptical Conclusions

For a putative knower S and a proposition P, two types of skepticism can be distinguished, depending on the conclusions they draw: outer skepticism, which concludes that S does not know that P, and inner skepticism, which concludes that S does not know whether P. This paper begins by showing that outer skepticism has undesirable consequences because that S does not know that P presupposes P, and inner skepticism does not have this undesirable consequence since that S does not know whether P does not presuppose P. We indicate that the two types of skepticism aim to different loci of doubts: while outer skepticism doubts whether we can gain an epistemic warrant for the actuality, inner skepticism doubts whether we can gain epistemic identification of the actuality. It is further indicated that responses to skepticism from externalist theories, as well as from fallibilist internalist theories, can only respond to outer skepticism but not to inner skepticism.