对充分条件句语义关系的概念理解与逻辑理解的相关与分离

实验用大学生被试考察了充分条件句语义关系表达形式（逻辑形式和概念形式）和条件句类型（五种条件句）对充分条件句语义关系理解的影响。实验结果发现,语义关系表达形式影响被试对条件句中必要性的语义关系理解,而不影响被试对条件句中充分性的语义关系理解,在对条件句前后件之间语义关系的逻辑理解成绩和概念理解成绩之间既有相关又有分离：对是否充分的语义关系的两种理解成绩之间存在相关一致,而对是否必要的语义关系的两种理解成绩之间存在分离;五种条件句在对后件对前件的必要性的知觉难易程度受条件句意义内容的影响而存在明显差异,这种差异导致被试对许可句和定义句的后件必要性理解成绩高于对偶然句、义务句和因果句的后件必要性理解成绩。     

一个匹配生成更新语义的条件句系统

条件句系统通常用择类语义来刻画,此语义对条件句逻辑来说是标准的。一个择类模型可以用一个三元组（W,f,V）来表示,其中W≠Φ,f是从P（W）×W到P（W）中的择类函数,且V是从一命题变元集PV到P（W）中的赋值函数。本文我们提出一个更新语义,它保留择类框架,但V被从PV到P（W）^P（W）中的一个更新函数代替,因为更新函数能表示动态命题而赋值函数则不能。最后我们证明一个条件句系统相对这样的语义有框架可靠性。     

Hiddleston因果模型语义学以及前进式与回溯式反事实条件句的区别（英文）

某些案例显示反事实条件句(counterfactual conditionals)是有"内在歧义的"(inherently ambiguous),即同一句反事实条件句既可以表达"前进式反事实条件句"(forward-tracking counterfactuals)也可以表达"回溯式反事实条件句"(backtracking counterfactuals)。在之前的文章中(Lee 2015,Lee 2016),我提出一个因果模型反事实条件句语义学(causal modeling semantics of counterfactuals),主张反事实条件句的内在歧义性是由不同的因果操弄(causal manipulation)所产生的。在一篇很重要的论文中(Hiddleston 2005),Eric Hiddleston提出一个截然不同的因果模型反事实条件句语义学,并宣称这个语义学可以解释反事实条件句的内在歧义性。本文将介绍上述两个因果模型反事实条件句语义学,并试图论证本人的语义学比Hiddleston的语义学能够更好地处理反事实条件句的内在歧义性。     

条件推理的语义关系表达形式效应

作者用以大学生为被试的实验考察, 基本条件句语义关系表达形式(充分关系、必要关系和析取关系表达形式)和作为心理模型外显建构的可能性判断任务对条件推理的可能影响。实验结果发现, 条件推理的语义关系表达形式效应显著, 条件句语义关系表达形式对被试条件推理有显著的影响, 条件推理成绩随条件句语义关系表达的外显程度增加而增加; 被试在可能性判断任务中对条件句所含心理模型的外显建构并没有明显改善条件推理的成绩; 在有可能性判断任务条件下, 被试外显心理模型建构的成绩变化模式并不能一致地预测条件推理成绩的变化模式。这些结果说明, 人们的条件推理可能并不是完全基于心理模型建构, 而是还受对条件句前后件之间语义关系理解的影响; 条件句表达形式中语义关系的外显内隐模式影响对条件句语义关系的知觉理解难易, 从而影响相应条件推理的成绩。     

排他性论证与对应关系——以“反事实条件句分析”为例

在排他性论证的讨论中,班尼特、钟磊等人从反事实条件句出发展开讨论。本文以他们的"反事实条件句分析"为例,考察了排他性论证中的附生性和因果关系,认为它们都只表达了一种对应关系。所以,从对应关系的层面重构排他性论证及相关讨论,对于把握排他性问题的本质是有益的。进一步的分析表明,排他性论证之所以成立,是因为人们等同地处理了精神因果和物理因果。但是物理因果发生在空间中,精神因果则不是,正是对它们的等同处理导致了排他性论证中的冲突。     

充分条件句语义关系知觉对条件推理的影响

作者通过实验考察了大学生被试对五种充分条件句语义关系知觉对其条件推理的影响。两个实验的结果表明,被试对条件句中前后件之间语义关系的知觉理解影响和调节其相应的条件推理的成绩。实验1新发现,被试对充分条件句后件对前件必要性的知觉理解存在难易差异,对许可句和定义句的后件必要性容易知觉,对偶然句、义务句和因果句的后件必要性难以知觉。实验2新发现,被试对充分条件句后件对前件必要性的知觉理解的难易差异导致被试在否定后件式推理成绩上的差异,对许可句和定义句的否定后件式推理成绩显著高于对偶然句、义务句和因果句的否定后件式推理成绩,对充分条件句否定后件式推理成绩随对后件必要性知觉增加而增加。     

基于语义的词汇判断的计算模型

词汇判断是一种在字词认知研究中广泛使用的实验范式。本文提出了一个基于分布式语义表征的计算模型,用来解释某些在词汇判断作业中出现的实验现象。模型是一个包括词形层、隐层、语义层、词典层和判断层的前传网络。词形层、隐层和语义层之间的连接权重在学习过程中被不断调整,使用反传算法进行学习。语义层、词典层和判断层之间的连接权重在学习前就已被固定,在学习过程中不进行调整。模型模拟了在词汇判断作业中出现的四种实验现象：（１）频率效应;（２）语义启动效应;（３）频率与语境的交互作用;（４）重复启动效应。模型所表现出的行为特性由模型的框架和学习算法所决定。     

句子背景下缺失音素的中文听觉词理解的音、义激活进程（Ⅰ）

听觉词的语义激活过程是认知心理学和心理语言学的热点问题。近期出现了两种假设：（1）全部通达理论;（2）语义背景依赖假设。采用缺失音素的中文双字词为材料,考察了中文听觉词的语音、语义激活进程。实验1考察了影响缺失音素的中文听觉词语音、语义激活的因素;实验2考察了在听觉词理解初期,词义提取是否存在句子背景效应。结果表明：（1）对缺失音素的中文听觉词识别受听觉词语音和句子语义背景影响;（2）句子语义背景在缺失音素的中文听觉词识别之初就开始发挥作用,并一直影响着中文听觉词的理解。     

汉语双字词超音段信息在语义激活中的作用

采用眼动方法,通过两个实验考察了汉语双字词超音段信息在语义激活中的作用。结果显示：（1）汉语双字词语义激活过程中,分别改变首字声调和尾字声调对语义激活起到抑制作用,首字声调改变时的抑制作用更大。结果支持了Cohort模型。（2）语义相关词的注视点和注视时间远远多于其控制词,但没有发现词频效应。（3）汉语声调的加工过程与声韵母一样,独立作用于语义激活过程。     

NTV观点引发的逻辑哲学问题——直陈条件句能嵌套吗

NTV观点的核心思想是直陈条件句不是命题,它没有真值条件并且无真值,其既不为真也不为假,而只表现为一个相应的概率值。这就引发了一个有争论的逻辑哲学问题——直陈条件句能否嵌套。如果把直陈条件句视为无真值的,那么嵌套后的复合条件句就不能判断其真假（真值表不能使用）。对于直陈条件句能否嵌套的问题,学界有不同的观点,我们认为要完全解决真之条件主义与条件概率主义两者之间的矛盾是非常困难的,然而,完全接受条件概率论题的哲学后果是非常危险的,同样,暗示放弃真之语义观也是非常危险的。     

Counterfactual Discourse in Context

The classic Lewis‐Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals captures that Sobel sequences are consistent sequences, for example:

• a. If Sophie had gone to the parade, she would have seen Pedro dance.
• b. But if Sophie had gone to the parade and been stuck behind someone tall, she would not have seen Pedro dance.

But reverse a sequence like this one and it no longer sounds so good, which is surprising on the classic semantics. This observation motivated Kai von Fintel (2001) and Thony Gillies (2007) to propose dynamic semantic accounts of counterfactual conditionals. Subsequently, Sarah Moss (2012) defended the classic semantics against the charge that it need be abandoned in the face of these order effects, arguing that the infelicity of the reverse sequences is pragmatic. I argue that both accounts are ultimately untenable, but each account has strengths. Seeing what works and what doesn't in each account points the way to the right positive view. With this in mind, I defend a contextualist account of counterfactuals that takes conversational relevance to play a central role.     

Content in a Dynamic Context

The standing tradition in theorizing about meaning, since at least Frege (1882), identifies meaning with propositions, which are, or determine, the truth‐conditions of a sentence in a context. But a recent trend has advocated a departure from this tradition: in particular, it has been argued that modal claims do not express standard propositional contents. This non‐propositionalism has received different implementations in expressivist semantics (Moss, 2015; Swanson, 2006; Yalcin, 2007) and certain kinds of dynamic semantics (Gillies, 2004, 2010; von Fintel and Gillies, 2007; Veltman, 1985, 1996). They maintain that the key aspect of interpretation of modal claims is the characteristic dynamic effect they have on the context. I argue that pessimism about truth‐conditions arises from an overly simplistic picture of content, context and their interaction. While I agree with the critics that an important aspect of modal meaning is the dynamic effect modals have on the context, I argue that they have mischaracterized the nature and the complexity of this effect. A more nuanced account of the interaction between modals and context shows that far from being incompatible with propositional meaning, the dynamic aspect of meaning is precisely what allows us to predict the correct propositional content of an utterance.     

Estimating Conditional Chances and Evaluating Counterfactuals

The paper addresses a puzzle about the probabilistic evaluation of counterfactuals, raised by Ernest Adams as a problem for his own theory. I discuss Brian Skyrms’s response to the puzzle. I compare this puzzle with other puzzles about counterfactuals that have arisen more recently. And I attempt to solve the puzzle in a way that is consistent with Adams’s proposal about counterfactuals.     

III. Counterfactuals and the new economic history

In discussing Elster's views on the use of counterfactuals and on the nature of contradictions in society, it is contended that, in general, these will not seem especially controversial to those trained in neoclassical economics. Similarly, there is little disagreement in principle between the views of many ‘new economic historians’ and Elster on the use of counterfactuals in the study of historical problems. In evaluating Elster's critique of several applications of counterfactuals in the ‘new economic history’, it is argued that the concentration on broad philosophical questions may obscure the point that much recent controversy is based upon disagreements concerning factual issues and the nature of empirical relationships and magnitudes.     

Upward and Downward Counterfactual Thought After Loss: A Multiwave Controlled Longitudinal Study

Counterfactual thoughts, mental simulations about how a situation may have turned out differently (i.e., “if only …, then …”), can reduce mental health after stressful life-events. However, how specific counterfactual thought types relate to post-loss mental health problems is unclear. We hypothesized that self-referenced upward counterfactuals (i.e., “If only I had done …, then the current situation would be better”) may serve as cognitive avoidance, thereby perpetuating loss-related distress. Conversely, downward counterfactuals (i.e., “If … had happened, then the current situation could have been [even] worse”) may facilitate benefit finding, thereby reducing distress. In a longitudinal survey, self-referent, other-referent, and nonreferent upward counterfactuals, and nonreferent downward counterfactuals were assessed at baseline. Prolonged grief and depression symptoms were assessed at baseline, and 6- and 12-month follow-ups. Multiple regression analyses assessed associations between counterfactual thoughts and symptom levels in 65 recently bereaved people who generated counterfactual thoughts about the loss-event. Moderator analyses assessed the unicity of significant effects in the previous step, by comparing these effects in 59 people generating loss-related counterfactuals with those in 59 propensity-score matched participants generating counterfactuals about other negative life-events. Multivariate analyses showed that nonreferent upward counterfactuals were uniquely strongly positively associated with prolonged grief and depression symptoms concurrently. Self-referent upward counterfactuals were uniquely positively associated with prolonged grief and depression symptoms longitudinally. Moderator analyses confirmed that thinking about how one’s (in)actions could prevent a death uniquely exacerbated prolonged grief and depression severity. Prolonged grief treatment may be improved by targeting self-blame and guilt.     

Counterfactual thinking and regulatory focus: implications for action versus inaction and sufficiency versus necessity

Counterfactual thinking is associated with regulatory focus in a way that explains previous empirical incongruities, such as whether additive counterfactuals (mutations of inactions) occur more or less frequently than subtractive counterfactuals (mutations of actions). In Experiment 1, regulatory focus moderated this pattern, in that additive counterfactuals were activated by promotion failure, whereas subtractive counterfactuals were activated by prevention failure. In Experiment 2, additive counterfactuals evoked a promotion focus and expressed causal sufficiency, whereas subtractive counterfactuals evoked a prevention focus and expressed causal necessity. In Experiment 3, dejection activated additive counterfactuals, whereas agitation activated subtractive counterfactuals. These findings illuminate the interconnections among counterfactual thinking, motivation, and goals.     

Probabilities of counterfactuals and counterfactual probabilities

Probabilities figure centrally in much of the literature on the semantics of conditionals. I find this surprising: it accords a special status to conditionals that other parts of language apparently do not share. I critically discuss two notable ‘probabilities first’ accounts of counterfactuals, due to Edgington and Leitgeb. According to Edgington, counterfactuals lack truth values but have probabilities. I argue that this combination gives rise to a number of problems. According to Leitgeb, counterfactuals have truth conditions-roughly, a counterfactual is true when the corresponding conditional chance is sufficiently high. I argue that problems arise from the disparity between truth and high chance, between approximate truth and high chance, and from counterfactuals for which the corresponding conditional chances are undefined. However, Edgington, Leitgeb and I can unite in opposition to Stalnaker and Lewis-style ‘similarity’ accounts of counterfactuals.     

Decisions about a crime: downward and upward counterfactuals

Deciding about people’s responsibility, intentions and need for punishment is particularly hard and it may be often associated with counterfactual thinking, which refers to the creation of mental alternatives to actual events. Ninety-three participants were asked to generate downward or upward counterfactuals regarding a given criminal event and, then, to give judgments about defendant’s predictability, responsibility, intentionality and punishment. Results showed that downward counterfactuals had led people to judge the event less intentional, the defendant less responsible and, therefore, to give him a less severe punishment (vice versa for upward). The relationship between counterfactuals and intentionality judgments was partially mediated by the perceived defendant’s predictability of the negative outcomes. Finally, downward counterfactuals were linked to a greater focus on the context (external factors), whereas upward counterfactuals on the defendant/victim’s behaviours (internal factors). Findings were discussed considering both theoretical decision-making models and applications on the judicial field.     

Morgenbesser’s Coin, Counterfactuals, and Causal Versus Probabilistic Independence

It is widely held that, as Morgenbesser’s case is usually taken to show, considerations of causal or probabilistic dependence should enter into the evaluation of counterfactuals. This paper challenges that idea. I present a modified version of Morgenbesser’s case and show how probabilistic approaches to counterfactuals are in serious trouble. Specifically, I show how probabilistic approaches run into a dilemma in characterizing probabilistic independence. The modified case also illustrates a difficulty in defining causal independence. I close with a suggestion for a strategy to handle this difficulty.     

Counterfactual thinking and stereotypes: The nonconformity effect

Past research has shown that counterfactual thinking (‘if only…’) is related to judgements of responsibility for negative events. It has also shown that behaviours deviating from the target's own behavioural standard (intrapersonal norm) are likely to trigger counterfactuals—the so‐called exceptional‐routine effect. In the present research, we demonstrate that behaviours deviating from a social category's behavioural standard (social norm) are also likely to trigger counterfactuals—what may be called the nonconformity effect. Two studies investigated counterfactual thinking regarding a rape case, classifying counterfactuals according to their conformity versus nonconformity to relevant social norms, and their focus on actions versus inactions. In Study 1, participants with higher endorsement of the rape victim stereotype generated more counterfactuals on the victim's non‐conforming inactions than did participants with lower stereotype endorsement. The presence of a nonconformity effect was confirmed in Study 2, where participants rated their agreement with externally generated counterfactuals. Moreover, in Study 2, counterfactuals focused on the victim's non‐conforming inactions predicted responsibility attribution to the victim through the mediating role of perceived avoidability of the event. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.