Human left-sided cradling preferences for dogs

Photographs of men and women holding dogs were analyzed for side-holding preferences. A significant majority of women in dog-themed magazines held dogs on their left sides, similar to reports of women holding infants. Men did not show the same left-sided preference, which is also consistent with other studies. The implications of these results for various hypotheses about infant cradling behavior were discussed.     

The logic of conditionals 1

The standard use of the propositional calculus ('P.C.’) in analyzing the validity of inferences involving conditionals leads to fallacies, and the problem is to determine where P.C. may be ‘safely’ used. An alternative analysis of criteria of reasonableness of inferences in terms of conditions of justification rather than truth of statements is proposed. It is argued, under certain restrictions, that P. C. may be safely used, except in inferences whose conclusions are conditionals whose antecedents are incompatible with the premises in the sense that if the antecedent became known, some of the previously asserted premises would have to be withdrawn.     

Differential Reactions of Patients Receiving Group Psychotherapy with Concomitant Somatic and Drug Therapies

The embeddedness of combat aggression, violence, survival, and antiauthority dynamics in the psychic organization of Vietnam veterans in groups shape the treatment enterprise. Inherent in treatment interactions and dynamic processes of the Vietnam therapy group are the reactivations of Vietnam-historical reenactments. These involve strong affective reactions toward superiors and toward fellow combatants (“grunts”), with an attendant sense of group danger, unconsciously reminiscent of Vietnam's guerrilla war terrain. This paper notes that because of the tendency of the group to repeat actual events (as opposed to fantasied events), these groups require divergent conceptualizations and technical management. An innovative model comprising a series of developmental phases is presented. This model, called “the curvilinear regressive-progressive model” of treatment with Vietnam veterans, focuses on both peer- and leader-centered dynamics in working through guilt-driven defenses in members. The leader plays a pivotal function in monitoring levels of affect tolerance in the group, and is expected to manage countertransference reactions, and to have sensitivity to the effects of combat stress on self structure. As the Vietnam therapy group members relive the history of the Vietnam conflict in the group, the leader utilizes a flexible, phase-sensitive system of interventions to reactivate arrested development by creating a healing climate where developmental tasks can be mastered and integrated by group members.     

Subjectivity and environmentalism

The main thesis of this paper is that the most cogent demands of subjectivity, at least with respect to questions concerning the contents of our thoughts, can be accommodated within an objectivist framework. I begin with two theses: (1) Subjectivity: I can know (the contents of) my own thoughts without appeal to any knowledge of features external to my mind; (2) Environmentalism: (The contents of) my thoughts are determined by features external to my mind, at least in this sense: without causal and/or social interaction between my internal states and various external features, these internal states would not have the particular contents they have and therefore would not be the mental states they are. Section I proceeds by elucidating various lines of environmentalism, an overtly objectivist thesis. Section II considers and refutes one purported environmentalist challenge to subjectivity, namely, that, according to it, thoughts are not in the head. Section III discusses a central subjectivist thesis, namely, thoughts do not admit of an appearance/reality distinction. Tyler Burge and Hilary Putnam, two environmentalists, seem to endorse such a distinction. It is argued that the two most reasonable routes of escape open to them require a retreat from environmentalism. This leaves us with an apparent dilemma: reject either subjectivity or environmentalism Section IV defends environmentalism. Section V considers and criticizes a maneuver Donald Davidson makes to preserve first‐person authority over thought‐contents. Section VI concludes with a brief defense of environmentalism which rests largely on rejecting a deeply entrenched epistemic model about how we access our own thoughts. It is argued that it is this bad epistemic model and not subjectivity per se, which has created whatever tension there appears to be between subjectivity and environmentalism.