Situated anticipation

In cognitive science, long-term anticipation, such as when planning to do something next year, is typically seen as a form of ‘higher’ cognition, requiring a different account than the more basic activities that can be understood in terms of responsiveness to ‘affordances,’ i.e. to possibilities for action. Starting from architects that anticipate the possibility to make an architectural installation over the course of many months, in this paper we develop a process-based account of affordances that includes long-term anticipation within its scope. We present a framework in which situations and their affordances unfold, and can be thought of as continuing a history of practices into a current situational activity. In this activity affordances invite skilled participants to act further. Via these invitations one situation develops into the other; an unfolding process that sets up the conditions for its own continuation. Central to our process account of affordances is the idea that engaged individuals can be responsive to the direction of the process to which their actions contribute. Anticipation, at any temporal scale, is then part and parcel of keeping attuned to the movement of the unfolding situations to which an individual contributes. We concretize our account by returning to the example of anticipation observed in architectural practice. This account of anticipation opens the door to considering a wide array of human activities traditionally characterized as ‘higher’ cognition in terms of engaging with affordances.

     

Metastable attunement and real-life skilled behavior

In everyday situations, and particularly in some sport and working contexts, humans face an inherently unpredictable and uncertain environment. All sorts of unpredictable and unexpected things happen but typically people are able to skillfully adapt. In this paper, we address two key questions in cognitive science. First, how is an agent able to bring its previously learned skill to bear on a novel situation? Second, how can an agent be both sensitive to the particularity of a given situation, while remaining flexibly poised for many other possibilities for action? We will argue that both the sensitivity to novel situations and the sensitivity to a multiplicity of action possibilities are enabled by the property of skilled agency that we will call metastable attunement. We characterize a skilled agent’s flexible interactions with a dynamically changing environment in terms of metastable dynamics in agent-environment systems. What we find in metastability is the realization of two competing tendencies: the tendency of the agent to express their intrinsic dynamics and the tendency to search for new possibilities. Metastably attuned agents are ready to engage with a multiplicity of affordances, allowing for a balance between stability and flexibility. On the one hand, agents are able to exploit affordances they are attuned to, while at the same time being ready to flexibly explore for other affordances. Metastable attunement allows agents to smoothly transition between these possible configurations so as to adapt their behaviour to what the particular situation requires. We go on to describe the role metastability plays in learning of new skills, and in skilful behaviour more generally. Finally, drawing upon work in art, architecture and sports science, we develop a number of perspectives on how to investigate metastable attunement in real life situations.

     

A Rorschach study of oral dependence in alcoholics and depressives

Despite the strong association between alcoholism and orality in psychoanalytic theory, use of the Rorschach Inkblot Test to provide empirical support for such a link has yielded decidedly mixed results. However, Masling's Rorschach Oral-Dependency (ROD) scale has shown twice that people with alcoholism give more oral-dependent responses on the Rorschach than matched comparison groups (Bertrand & Masling, 1969; Weiss & Masling, 1970), which is supportive of classical analytic theory. In this study, we investigated alcohol groups, depression groups, and "normal" undergraduates with the ROD scale and found that the 2 clinical groups produced higher ROD scores than the undergraduates. In addition, recent studies by Duberstein and Talbot (1993) and Fowler, Hilsenroth, and Handler (1996) provide evidence for an object relations model of dependency that suggests that a balance between anaclitic dependence and complete independence, in which dependency needs are acknowledged but are not overwhelming, is most adaptive. This model of dependency was evaluated; it was found that a simple difference in group means provided a better fit with the data, although some evidence of an object relations model also was found. Finally, Rorschach and MMPI-2 (Butcher, Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989) levels of general defensiveness and primary process manifestations in Rorschach content were investigated to assess whether participants were responding defensively to the testing and whether there were any differences in the nature of oral-dependent responses between the clinical groups.     

Forgetting to remember: the functional relationship of decay and interference

Functional decay theory proposes that decay and interference, historically viewed as competing accounts of forgetting, are instead functionally related. The theory posits that (a) when an attribute must be updated frequently in memory, its current value decays to prevent interference with later values, and (b) the decay rate adapts to the rate of memory updates. Behavioral predictions of the theory were tested in a task-switching paradigm in which memory for the current task had to be updated every few seconds, hundreds of times. Reaction times and error rates both increased gradually between updates, reflecting decay of memory for the current task. This performance decline was slower when updates were less frequent, reflecting a decrease in the decay rate following a decrease in the update rate. A candidate mechanism for controlled decay is proposed, the data are reconciled with practice effects, and implications for models of executive control are discussed.     

Reconsolidation Reconsidered

Some of the considerations that led to a consolidation interpretation of retrograde amnesia (RA), which states that RA results from the disruption of memory processing and storage when neural activity is interrupted by a brain insult, are reviewed here. The time-dependent gradient of memory loss (i.e., new memories are more vulnerable to amnesia than old memories) that characterizes RA seemed to fit nicely with the notion of a cascade of cellular events occurring during the immediate post-acquisition period that would transform a labile representation into a more stable form (i.e., consolidate the memory). However, a variety of observations came to challenge the storage-disruption model, and among these was the finding of amnesia for old but reactivated memories. A recent study by Nader, Schafe, and LeDoux (2000) provides an important analytic extension of the work on "reconsolidation" by showing that inhibition of protein synthesis in the lateral and basal nuclei of the amygdala immediately following the reactivation of old memory will induce retrograde amnesia. We offer a retrieval-oriented conceptualization to account for the temporal gradient and the "reconsolidation" phenomena.     

Regulation of Negative Affect During Mother–Child Problem-Solving Interactions: Adolescent Depressive Status and Family Processes

Despite recent suggestions that depression can be conceptualized as a disorder of affect regulation, relatively little research has focused on affect regulation skills in depressed individuals. This paper investigated whether depressed adolescents (N = 25) differ from nondepressed adolescents (N 25) on two indices of affect regulation (i.e., duration of negative affective states and reciprocity of maternal negative affect) as well as whether these indices are related to microsocial family interactional processes. Analyses revealed that depressed teens differed from their nondepressed peers with regard to duration of negative affective states but not in their likelihood of reciprocating negative affect. Additionally, indices of adolescent affect regulation were related to family interactional processes. Duration of depressive affect was positively associated with maternal display of facilitative behavior contingent on adolescent depressive behavior. Duration of aggressive behavior was inversely related to maternal problem-solving responses to aggressive behavior. Finally, adolescent reciprocity of maternal depressive and aggressive behaviors was strongly associated with mothers' reciprocity of adolescents' negative affective behavior.     

Causal attribution and hindsight bias for economic developments

Hindsight bias for economic developments was studied, with particular focus on the moderating effects of attitudes and causal attributions. Participants (N = 263) rated the likelihood of several economic developments 6 months before and 6 months after the euro introduction in 2002. Hindsight bias occurred selectively for attitude-consistent economic developments: Euro supporters showed stronger hindsight bias for positive developments than for negative ones; euro opponents showed the opposite pattern. Causal attribution further moderated the hindsight bias: participants who perceived a strong connection between the euro introduction and specific economic developments showed higher attitude-consistent hindsight bias than participants who perceived those developments as unrelated to the euro. It is argued that hindsight bias serves to stabilize subjective representations of the economy.     

Do People Know How Their Personality Has Changed? Correlates of Perceived and Actual Personality Change in Young Adulthood

Abstract How much do we think our personality changes over time? How well do our perceptions of change correspond with actual personality change? Two hundred and ninety students completed measures of the Big Five personality traits when they first entered college. Four years later, they completed the same measures and rated the degree to which they believed they had changed on each dimension. Participants tended to view themselves as having changed substantially, and perceptions of change showed some correspondence with actual personality change. Perceived and actual change showed theoretically meaningful correlations with a host of variables related to different aspects of college achievement and adjustment.