Articulatory and Phonological Determinants of Word Length Effects in Span Tasks

Several previous studies have shown that memory span is greater for short words than for long words. This effect is claimed to occur even when the short and long words are matched for the number of syllables and phonemes and so to provide evidence for subvocal articulation as being one mechanism that underlies memory span (Baddeley, Thomson, & Buchanan, 1975). The three experiments reported in this paper further investigate the articulatory determinants of word length effects on span tasks. Experiment 1 replicated Baddeley et al.'s finding of an effect of word length on auditory and visual span when the stimuli consist of words that differ in terms of the number of syllables. Experiments 2 and 3 showed that the effects of word length are eliminated when the words in the span task are matched for the number of syllables and phonemes but differ with respect to the duration and/or complexity of their articulatory gestures. These results indicate that it is the phonological structure of a word and not features of its actual articulation that determines the magnitude of the word length effect in span tasks.     

Supervenience,Repeatability, & Expressivism

Expressivists traditionally explain normative supervenience by saying it is a conceptual truth. I argue against this tradition in two steps. First, I show the modal claim that stands in need of explanation has been stated imprecisely. Classic arguments in metaethics for normative supervenience and those that rely on it as a premise presuppose a constraint on the supervenience base that is rarely (if ever) made explicit: the repeatability of the non-normative properties on which the normative supervenes. Non-normative properties are repeatable when it is possible for numerically distinct individuals to share them. Second, I show if the modal truth that stands in need of explanation entails that there are individuals exactly alike in repeatable non-normative respects that cannot normatively differ, then standard expressivist accounts of normative supervenience as a conceptual truth are unsuccessful. Expressivist metasemantics for normative terms, together with constitutive facts about the non-cognitive attitudes essentially involved in normative thought, strongly suggest that repeatable supervenience could not be a conceptual truth. I argue, finally, that although repeatable supervenience bears the marks of a conceptual truth, expressivists should be content to treat it as an ordinary normative truth, and to explain it the same way they explain other normative truths.     

Assessing elements of women's decisions about mammography.

We investigated motivational and cognitive processes of behavior change with respect to mammography screening. One hundred forty-two women (ages 40 and older) recruited from three worksites answered a 41-item questionnaire consisting of statements based on constructs from the transtheoretical model of behavior change. Principal-components analysis identified two factors: a six-item component representing positive perceptions of mammography (Pros) and a six-item component representing avoidance of mammography (Cons). Analysis of variance showed that Pros, Cons, and a derived Decisional Balance measure (Pros minus Cons) were associated with stage of mammography adoption. Results are consistent with applications of the model to smoking cessation. The model is also discussed as it relates to other theories of behavior change and as a general strategy for analyzing perceptual data pertinent to health-related actions and intentions for behavioral change.     

Cognitive-behavioral stress management intervention decreases the prevalence of depression and enhances benefit finding among women under treatment for early-stage breast cancer.

The authors tested effects of a 10-week group cognitive-behavioral stress management intervention among 100 women newly treated for Stage 0-II breast cancer. The intervention reduced prevalence of moderate depression (which remained relatively stable in the control condition) but did not affect other measures of emotional distress. The intervention also increased participants' reports that having breast cancer had made positive contributions to their lives, and it increased generalized optimism. Both remained significantly elevated at a 3-month follow-up of the intervention. Further analysis revealed that the intervention had its greatest impact on these 2 variables among women who were lowest in optimism at baseline. Discussion centers on the importance of examining positive responses to traumatic events--growth, appreciation of life, shift in priorities, and positive affect-as well as negative responses.