道德自律与道德风险

道德自律是一种高级的道德情感与道德理性在个体人格上的典型表现,是个体对社会共同生活经验中的善恶观点的独立辨识与自我约束的统一.它的基础是道德需要的发生与发展.道德需要是个体需要,是道德个体承担道德使命的动机来源.而道德需要又是存在于价值运动个体化的全过程中.由于价值运动个体化在性质、水平、方向等方面受制于社会经济关系,这使得社会个体的道德需要不可能在社会规模上获得完全的一致性.其中,最典型的是两个相反方向的个体化现象:利己主义与利他主义.     

最真实的需要——评《道德需要论》

道德需要是伦理学的一个重要的理论问题,涉及道德的起源、本质、功能等多方面的内容,是考察个体道德和群体道德发生的一个重要环节,也是道德原则、规范得以确立的一个重要心理依据.道德需要也是一个重要的现实课题.     

道德需要、道德层次与新时期道德建设

道德需要、道德层次与新时期道德建设陈小明一、道德需要与道德层次道德不仅是客观规范,而且也是人的内在需要。个人之所以需要道德,是因为：第一,道德是使个人在社会中得以生存的必要条件。道德是运用社会舆论、良心等力量来影响人的行为、协调人际关系的行为规范。社...     

道德需要范畴刍议

道德需要是主体意识到道德与其生存和发展的价值、意义后而对道德产生的心理倾向。道德需要作为人的特殊的高级需要 ,具有功利性和超功利性的二重属性。     

公益性社会组织的道德自律机制研究

公益性社会组织的社会性、志愿性、公益性或互益性,正与新时代人民日益增长的美好生活需要相契合。公益性社会组织的治理与发展需要合理、有效的制度约束,但不能仅仅凭借互益所依赖的成员相互监督、促进的他律性机制实现其良性运转,而必须通过由外部可见的道德自律展现出其良好的公益形象。从组织伦理视角看,公益性社会组织在道德自律机制上的特殊性主要体现为它对个体品德的超越性、对组织伦理能力的依赖性和不同体制、结构下道德自律机制的差异性等方面。公益性社会组织的道德自律机制,主要通过基于个体道德需要的自律、基于权威或公议的自律、基于心理契约或互信的自律、基于制度自觉的自律以及基于组织伦理能力的自律等几方面共同作用得以顺利、有效地运行。     

一九八八年上半年报刊部分伦理学论文索引

马克思主义关于人的需要的理论与马克思主义的道 德观 王淑芹 北京师院学报 4按道德的自身规律建设道德 张善诚 厦门日报 (闽)3.5略论个人道德创造与道德进化 韩东屏 广州研究 2道德本质再探 曲炜 福建论坛 3自我实现的个体道德需要是人类道德的内驱力 肖群忠 光明日报 4.18论道德的主体性 贝月 哲学探讨 3论道德的激励功能 李健 社会科学(上海)6利益如何作为道德的基础 林恒森 贵州教育学院     

论竞技体育主体的道德需要

竞技体育主体从广义上来说包括竞技体育所有的参与者;从狭义上来说,则主要指竞技体育的直接参与者——运动员。竞技体育主体的道德需要是其作为人的本质规定性所决定的,这种道德需要体现为主体内在的道德素养和运动外在的道德规范。竞技体育主体的道德需要对竞技体育主体具有重要作用,主要通过提高主体的道德能力和完善体育制度来实现。     

论道德内化的心理机制及其特征

所谓道德内化,是指个体在后天的社会生活和实践中,经过一定方式的社会学习,接受社会的道德教化,将社会的道德原则、规范和要求转化为其自身的道德需要,形成其自身稳定的道德人格特质和道德行为反应模式的过程。道德内化的心理机制是道德主体的自我意识,它一般由“由我是什么”、“我应当成为什么”和“我必须成为什么”三个逻辑环节组成。道德内化具有他律性和自律性相统一、平衡性和失衡性相统一、共同性和差异性相统一、阶段性和整体性相统一等特点。     

目前的道德需要“重建”还是“创建”？

目前的道德需要“重建”还是“创建”？章海山由于我国已进入新时期,市场经济逐渐代替传统的计划经济,有人认为在新形势下需要“重建”道德以代替传统道德。对于重建道德的理由主要有：认为市场经济与计划经济有本质区别,因此适应市场经济的道德需要重建;认为新民主义...     

从个体伦理到“集体与个体”二维伦理——论当代集体主义道德建构路径

集体主义道德需要在当代语境中予以诠释。这一诠释的立意在于强调集体主义道德话语需要凸显其对成员个体的尊严、自由、权利和利益的关怀与保障, 并在提供这种关怀与保障的基础上对集体主义之“整体利益”的道德合法性提供论证。不仅如此, 集体主义话语还必须对当代伦理学前沿话语作出回应。这一切正是集体主义道德的传统所未予言说的东西, 也是其在当代社会中陷入困境的根源所在。一、传统集体主义话语解读传统集体主义道德意识形态是中国社会主义传统制度语境中的显性话语。不可否认, 随着市场经济所衍生的道德关系、道德原则、道德标准、…     

移情对亲社会行为决策的两种功能

移情对亲社会行为决策具有动机功能和信息功能。霍夫曼认为,移情忧伤不仅能够作为亲社会道德动机促进亲社会行为的产生,而且能够激活观察者的道德原则,进而引发亲社会行为。巴特森强调移情不仅能够增强解除他人困境的动机,而且带有重视他人福利和想使他人困境得到解除的程度的信息。移情的动机功能依赖于诱发移情的情境,而信息功能具有稳定的倾向性,比动机功能更持久,两种功能共同作用使移情在亲社会行为决策中具有更强的适应性。移情功能理论对道德教育具有启示作用。     

道德教育：在日常生活与非日常生活之间

道德教育应当回归生活世界,已成为解决当前道德教育弊病的一种共识。但是如何回归,这是一个有待深入探讨的问题。从道德教育与生活世界共在同构的基础上,我们可把生活世界划分为日常生活世界与非日常生活世界,因此,针对当今道德教育的弊端,我们认为道德教育应当在日常生活与非日常生活之间的张力结构中博弈式存在。     

A social cognitive explanation of situational and individual effects on moral sensitivity

Models of moral decision making describe the process as beginning with the recognition of moral content in the decision environment. This recognition ability, or moral sensitivity, represents a key input to moral decision making. Adopting a social cognitive perspective, this paper studies the degree to which moral sensitivity is explained in terms of moral schema activation. In a single experiment, two situational factors (moral content priming and issue moral intensity) and two individual characteristics (moral identity and need for cognition) are tested for their effects on moral sensitivity. Results support the social cognitive explanation of moral sensitivity. The moral schema's propensity for activation, development, and accessibility significantly influence the ability to recognize moral issues in the decision environment.     

The importance of what they care about

Many forms of contemporary morality treat the individual as the fundamental unit of moral importance. Perhaps the most striking example of this moral vision of the individual is the contemporary global human rights regime, which treats the individual as, for all intents and purposes, sacrosanct. This essay attempts to explore one feature of this contemporary understanding of the moral status of the individual, namely the moral significance of a subject’s actual affective states, and in particular her cares and commitments. I argue that in virtue of the moral significance of actual individuals, we should take actual cares and values very seriously—even if those cares and values are not expressions of the person’s autonomy—as partially constituting that individual as a concrete subject who is the proper object of our moral attention. In particular, I argue that a person’s actual cares and values have non-derivative moral significance. Simply because someone cares about something, that care is morally significant. In virtue of this non-derivative moral significance of cares, we ought to adopt of a commitment to accommodate others’ cares and a commitment not to frustrate their cares.     

试论甲型H1N1流感防控中个体的道德责任

甲型H1N1的防控不仅是国家、政府、专门机构及专业人员的责任,同时也是每个社会成员应该承担的责任。个体责任缺失是甲型H1N1在我国流行的主要原因之一。导致个体道德责任缺失的原因主要包括：社会中主体的原子化对个体道德责任的排斥、非理性社会心理对个体道德责任的冲击和公共卫生防疫体制中薄弱环节对个体道德责任的影响。基于道德责任产生的基础不同,不同的个体应该承担不同的道德责任。     

青少年网络不道德行为与父母教养方式的关系——道德脱离、责任心、道德同一性的中介作用

研究采用问卷法,对764名青少年进行测试,用结构方程模型检验了教养方式、责任心、道德同一性、道德脱离和网络不道德行为之间的关系模型。结果表明,拒绝型教养方式通过责任心、道德同一性和道德脱离的中介来间接影响网络不道德行为。责任心可以直接作用于网络不道德行为,也可以通过道德脱离的中介来影响网络不道德行为。道德同一性只能通过道德脱离来影响不道德行为。     

儿童道德义愤的发展及其对第三方公正行为的影响

为了探讨儿童道德义愤的发展及其对第三方公正行为的影响，实验1考察106名幼儿园大班、小学2年级和4年级儿童的道德义愤在年级以及数目和价值不公平分配上的差异；实验2考察57名小学儿童在有无代价条件下，其道德义愤对第三方公正行为的影响。结果表明：儿童的道德义愤呈现随年级增长而不断增强的趋势；儿童由数目不公平分配引发的道德义愤得分显著高于价值不公平分配；幼儿园大班和2年级儿童在数目不公平分配中的道德义愤得分均显著高于价值不公平分配，而4年级儿童在数目和价值不公平分配中的道德义愤得分不存在显著差异；诱发道德义愤的儿童更多地做出第三方公正行为，并且更愿意选择补偿受害者；在不同诱发道德义愤条件下，是否需要付出代价都不会影响儿童的第三方公正行为。研究说明儿童的道德义愤随年级增长而发展，并影响第三方公正行为。     

The Consequences of Individual Consumption: A Defence of Threshold Arguments for Vegetarianism and Consumer Ethics

As a moral foundation for vegetarianism and other consumer choices, act consequentialism can be appealing. When we justify our consumer and dietary choices this way, however, we face the problem that our individual actions rarely actually precipitate more just agricultural and economic practices. This threshold or individual impotence problem engaged by consequentialist vegetarians and their critics extends to morally motivated consumer decision‐making more generally, anywhere a lag persists between individual moral actions taken and systemic moral progress made. Regan and others press just this point against Singer's utilitarian basis for vegetarianism; recently Chartier criticizes act‐consequentialist vegetarianism by identifying many factors weakening the connection between individual meat purchases and changes in animal production. While such factors are relevant to act‐consequentialist moral reasoning, I argue, they need not defeat the act‐consequentialist case for vegetarianism and consumer ethics. This is shown by offering a probabilistic account of the threshold issue and discussing the positive and negative role‐modelling effects of our morally motivated dietary and consumer choices.     

The Moral Dimensions of Infrastructure

Moral issues in urban planning involving technology, residents, marginalized groups, ecosystems, and future generations are complex cases, requiring solutions that go beyond the limits of contemporary moral theory. Aside from typical planning problems, there is incongruence between moral theory and some of the subjects that require moral assessment, such as urban infrastructure. Despite this incongruence, there is not a need to develop another moral theory. Instead, a supplemental measure that is compatible with existing moral positions will suffice. My primary goal in this paper is to explain the need for this supplemental measure, describe what one looks like, and show how it works with existing moral systems. The secondary goal is to show that creating a supplemental measure that provides congruency between moral systems that are designed to assess human action and non-human subjects advances the study of moral theory.     

Individual Moral Development and Moral Progress

At first glance, one of the most obvious places to look for moral progress is in individuals, in particular in moral development from childhood to adulthood. In fact, that moral progress is possible is a foundational assumption of moral education. Beyond the general agreement that moral progress is not only possible but even a common feature of human development things become blurry, however. For what do we mean by ‘progress’? And what constitutes moral progress? Does the idea of individual moral progress presuppose a predetermined end or goal of moral education and development, or not? In this article we analyze the concept of moral progress to shed light on the psychology of moral development and vice versa; these analyses are found to be mutually supportive. We suggest that: moral progress should be conceived of as development that is evaluated positively on the basis of relatively stable moral criteria that are the fruit and the subject of an ongoing conversation; moral progress does not imply the idea of an end-state; individual moral progress is best conceived of as the development of various components of moral functioning and their robust integration in a person’s identity; both children and adults can progress morally - even though we would probably not speak in terms of progress in the case of children - but adults’ moral progress is both more hard-won and to a greater extent a personal project rather than a collective effort.