Towards a decolonized assessment of the religious other

When confronted by the plurality of religions (and the corresponding plurality of claims to truth), believers usually resort either to absolutism or relativism. The absolutist evaluates the religious other in view of criteria with which the latter does not agree. The religious other is thus being colonized by a hegemony (i.e. enforced homogeneity) of standards. In an attempt to transcend this hegemonic colonization, the relativist, on the other hand, simply surrenders the evaluation of the beliefs and practices of the religious other to subjective arbitrariness. This attempt at the decolonization of the religious other defeats itself, in so far as it deprives us of the right to criticise the beliefs and practices of any other, including the colonizing other. Avoiding both absolutism and relativism calls for an interreligious common scale which will, as such, allow the ‘objective’ or non-arbitrary evaluation of religious beliefs and practices. This scale can only, if at all, be identified through an ongoing interreligious dialogue which respects the particularity, individuality and historicity—or, in short, the non-foundational nature—of both religious and meta-religious beliefs. As such, interreligious dialogue constitutes the first step towards an effective decolonization of the religious other.     

The affective priming effect: Automatic activation of evaluative information in memory

Abstract

Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, and Kardes (1986) argued that affect may be activated automatically from memory on the mere observation of an affect-loaded stimulus. Using a variant of the standard sequential priming paradigm, it was demonstrated that the time needed to evaluate target words as positive or negative decreased if they were preceded by a similarly valenced prime word, but increased when preceded by a prime of opposite valence. Several aspects of their procedure, however, do not warrant their conclusion concerning the unconditionality of the effect. The present research investigated the generality of this affective priming effect. In Experiment 1, it was tested whether the effect can be generalised to more complex visual material. Stimulus pairs consisted of colour slides. Subjects had to evaluate the targets as quickly as possible. In Experiment 2, the standard word-word procedure was used, but target words had to be pronounced. In both experiments, significant affective priming effects were observed, supporting Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, and Pratto's (1992) assertion that the automatic activation effect is a pervasive and relative unconditional phenomenon. Implications for theories of affect and emotion are discussed.     

Prospective and concurrent correlates of emotion perception in psychotic disorders: A naturalistic,longitudinal study of neurocognition,affective blunting and avolition

This naturalistic study investigated longitudinal and cross‐sectional symptomatic and neurocognitive correlates of social cognition indexed by emotion perception. Participants were 31 persons admitted to a psychiatric emergency ward due to acute psychosis. Positive and negative (i.e., affective blunting and avolition) symptoms were assessed at baseline and 12‐month follow‐up using the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale. Participants completed neuropsychological assessments with alternative versions of the Repeatable Battery for the Assessment of Neuropsychological Status at baseline and at 12‐month follow‐up. Emotion perception was measured using the Face/Voice Emotion Test at 12‐month follow‐up. Correlational analyses (Spearman's rho) revealed strong and statistically significant associations between neurocognition and emotion perception (baseline r = 0.58, follow‐up r = 0.43). Associations between positive symptoms and emotion perception were weak or non‐existent (baseline r = 0.13, follow‐up r  =  –0.01). Emotion perception was moderately, but not significantly, associated with affective blunting at follow‐up (r = 0.33), but not at baseline (r = 0.21). The association with avolition was non‐existent (baseline r  =  –0.05, follow‐up r = 0.01). This study supports the notion that emotion perception has neurocognitive correlates. The cross‐sectional trend level association with affective blunting suggests that the ability to perceive emotions might be related to, but dissociable from the ability to express emotions.     

Systemische Familien- und Spieltherapie im Krankenhaus

Studies on children after pediatric liver transplantation have shown that patients are confronted with various psychosocial problems due to the illness and long hospitalization. They do not have suitable coping strategies available to handle this situation. A concept of systemic family therapy and play therapy for children in hospital was thus developed. The patients and their families are accompanied during hospitalization, are supported preventively and are helped in developing suitable strategies for coping with the psychosocial stress.     

How Preschoolers Use Cues of Dominance to Make Sense of Their Social Environment

A series of four experiments investigated preschoolers’ abilities to make sense of dominance relations. Experiments 1 and 2 showed that as early as 3 years old, preschoolers are able to infer dominance not only from physical supremacy but also from decision power, age, and resources. Experiments 3 and 4 showed that preschoolers have expectations regarding the ways in which a dominant and a subordinate individual are likely to differ. In particular, they expect that an individual who imposes his choice on another will exhibit higher competence in games and will have more resources.     

Comparing mislocalizations with moving stimuli: The Fröhlich effect,the flash-lag,and representational momentum

When observers are asked to localize the onset or the offset position of a moving target, they typically make localization errors in the direction of movement. Similarly, when observers judge a moving target that is presented in alignment with a flash, the target appears to lead the flash. These errors are known as the Fröhlich effect, representational momentum, and flash-lag effect, respectively. This study compared the size of the three mislocalization errors. In Experiment 1, a flash appeared either simultaneously with the onset, the mid-position, or the offset of the moving target. Observers then judged the position where the moving target was located when the flash appeared. Experiments 2 and 3 are exclusively concerned with localizing the onset and the offset of the moving target. When observers localized the position with respect to the point in time when the flash was presented, a clear mislocalization in the direction of movement was observed at the initial position and the mid-position. In contrast, a mislocalization opposite to movement direction occurred at the final position. When observers were asked to ignore the flash (or when no flash was presented at all), a reduced error (or no error) was observed at the initial position and only a minor error in the direction of the movement occurred at the final position. An integrative model is proposed, which suggests a common underlying mechanism, but emphasizes the specific processing components of the Fröhlich effect, flash-lag effect, and representational momentum.     

A matter of design: No representational momentum without predictability

When observers are asked to localize the final position of a moving target, a forward shift of the judged final position is observed. So far, the forward shift has been attributed to the influence of mental continuation of the final target position (representational momentum). However, studies investigating forward displacement have used highly predictable target motion. The direction of target motion and the final target position were often varied between subjects. Thus, observers may have expected the target to travel in a particular direction or vanish at a particular location before a given trial started. In this study, direction of motion and final position were treated as fixed or random factors. The forward shift and the reversal of the shift with time (memory averaging) were absent when both factors were randomized. Thus, the forward shift with implied motion is restricted to repeatedly observed motion sequences that allow for pre-trial motion prediction.     

A cross-cultural study of hindsight bias and conditional probabilistic reasoning

Hindsight bias is a mistaken belief that one could have predicted a given outcome once the outcome is known. Choi and Nisbett (2000 Choi, I. and Nisbett, R. E. 2000. Cultural psychology of surprise: Holistic theories and recognition of contradiction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79: 890–905. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) reported that Koreans showed stronger hindsight bias than Americans, and explained the results using the distinction between analytic cognition (Westerners) and holistic cognition (Easterners). The purpose of the present study was to see whether hindsight bias is stronger among Easterners than among Westerners using a probability judgement task, and to test an “explicit–implicit” hypothesis and a “rule-dialectics” hypothesis. We predicted that the implicit process is more active among Easterners to generate hindsight bias, and that Easterners are more dialectical thinkers, whereas Westerners are more rule-based thinkers. French, British, Japanese, and Korean participants were asked to make probabilistic judgements in a Good Samaritan scenario (Experiment 1) and in a scenario including conditional probabilistic judgement (Experiment 2). In both Experiments, we presume that the implicit revision of causal models is made just by being given unexpected outcome information, and that explicit revision is made by being asked to point out possible factors for an unexpected outcome. In the results Easterners showed greater hindsight bias generally and it was greater in the Good Samaritan scenario. We conclude that the reason why hindsight bias was lower among Westerners is primarily that they tried to follow a rule to suppress the bias.     

Misleading postevent information and working memory capacity: an individual differences approach to eyewitness memory

The present study examines how individual differences in working memory capacity relate to the effect of misleading postevent information on memory for the original event. Participants were shown a film of a crime event and were then asked to unscramble a narrative that included misinformation regarding some of the film's details. Additionally, the working memory capacity of the participants was measured using the operation‐word span task. Finally, in a free recall test, participants recalled fewer correct details in the misinformation condition compared to the control condition. This effect was negatively correlated with working memory capacity. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.