Old is old is old?

We examined potential differences between two matched subgroups of elderly men: young-old (65-74 years of age; n = 53) and old-old (75 years of age and older; n = 56). Subjects were fairly healthy men from community agencies, who were interviewed and tested on a number of characteristics involving personality, mood, attitudes, and behaviors. Although t tests and correlations indicated some differences between the groups, the overall findings underlined their similarity on the vast majority of variables scrutinized. The crucial base for enhancing understanding in gerontology should not only focus on the age-advancing senescent person but on the whole individual.     

Control is good; prediction is better?

Franz Mechsner (2004) suggests that movements are exclusively controlled with respect to the effects that they cause in the external world and that motor control can be reduced to prediction of movement effects. Although predictive mechanisms certainly deserve a lot more attention than they have received in the past, the author argues here that prediction and control must necessarily work together to build a flexible and effective motor system.     

What is spiritual? What is spiritual suffering?

The author offers definitions for "spiritual" and for "spiritual suffering," suggesting that human spiritual needs include Love, Faith, Hope, Virtue, and Beauty. Spiritual suffering is experienced when these needs are unfulfilled. Spiritual care involves assisting in the fulfillment of these needs. He considers the constant movement between spiritual needs and fulfillments, encouraging use of fluid (not static) assessment methods using "spiritual spectra." As a model, this outline of basic spiritual needs may serve as the foundation for many current spiritual assessment tools.     

Where is here? When is now?1

With a Kleinian perspective influenced by Betty Joseph, the author describes the distinctive ‘here and now’ of a psychoanalysis as the place and the time of the patient’s inner subjective world as it emerges in the work of patient and analyst. This psychoanalytic ‘here’ and ‘now’ is examined with clinical material from the analysis of Mr X; first, with an account of the way his analysis begins and then through a detailed session five years later.The author identifies Mr X’s problems with place and time, and how these change over the course of the analysis. He moves from sequestered dyadic relationships towards an Oedipal and family space, and from disconnection and timelessness to acquiring a sense of duration, of being in the present with a past and a future – all of which, the paper aims to show, has implications for technique.     

What is my evidence that here is a cup?

This paper is about Susanna Schellenberg's view on the explanatory role of perceptual experience. I raise a basic question about what the argument for her view might be. Then I develop two new problem cases: one involving “seamless transitions” between perception and hallucination and another involving the graded character of perceptual evidence and justification.     

When is Death Bad,When it is Bad?

Philosophia - On a view most secularists accept, the deceased individual goes out of existence. How, then, can death be a bad thing for, or harm, the deceased? I consider the doctrine of...     

Who is exaggerating cognitive impairment and who is not?

This chart review examined the effects of effort on neuropsychological assessment and test performance patterns among genuine and exaggerating patients, with and without neurological findings, as aids to diagnosing symptom exaggeration. The sample consisted of 561 consecutive patients involved in compensation claims. With a flexible neuropsychological test (NPT) battery, the claims were assessed over 2 days. The sample included 303 patients evaluated for traumatic brain injury, 55 patients with neurological disease, and 203 patients assessed for other conditions (eg, depression or chronic pain). An average of 38 ability measures per patient were used to generate an overall NPT domain score. Composite scores were also computed for symptom validity tests, self-report measures of psychiatric symptoms, and memory complaint inventory. Seven NPT cognitive subdomain scores were multiply regressed onto the symptom validity test composite, accounting for 45% of its total variance. Patients were also assigned to Genuine or Exaggerator groups based on symptom validity test performance. The NPT for Exaggerating patients averaged 1.43 standard deviations below that of Genuine patients, suggesting that NPT scores for most Exaggerating patients are underestimates of their true ability. Factor analysis results differed between these groups. As a result, clinicians might avoid falsely identifying genuine patients as exaggerating by incorporating their self-reports of psychiatric symptoms and memory complaints into the diagnostic process.     

What is iso and what is morphic in isomorphism?

Summary Isomorphism is not a simple concept. As a rule, the term applies to geometrical sameness. However, mathematicians use the term to denote algebriac linear, invertible relationships. Substantively there is also a problem: isomorphism may refer to the brain-experience relation, to the brain-environment relation, or to a three-way relationship of all of these. This commentary summarizes work done and discussions by the author with Wolfgang Köhler regarding these meanings of isomorphism.     

What is Apple-Psych?

Apple Psych, a system of software subroutines written in Apple Pascal and 6502 assembly language, was designed to run real-time psychological experiments on the Apple II, II+, and IIe microcomputers. This paper describes the minimum system requirements necessary to run Apple-Psych, the capabilities of the basic system, and the advantages and disadvantages of using Apple-Psych. Because the utility of a system to a researcher is often linked to its flexibility and expandability, this paper includes a brief discussion of hardware expansions already supported by the Apple Psych software and hardware expansions that would require additional software support.     

What is Sound?

Our standard view about sound is incoherent. On the one hand, we suppose that sound is a quality, not of the object that makes the sound, but of the surrounding medium. This is the supposition of our ordinary language, modern science and a long philosophical tradition. On the other hand, we suppose that sound is the object of hearing. This too is the assumption of ordinary language, modern science and a long philosophical tradition. Yet these two assumptions cannot both be right – not unless we wish to concede that hearing is illusory and that we do not listen to the objects that make sounds. To avoid these consequences we must recognize and repair the inconsistencies contained in our standard view of what sound is. I offer an account that describes sound as a quality belonging, not to the medium, but to the object that makes the sound.
email : pasnau@sju.edu     

What is psychoanalysis?

Although we are now less inclined to argue about whose treatment is entitled to be called psychoanalysis, we will understand current debates better if we revisualize what originally made psychoanalysis different from other treatments. At its birth, psychoanalysis twisted the common-sense treatments it grew out of into very peculiar shapes. In reaction to that extreme peculiarity, a process of normalizing began almost immediately and continues to this day. This process is illustrated by tracing the rise and fall of peculiarities in four aspects: medical procedure, the analyst's vision, the analyst's role, and the sense of time.     

What is Presentism?

Different versions of the A‐theory of time (according to which some instant of time is absolutely, objectively present) are traditionally defined in terms of whether everything is present, or whether there are also past and future things. In this paper I argue that the traditional way of defining A‐theories should be abandoned. I focus on the traditional definition of presentism, according to which always, everything is present (§2). First, I argue that there are good reasons to reject all the most plausible interpretations of the predicate ‘is present’ as it appears in the traditional definition of presentism (§3). It follows that there are also good reasons to reject the most plausible interpretations of the traditional definitions of the other A‐theories. I then argue that there is a better way of defining the A‐theories, in terms of the question of whether existence has a beginning and an end (§4). Finally, I argue that what goes for the traditional definition of presentism goes for the traditional definition of its modal analogue actualism, according to which necessarily, everything is actual (§5): there are good reasons to reject the traditional definition of actualism in favour of a definition in terms of contingent existence.     

Who is approachable?

The consequences of social interaction can be variable, sometimes harmful, but often rewarding. The adaptive social perceiver must therefore determine which interactions are worthwhile pursuing and which are not. The present research investigated whether subtle but meaningful differences in facial expressions are perceived in terms of the affordance of approachability. Participants engaged in simulated social encounters with targets displaying enjoyment smiles, non-enjoyment smiles or neutral expressions while fluctuations in their posture were measured. The results indicated systematic differences in perceived approachability as a function of facial expression and target sex. These findings are discussed in terms of the functional coupling between social perception and action with respect to the information that specifies the affordance of approachability.     

What is Testimony?

C.A.J. Coady, in his book Testimony: A Philosophical Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), offers conditions on an assertion that p to count as testimony. He claims that the assertion that p must be by a competent speaker directed to an audience in need of evidence and it must be evidence that p . I offer examples to show that Coady's conditions are too strong. Testimony need not be evidence; the speaker need not be competent; and, the statement need not be relevant or directed to someone in need of evidence. I give alternative conditions. Coady was led into the stronger conditions by investigating testimony as it occurs in legal contexts, where special steps are taken to ensure that testimony provides the jury or the judge with evidence by a competent speaker that is relevant to the disputed question of the guilt or innocence of the defendant.     

What is Antiphilosophy?

In certain philosophical quarters, a new metaphilosophical position is being discussed—antiphilosophy. Such a position seems to maintain that there is no distinction between philosophy and sophistry, reason and rhetoric, arguing and emoting. This paper examines antiphilosophy. Specifically, it aims to address three interrelated questions: Is antiphilosophy a possible metaphilosophical position? If it is, what characterizes it? And what ramifications would it have? The paper argues that antiphilosophy is possible and is best construed as an attempt to reconstruct philosophical discourse on noncognitive lines. Explicitly, “to assert” and the belief propositional attitude is replaced by “to convince” and a pro‐attitude desire to rhetorically talk someone into something. The paper examines one possible form such a position could take as well as various ramifications of it.