人学研究的政治经济学批判视域

近年来,学术界对中国20多年来的马克思主义人学研究进行了审慎的总结和清理,努力探索马克思主义人学研究的新范式、新视角和新路径,以期直面我国人学研究范式转换带来的巨大挑战。既有的马克思主义人学思想研究主要是从意识哲学层面对马克思主义人学的基本原理进行了梳理和阐发,而要全面、     

建构当代中国马克思主义哲学研究的“范式”与“学派”

<正>以20世纪80年代为起点的当代中国改革开放,不仅带来了中国社会的巨大进步,而且也繁荣了当代中国的马克思主义哲学研究,其中一个重要的方面就是:众多马克思主义哲学研究的"范式化"。当下,中国马克思主义哲学的研究者不断地探索理解马克思主义哲学形态的新视域、新路径,     

中国马克思主义哲学研究的历史进展——基于马克思所开辟的哲学道路

本文的任务是探讨当代中国马克思主义哲学研究的历史进展。认为建构马克思主义哲学的当代形态,是一个涉及马克思主义哲学研究各个方面的总体性问题,是对待马克思主义哲学既要一脉相承又要与时俱进的一种战略性考虑;建构中国化马克思主义哲学的当代形态的重要途径之一,就是对当代中国马克思主义哲学研究的历史进展给予全面深入的清理、总结与整合;这种进展主要体现哲学主题转换、哲学观念发展、哲学思维方式跃迁、哲学视野拓展、哲学内容丰富、哲学研究方式变化、哲学发展新路径和哲学功能提升、哲学本体重解和哲学形态建构十个方面。     

建构中国自主宗教学知识体系的新探索 读《宗教学理论新探》

<正>改革开放以来，特别是党的十八大以来，在习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想引领下，我们国家从事哲学社会科学研究的一些专家学者，围绕着马克思主义基本原理同中国具体实际相结合、同中华优秀传统文化相结合，不断地探索、思考着相关哲学社会科学的问题，取得了一系列显著的理论成果。     

当代中国马克思主义哲学研究范式的创新与转换

<正>改革开放不仅极大地推动了马克思主义哲学的观点、内容和形态的创新,同时也唤醒了学界的"方法论自觉",推动了马克思主义哲学的研究路径、范式的创新与转换,从过去的单一视域、单一路径、单一模式转向多元视域、多种方法、多样范式,先后呈现出教科书改革与原理创新、马克思主     

深化中国学术视野中的古代希腊与罗马哲学研究

本文回眸了古希腊罗马哲学在中国的历程,指出了改革开放以来逐步进向以中国学术视野做有学术创新的研究,但需要加强某些薄弱环节;本文论述了古希腊罗马哲学的现代意义,为加强中西哲学与文化传统的整体性交往,需要深化中国学术视野中的古希腊罗马哲学研究;本文还就跨文化研究古希腊罗马哲学的视野与方法,提出一些供参考的见解.     

近期文化哲学研究回溯

世纪之交,中国文化哲学已经成为哲学研究中的显学。近年来,这一领域的研究得到了进一步的推进。本文首先从文化哲学总体认识的深化、马克思主义与文化哲学的关系、全球化背景下的文化冲突与文化转型等三个方面对这一进展进行回顾,并在此基础上对中国文化哲学的研究提出了前瞻。     

艾思奇对马克思主义哲学中国化的突出贡献

论文力图对艾思奇来延安后为确立毛泽东思想的指导地位而作的贡献进行研究;并以此为前提,分别阐述他在哲学通俗化基础上实现哲学中国化和编写中国化马克思主义哲学教材的开创性贡献。笔者认为,重温这些贡献,对于当前进一步实现马克思主义中国化是有启迪意义的。     

社会心理隐性决定论:文化、社会心理和人的选择

一1978年以来,我国的人学研究取得了不可否认、不可低估的巨大成就。在学术上,它不仅成为我国马克思主义哲学研究中人们比较关注的一个热点和亮点,成为人们在讨论马克思主义哲学的时候不可     

困境中的马克思主义哲学研究——一种反思性的视角

当前,怎样理解和发展马克思主义、如何实现马克思主义与生活世界的互促互动,关乎中华民族的伟大复兴能否实现,关乎中国特色社会主义的伟大实践能否成功。与这种理论和现实的强烈需求形成鲜明对比的是,学界在马克思主义哲学研究方面所陷入的尴尬局面:在基础理论研究方面仍然未能取得根本性和突破性的进展;在研究方式上很大程度上是自说自话、自娱自乐;在研究的终极关怀中,仍然自     

Normativity in the Philosophy of Science

This paper analyzes what it means for philosophy of science to be normative. It argues that normativity is a multifaceted phenomenon rather than a general feature that a philosophical theory either has or lacks. It analyzes the normativity of philosophy of science by articulating three ways in which a philosophical theory can be normative. Methodological normativity arises from normative assumptions that philosophers make when they select, interpret, evaluate, and mutually adjust relevant empirical information, on which they base their philosophical theories. Object normativity emerges from the fact that the object of philosophical theorizing can itself be normative, such as when philosophers discuss epistemic norms in science. Metanormativity arises from the kind of claims that a philosophical theory contains, such as normative claims about science as it should be. Distinguishing these three kinds of normativity gives rise to a nuanced and illuminating view of how philosophy of science can be normative.     

Death: Bridge between science and spirit

It is argued that contemporary health science, being part of a general cultural trend toward the materialism of scientific rationality, has reduced human health to a system of machine-like events. This philosophical trend has had the indirect effect of excluding the human spirit from playing any significant role in our understanding of man's health and well-being. The recent effort of biomedical science to extend this materialist philosophy into the area of human death and dying is examined in the context of this ideological trend. It is suggested that the trend has brought about an ever-widening conceptual gap between the realms of spirit and matter. The issue of bridging this contemporary conceptual gap is discussed in terms of recent research findings that suggest that the human brain may be capable of intergrating the logic of two seemingly irreconcilable ways of thinking into a whole which is enriched from the presence of both. This holistic possibility is discussed in the context of the philosophies that support the existence of spirit and matter.     

Chuang Tzu,Butterfly and Wittgenstein: An Exploration of the Relationship Between Psychological Factors and Philosophical Thinking in the Life of Ludwig Wittgenstein

This is a preliminary attempt at exploring the relationship between psychology and philosophical thinking. It first looks at Chuang Tzu’s analogy of the butterfly representing the spirit of spontaneity that is central in Taoist philosophy. Second, it explores the psychology of self-consciousness that inhibits spontaneity, and lastly, it looks at the impact of psychopathology in the life of Ludwig Wittgenstein and his philosophical thinking by focusing on his struggle with mental illness and two philosophical transitions: the movement toward mysticism as an attempt to quiet his obsession and his later writings on ordinary language philosophy as a way out of the pain of self-consciousness. This article puts forth the argument that Wittgenstein’s development of ordinary language philosophy is closely connected with his personal struggle with mental illness. It is a philosophical attempt at coping with his existential psychological struggle, the quest for the butterfly.     

熊十力《新唯识论》的易学渊源与理论创新

研究《周易》生命哲学,单向度地从宇宙论演绎太极阴阳变化,或从心性论凸显易道生命实践的主体能动性,都无法实证宇宙大生命一体贯通的诚明合一之境。在熊十力哲学多元文化渊源和思想元素中,《周易》无疑是其哲学创新的最深邃的理论源泉和精神根基。宇宙本体与生命主体圆融为一,以生生之道涵化主体心灵,用主体心灵担当天地之情,成为熊十力《新唯识论》生命哲学理论突破的关键所在。     

From Nature to Culture? Diogenes and Philosophical Anthropology

This essay is concerned with the central issue of philosophical anthropology: the relation between nature and culture. Although Rousseau was the first thinker to introduce this topic within the modern discourse of philosophy and the cultural sciences, it has its origin in Diogenes the Cynic, who was a disciple of Socrates. In my essay I (1) historically introduce a few aspects of philosophical anthropology, (2) deal with the nature–culture exchange, as introduced in Kant, then I (3) relate this topic to the Ancient Cynic Diogenes. Surprisingly, although we usually identify Critical Theory and Freudian psychoanalysis as theories that have shown that cultural progress should not be comprehended as a development from nature to culture, and that instead it should be conceived as a development from culture against (external as well as internal) nature, I show that Cynicism can be conceived as a vivid example within the history of our culture that reveals a double sense of repression and alienation, which is part of human civilization and mankind.     

Philosophers should prefer simpler theories

Recent years have seen considerable attention paid to the methodology of philosophy. The puzzle is simple—if philosophy is not an empirical discipline, how can one philosophical theory be rationally preferred over another? One answer to this question is that we should apply the theoretical virtues. Foremost among these theoretical virtues is simplicity—so perhaps we should prefer simpler philosophical theories to more complex ones. Huemer (Philos Q 59:216–236, 2009) objects that the reasons to prefer simpler theories in science do not apply in philosophy. I will argue that Huemer is mistaken—the arguments he marshals for preferring simpler theories in science can also be applied in philosophy. Like Huemer, I will focus on the philosophy of mind and the nominalism/Platonism debate. But I want to engage with the broader issue of whether simplicity is relevant to philosophy.     

关于三大神学问题的哲学思考

灵魂是否不灭?上帝是否存在?上帝意志是否具有超必然的自由?这三个问题涉及宗教的根本基础。宗教神学家一直把上述三个问题视为神学的基本问题。一方面把它们奉为神圣的信条,不许信仰者怀疑;另一方面,也不断利用哲学和理性的形式,对之作出各式各样的证明。但是历史上的启蒙哲学家和自然科学家对之发出了公开的挑战,从哲学世界观的高度,从自然科学新成就出发,证明统一的自然界不可能有任何超自然存在。围绕三大神学问题的争论,一直是哲学与神学关系史上的中心问题,它也成了宗教哲学必须解答的重要理论问题。     

Descartes as critic of Galileo's scientific methodology

Some philosophers of science suggest that philosophical assumptions must influence historical scholarship, because history (like science) has no neutral data and because the treatment of any particular historical episode is going to be influenced to some degree by one's prior philosophical conceptions of what is important in science. However, if the history of science must be laden with philosophical assumptions, then how can the history of science be evidence for the philosophy of science? Would not an inductivist history of science confirm an inductivist philosophy of science and a conventionalist history of science confirm a conventionalist philosophy of science? I attempt to resolve this problem; essentially, I deny the claim that the history of science must be influenced by one's conception of what is important in science — one's general philosophy of science. To accomplish the task I look at a specific historical episode, together with its history, and draw some metamethodological conclusions from it. The specific historical episode I examine is Descartes' critique of Galileo's scientific methodology.     

试析现代西方心理学的文化转向

西方心理学正在展现出对文化影响日渐增加的关注。这种文化转向既有科学哲学和历史的原因,也受到世界范围内心理学本土化运动的影响。文化转向的主要表现是：(1)对心理学自然科学模式的反思与诘难;(2)多元文化心理学的兴起;(3)跨文化心理学面临的批评及其转变;(4)认知心理学、发展心理学和健康心理学等分支领域对文化影响的关注。作者认为,文化的转向对于西方心理学的发展具有积极的意义。     

Kuhn’s Legacy: Theoretical and Philosophical Study of History

This paper considers the legacy of Kuhn and his Structure with regard to the current history and philosophy of science. Kuhn can be seen as a myth breaker, whose contribution is the way he connected historical and philosophical studies of science, questioning the cumulativist image and demanding historical responsibility of the views of science. I build on Kuhn’s legacy and outline a suggestion for theoretical and philosophical study of history (of science), which can be subdivided into three categories. The first is the philosophical analysis of historical interpretation and its relation to the historical record. The second is ‘theoretical history’ in which one tries to infer philosophically relevant interpretations on the nature of science on the basis of historical evidence. The third is the conceptual reflection of the assumptions and implications of the contemporary historiography of science. At the end I suggest that theoretical and philosophical study of history offers a fresh way to make history and philosophy relevant to each other.