Aids,myth, and ethics

The present paper is a commentary on an article by Larry Churchill [1]. Churchill has argued that the negative attitudes and adverse behavior we commonly encounter in connection with (suspected) AIDS patients may be understood in terms of a dualistic myth inspiring a ritual avoidance of dirt, of dirt as something that does not belong to a clean world order. The deep-seated mythical character of attitudes and behavior here makes them less accessible to the kind of rational argument commonly employed in ethics. Churchill also proposes a remedy for the (morally outrageous) dualistic mythical-ritual behavior he has focused — a remedy that may be overly intellectualistic.Three further comments are made: on the metaphorical meaning of myth, on a reductionist tendency in Churchill's deep-looking project, and on an ethically crucial ambiguity in the meaning of the other person's otherness. These (mildly critical) comments do not, however, detract from a positive overall evaluation of Churchill's basic idea that we will understand more about adverse attitudes and behavior in connection with AIDS if we think in terms of myth, ritual, dirt, and cleanliness.     

Foucault on the Case: The Pastoral and Juridical Foundation of Medical Power

This paper employs Foucaults concept of governmentality to examine critically the efforts by medical humanists to reform the medical case. I argue that these reform efforts contribute to the individualizing dimensions of medical power through the development of a pastoral technique that medicine has taken over from religious authority. Clinical experiences at this NEH Institute also revealed a juridical dimension of the medical case that treats a patients statements as suspect and in need of corroboration by evidence provided by the patients body. The combination of these pastoral and juridical dimensions of the case contributes to the normalizing power of modern medicine, and medical humanists need to be aware of their own contribution to this form of power as they reform the case.     

Richard Zaner’s Phenomenology of the Clinical Encounter

The clinical ethics propounded by Richard Zaner is unique. Partly because of his phenomenological orientation and partly because of his own daily practice as a clinical ethicist in a large university hospital, Zaner focuses on the particular concrete situations in which patients and their families confront illness and injury and struggle toward workable ways for dealing with them. He locates ethical reality in the clinical encounter. This encounter encompasses not only patient and physician but also the patients family and friends and indeed the entire lifeworld in which the patient is still striving to live. In order to illuminate the central moral constituents of such human predicaments, Zaner discusses the often-overlooked features of disruption and crisis, the changed self, the patients dependence and the physicians power, the violation of personal boundaries and their necessary reconfiguring, and the art of listening.     

Between Science and Nature: Interpreting Lactation Failure in Elizabeth von Arnim's The Pastor's Wife

Interpreting a scene of lactation failure allows us to represent breast-feeding as a contested social practice. This essay reads a novelistic scene of lactation failure in the context of the decline of breast-feeding in the twentieth century. The protagonist's ignorance of the female experiences of pregnancy, childbirth, and lactation is an effect of her objectification within the opposition between science and nature. Unnatural as a woman because she is a natural individual, the pastor's wife exemplifies the dilemmas of breast-feeding as a biosocial practice of maternity in a technological society which features the breakdown of traditional female networks in which knowledge about maternity and breast-feeding are circulated.     

From principles to principals: The new direction in medical ethics

Many alternatives or supplements to principalism seek to reconnect medical ethics with the thoughts, feelings, and motivations of the persons directly involved in ethically troublesome situations. This shift of attention, from deeds to doers, from principles to principals, acknowledges the importance of the moral agents involved in the situation — particular practitioners, patients, and families. Taking into account the subjective, lived experience of moral decision-making parallels recent efforts in the teaching of medicine to give the patient's subjectivity — his or her personal experience of being sick or disabled — epistemological parity with scientific medicine's objective, biomedically-oriented view of the person's sickness or disability.Moreover, the shift from principalism to principals signals a growing realization that ethical problems in the profession of medicine are inseparable from its practice. Philosophers and other humanists working in medicine should resist the temptation to institutionalize a professional role as solver of ethical problems, clarifier of values, or mediator of disputes and work instead to help practitioners practice medicine reflectively.     

Ethical Reasoning And The Embodied,Socially Situated Subject

My discussion is concerned with how symbolic power constitutively structures our very identities in relation to one another and at the bodily level of lived experience. Although many accounts of the self and of subjectivity as socially situated have difficulties in their explanations of agency, Zaners work suggests a basis upon which the selfs independence from others can be understood. His phenomenology of embodied subjectivity explains how the emerging self presupposes presence with others. At the same time, however, co-presence also reveals the selfs distinct perspective and capacity for circumstantial possibilizing, that is to say, actualizing another possible than the actual. My aim is to examine critically the intersections between Zaners phenomenology and other theoretical accounts of the socially situated self. I also show how Zaners work contributes to these discussions a way of understanding the possibility of agency that is rooted in embodied experience.     

What is non-fregean in the semantics of Wittgenstein'sTractatus and why?

From J.M. Bocheski's Rady starego filozofa [Advice of the old philosopher]: 6. Pytaj sie Zawsze (i) co to znaczy? i (ii) dlaczego? [Ask always (i) what does it mean? and (ii) why?]     

The observing subject and psychophysiological research: An epistemological discourse

Realizing that scientific knowledge was not based on a simple disclosure of reality, but was rather invented and developed in accordance with our own conceptions and prejudices, it should no longer be possible to consider matters as if they existed independently of us out there.Taking as examples the notions of memory and information we try to elucidate the relevance this perspective has with respect to neuro- and psychophysiological research.     

Moral Responses and Moral Theory: Socially-based Externalist Ethics

The paper outlines a view called social (or two-level) response-dependency as an addition to standard alternatives in metaethics that allows for a position intermediate between standard versions of internalism and externalism on the question of motivational force. Instead of taking psychological responses as either directly supplying the content of ethics (as on emotivist or sentimentalist accounts) or as irrelevant to its content (as in classical versions of Kantian or utilitarian ethics), the view allows them an indirect role, as motivational props to moral teaching and thus to the general institution of moral discourse. However, they are not implied by any particular moral judgment (or speaker), so that amoralism comes out as possible. The response that defines the distinctively moral notion of wrong on this account is the second-level (social) response of forbidding some behavior; but this is ultimately to be understood in terms of (variable) individual reactions. Natural human emotion tendencies thereby constrain the content of ethics, while allowing for some degree of social variation in moral codes.     

Is the mind-body interface microscopic?

This paper puts forward the hypothesis that consciousness might be linked to matter in a way which is more sophisticated than the traditional macroscopic Cartesian hypothesis suggests.Advances in the biophysics of the nervous system, not only on the level of its macroscopic functioning but also on the level of individual ion channels, have made the question of how finely consciousness is tied to matter and its dynamics more important. Quantum mechanics limits the attainable resolution and puts into doubt the idea of an infinitely fine-woven attachment. A recent approach to physics rekindles such a rationalist hope. Endophysics focuses on the global implications of microscopic computer simulations of chemical and biophysical processes. A complete artificial universe can be set up in the computer. It produces non-classical and nonlocal effects inside — on the interface that exists between an internal observer (fluid neuron) and the rest of the world. This interface is finer than any brain property to which the status of the mind-body interface has been attributed hitherto. A new class of experiments becomes possible in the artificial world and, by analogy, in the real world. Magnetic resonance imaging experiments, routinely performed under open-loop conditions, can be repeated under psychophysical (closed-loop) conditions — in search for microscopically induced changes in the perceived and measured structure of the world.     

Логистическая система, исходными связками которой являются эквивалентность и дизъюнкция

- Allatum est die 5 Martii 1970     

Indeterminiertheit,Iterabilität und Intentionalität

In his recent paper Indeterminacy, empiricism, and the first person John R. Searle tries to refute Willard V. O. Quine's famous indeterminacy of translation thesis by arguing that this thesis is in fact areductio ad absurdum of Quine's own linguistic behaviorism. Searle accuses Quine of being (irrationally) antimentalistic and suggests that the absurdity of Quine's thesis might be avoided if a full-fledged intentionality were tolerated in the debate on meaning. — This anti-Quinean approach in some respects reminds of the improbable debate between Searle and Jacques Derrida ten years ago, when Derrida had split and deferred intentionality by showing that the essential iterability of signs inevitably infects every intentional act with an unremovable non-presence.In this paper it is argued that Searle's attacks on Quine and Derrida have both failed — and that there are structural similarities between these two failures which reveal some interesting parallels between Quine's and Derrida's philosophy.     

Listening to a different voice: A feminist critique of Gilligan

A critical examination of Carol Gilligan's study of psychological theory and women's development, this essay begins by exploring her concerns about malebiased developmental theorizing. I consider in detail Gilligan's criticisms of Sigmund Freud and her own empirical studies of moral development, as they relate to the work of L. Kohlberg. After defending Freud to some degree, I propose various (less theoretical but intuitively plausible) alternative interpretations of her data-interviews with males and females about hypothetical ethical dilemmas and with females about actual abortion decisions. I contend that Gilligan is too willing to concede the adequacy of Kohlberg's categories for fathoming the moral reasoning of males and that she may, in consequence, exaggerate differences between males and females. Noting the ironic similarities between Gilligan's claims and Schopenhauer's misogyny, I suggest that there may be something undesirably self-limiting about the different course of development she sketches. To move toward a morally preferable, feminism-compatible version of an ethic of care, I recommend that it be extended — by the imagination — beyond the here and now and that it not be restricted to existing webs of personal relationships.     

Some basic problems in the development of the human sciences in China today

Paper read on November 3, 1988 before the Philosophical Society of Fribourg (Switzerland) — In China we use social sciences to refer to all disciplines in the humanities and the social sciences. The expression is juxtaposed to natural sciences. Since I do not discuss such subjects as economics, education, journalism, and other practical fields, I prefer to use here the term human sciences.     

Language in action

A number of general points behind the story of this paper may be worth setting out separately, now that we have come to the end.There is perhaps one obvious omission to be addressed right away. Although the word information has occurred throughout this paper, it must have struck the reader that we have had nothing to say on what information is. In this respect, our theories may be like those in physics: which do not explain what energy is (a notion which seems quite similar to information in several ways), but only give some basic laws about its behaviour and transmission.     

Definability of directly indecomposable congruence modular algebras

It is proved that the directly indecomposable algebras in a congruence modular equational class form a first-order class provided that fulfils some two natural assumptions.Research supported by CONICOR and SECYT (UNC).Presented by W. Dziobiak     

A Translation of Intuitionistic Predicate Logic into Basic Predicate Logic

Basic Predicate Logic, BQC, is a proper subsystem of Intuitionistic Predicate Logic, IQC. For every formula in the language {, , , , , , }, we associate two sequences of formulas 0,1,... and 0,1,... in the same language. We prove that for every sequent , there are natural numbers m, n, such that IQC , iff BQC n m. Some applications of this translation are mentioned.     

Positive modal logic

We give a set of postulates for the minimal normal modal logicK ₊ without negation or any kind of implication. The connectives are simply , , , . The postulates (and theorems) are all deducibility statements . The only postulates that might not be obvious are

Variations in use of the term “or”

Two studies showed that adults' responses to questions involving the term or varied markedly depending upon the type of question presented. When presented with various objects (A's and B's) and asked to circle all things which are A or B subjects tended to circle A's as well as B's, whereas when asked to circle all the A's or B's subjects showed a relatively stronger tendency to circle one or the other. Moreover the nature of the sets of objects (As and Bs) influenced behavior as well. There was also evidence that the effects due to question wording or set type transferred.