动机冲突下2~4岁幼儿反事实思维理解的发展

采用故事法, 考察在3种动机冲突下幼儿反事实思维理解的发展。结果表明：(1) 2岁幼儿的加法、减法反事实思维得分显著高于替代反事实思维。(2)在加法反事实任务中, 2岁幼儿显著低于4岁幼儿;在减法反事实任务中, 3个年龄组得分有显著性差异。(3)在趋避冲突下, 加法与减法反事实得分都显著高于替代反事实。(4)在结果反事实理解任务中, 随着年龄增长, 幼儿结果反事实思维理解能力有显著提高。     

幼儿反事实推理的错误源分析

本研究选取57名3~5岁幼儿,考察了在两种选择和三种选择的反事实推理任务中儿童的表现以及是否出现现实错误。结果如下:无论在两种还是三种选择的反事实任务中,3岁组儿童的得分显著低于4岁和5岁组儿童,而4岁和5岁组儿童之间不存在显著差异;幼儿在反事实推理中的确会出现现实错误,但除此之外,幼儿在三种选择任务中也会选择现实和正确答案之外的第三个选项。由此可见,年幼儿童可能在抑制现实和建构反事实替代情境方面都存在困难,这尚需我们进一步探究。     

关于反事实思维的研究

反事实思维是个体对过去事件加以心理否定并构建出一种假设可能的思维活动。该文讨论了反事实思维的分类、反事实思维产生过程的两阶段模型及其影响因素以及反事实思维对于个体生活的作用。     

结果的接近性和不同等级分界线对反事实思维的影响

反事实思维是个体对不真实的条件或可能性进行替换的一种思维过程.它是在心理上对已经发生的事件进行否定,然后表征原本可能发生但现实并未发生的心理活动.本文以170名大学生为被试,采用情境模拟技术,研究结果的接近性和不同等级的分界线对反事实思维及满意度的影响.实验一表明,结果接近分界点较结果远离分界点时,被试产生的下行反事实思维要多.当结果的效价为成功时,更易引发反事实思维.实验二发现上行反事实思维随成功的等级变化而呈整体上升趋势,个体对结果的满意度随成绩的增加而上升.     

儿童反事实思维的研究述评

反事实思维一直以来是成人认知研究中备受关注的课题,近年来有关儿童反事实思维的发展也逐步引起研究者的兴趣。本研究论述了儿童反事实思维产生的早期信号、年龄变化、出现错误的原因以及与心理理论、因果推理、假装等心理状态之间的关系,最后在评述前人研究的基础上提出未来的研究方向。     

幼儿反事实推理的发展特点及影响因素

本研究以北京某幼儿园94名幼儿为被试,采用图片故事法和口语报告相结合的方式,考查了幼儿反事实堆理能力的发展特点及影响因素。结果表明：（1）4、5岁幼儿的表现明显好于3岁幼儿,但是4、5岁幼儿之间没有明显差异;（2）问题形式和因果链对反事实推理的影响上具有交互作用;（3）领域知识在各年龄阶段上对反事实推理的影响存在差异。     

幼儿前提反事实推理的发展特点和影响因素

本研究选取90名3~5岁幼儿为被试,采用图片故事法和口语报告法测查幼儿前提反事实推理的发展特点以及结果性质和领域知识的影响。结果表明:(1)幼儿前提反事实推断数量随年龄而增多;(2)幼儿产生的减法式反事实推断数显著多于加法式,但上行和下行反事实推断数之间的差异不显著;(3)对反事实推断的影响因素方面,结果性质主效应不显著,领域知识主效应显著,两者存在交互作用,当控制语言能力后交互作用不显著。     

反事实思维对行人交通安全行为意向的影响

反事实思维是对过去发生事情进行否定而产生的假设性思维表征,对行为改变和绩效改善有显著影响。因此,作为一种重要的认知策略,反事实思维常常被用于行为干预的研究。本研究采用单因素(反事实启动/经验启动)被试间实验设计,以4种常见的行人不安全行为为实验材料,运用顺序启动范式的语义启动分别激活自变量的两个水平,将遵守交通规则行为意向的评分和反应时双变量作为因变量指标,探索反事实思维对行人安全行为的促进作用。结果表明:与基线水平和经验启动相比,反事实启动诱导产生的行人交通安全行为意向更加积极,并且产生的自动化水平更高。文章最后讨论了研究的理论意义和对安全管理实践的启发。     

事实·修辞·语境——元人吴澄传记的叙事学研究

无论何种传记 ,究其实际不过是一种叙事或一种解释。对传记文献的比较研究 ,其任务不只是进行历史的复原 ,同时还包括叙事学研究。有关传记的叙事学研究 ,将突破个案研究的区域限制而获得对某一时期文化社会心理形势的广泛了解。本文即从叙事学纬度研究吴澄的传记。首先是发现问题 :从校勘入手 ,展示传记被加工的痕迹 ;其次是解释疑问 ,追溯新叙事所以生成的语境 ,考量其得以实现的修辞策略。通过对吴澄传记的叙事学分析 ,揭示 :即使在以真实为生命线的历史传记类著作中 ,修辞策略也屡见不鲜。     

3～5岁幼儿反事实思维的发展研究

该研究采用结果和前提反事实推理任务,选取58名3-5岁幼儿为被试,考察了其反事实思维能力的发展。结果表明:1.3岁儿童在结果反事实推理中的得分显著低于4岁和5岁儿童,而4岁和5岁儿童的得分并不存在显著差异;2.幼儿的前提反事实推理因结构和方向不同而表现出不同的年龄变化趋势;3.幼儿产生的上行和下行反事实论断之间不存在显著差异。如成人一样,幼儿较少产生减法反事实。     

Counterfactual Discourse in Context

The classic Lewis‐Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals captures that Sobel sequences are consistent sequences, for example:

• a. If Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro dance.
• b. But if Sophie had gone to the parade and been stuck behind someone tall, she would not have seen Pedro dance.

But reverse a sequence like this one and it no longer sounds so good, which is surprising on the classic semantics. This observation motivated Kai von Fintel (2001) and Thony Gillies (2007) to propose dynamic semantic accounts of counterfactual conditionals. Subsequently, Sarah Moss (2012) defended the classic semantics against the charge that it need be abandoned in the face of these order effects, arguing that the infelicity of the reverse sequences is pragmatic. I argue that both accounts are ultimately untenable, but each account has strengths. Seeing what works and what doesn't in each account points the way to the right positive view. With this in mind, I defend a contextualist account of counterfactuals that takes conversational relevance to play a central role.     

Counterfactual potency

Counterfactual thoughts typically take the form of implied or explicit if-then statements. We propose that the multiplicative combination of "if likelihood" (the degree to which the antecedent condition of the counterfactual is perceived to be likely) and "then likelihood" (the perceived conditional likelihood of the outcome of the counterfactual, given the antecedent condition) determine the strength and impact of counterfactuals. This construct, termed counterfactual potency, is a reliable predictor of the degree of influence of counterfactual thinking upon judgments of regret, causation, and responsibility. Through 4 studies, we demonstrate the predictive power of this construct in a variety of contexts and show that it plays a causal role in determining the strength of the effects of counterfactual thought. Implications of counterfactual potency as a central factor of counterfactual influence are discussed.     

Attributionism and Counterfactual Robustness

In this journal (AJP 2016), Vishnu Sridharan presents a novel objection to attributionism, the view according to which agents are responsible for their conduct when it reflects who they are or what they value. The key to Sridharan's objection is that agents can fulfil all attributionist conditions for responsibility while being under the control of a manipulator. In this paper, we show that Sridharan's objection falls prey to a dilemma—either his manipulator is counterfactually robust, or she is not—and that neither of its horns undermines attributionism.     

Reversing the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation

The counterfactual analysis of causation has focused on one particular counterfactual conditional, taking as its starting‐point the suggestion that C causes E iff (～C □→ ～E). In this paper, some consequences are explored of reversing this counterfactual, and developing an account starting with the idea that C causes E iff (～E □→ ～C). This suggestion is discussed in relation to the problem of pre‐emption. It is found that the ‘reversed’ counterfactual analysis can handle even the most difficult cases of pre‐emption with only minimal complications. The paper closes with a discussion of the wider philosophical implications of developing a reversed counterfactual analysis, especially concerning the differentiation of causes from causal conditions, causation by absences, and the extent to which causes suffice for their effects.     

Causation and Counterfactual Dependence

Recently Stephen Barker has raised stimulating objections to the thesis that, roughly speaking, if two events stand in a relation of counterfactual dependence, they stand in a causal relation. As Ned Hall says, however, this thesis constitutes the strongest part of the counterfactual analysis of causation. Therefore, if successful, Barker’s objections will undermine the cornerstone of the counterfactual analysis of causation, and hence give us compelling reasons to reject the counterfactual analysis of causation. I will argue, however, that they do not withstand scrutiny.     

Counterfactual Logic and the Necessity of Mathematics

Journal of Philosophical Logic - This paper is concerned with counterfactual logic and its implications for the modal status of mathematical claims. It is most directly a response to an ambitious...