生命伦理学语境中人的尊严

学科语境的首要因素是学科宗旨。生命伦理学以保护人类生命及其相关权利为宗旨,其语境中人的尊严有三个主要特征:以生命尊严为内核,以人格尊严为外围;属于现代人类中心主义价值观;具有指导化解原则冲突、奠基相关权利、贯通法律和政策等作用,是生命伦理学建制化行动的指南。在如何对待人的问题上,"人的尊严"凝聚了宗教和世俗、伦理和法律、政府和民间的道德共识,是生命伦理学的宝贵资源。     

生命伦理学语境中康德尊严观的重新阐释

人的尊严是生命伦理学的核心概念。康德的人性公式在很大程度上塑造了当代生命伦理研究中的尊严观。由于对人性公式的片面理解,生命伦理学中的"康德主义"否定人类尊严的平等性,遮蔽了康德的尊严概念本应具有的重要理论功能。人性公式论述的是尊严的道德要求,而非尊严的基础。构建康德的尊严观,需要超越人性公式之外对康德的尊严理论进行阐释。通过分析人性、人格和道德自主等康德哲学中的重要概念,可以得出以下推论:人类个体的尊严并非来自于个体自主选择的能力,而是来自于个体对人类整体尊严的分享;人类整体的尊严来自人类道德自主的潜力,而非已表现出的能力。这样的尊严观恰恰认可并论证了尊严概念在当代生命伦理研究中所承担的不同于以往的功能,并有助于解决当代生物医学技术的应用所带来的伦理困境。     

医学伦理学与生命伦理学——《中国医学伦理学辞典》条目选载之三

1　医学伦理学 (ｍｅｄｉｃａｌｅｔｈｉｃｓ)对医学伦理学的界定直接与对生命伦理学的界定有关 ,即医学伦理学与生命伦理学是谁包括谁亦或是两个各自独立的学科 ?ＷａｒｒｅｎＲｅｉｃｈ在 1971年准备编写《生命伦理学百科全书》时 ,开始时用的《医学伦理学百科全书》名称 ,可见 ,医学伦理学和生命伦理学已是两个不同的概念。ＤａｎｉｅｌＣａｌｌａｈａｎ在《生命伦理学百科全书》第二版中的生命伦理学条目中 ,把医学伦理学与生命伦理学相比 ,认为“医学伦理学是古老的学科 ,代表很窄的范围 ,只强调医生的道德义务和医患关系 ,虽然在现今…     

论自主性及其在生命伦理学中的意义

本文试图探讨自主性及其对生命伦理学的意义.文章以英国哲学家Onora O'Neill对自主性的质疑为起点,对康德和密尔意义上的自主性概念、以及自主性概念的来源和发展进行分析论证,在此基础上指出,自主性在生命伦理学中所面临的困境,并非如许多哲学家所认为的生命伦理学的自主性与康德意义上的自主性发生了偏离,而是因为在实际运用中自主性的形式与实质被割裂了开来.文章提出,为使尊重自主性原则真正体现保护病人和受试者的利益,不应抛弃形式上的自主性,而应该修复它,并使之更好地体现和服务于实质的自主性.     

生命伦理学视野中的人及其尊严辨义

<正>一、引言生命伦理学许多争论中的核心概念是人的尊严,即争论中赞成和反对的双方都援引人的尊严作为其理据。例如,有人认为,人工流产和安乐死等操控生死的做法其实质就是杀人,是对人的尊严的践踏,所以是应该禁止的;相反,有人则认为,人工流产杀的不是人,安乐死不但没有践踏人的尊严,反而提升了人的尊严,所以是应该允许的。又如,有人认为,辅助生殖、器官移植、克隆、基因增强等生命科学技术的应用是在操控人的生命和生死,把人当做工具,贬损了人的尊     

生命尊严的确立和制度化

人的生命尊严在基督教有完整论证,但其证立需借助神性。理性尊严观、德性尊严观、自主尊严观等确立了人的内在尊严,但同时排除了人的生命尊严。医学伦理学和生命伦理学一方面频繁使用"生命尊严";另一方面对"尊严"循理性主义解释,导致"尊严无用论"和"尊重取代论"出现。人的生命尊严亟需哲学论证。人与万物的物质差异是生命尊严的存在论基础;人与人之间对生命之至上性、关键权益性、神圣不可侵犯性的价值互认是生命尊严的价值论根据。我国生命尊严的制度化有长足进步,但人的生命、健康、安全还面临许多威胁,把生命尊严作为一项制度伦理原则十分必要。     

施韦策及其尊重生命的伦理学一瞥

施韦策尊重生命的伦理学为西方生态伦理学奠定了基础并确定了方向,成为现代环境保护运动的重要思想资源。施韦策认为,万物都有要生存下去的坚强意志,人应当尊重其他生命意志,并与它休戚与共。指出尊重生命的世界观具有宗教性,遵行它即是对上帝的敬畏与崇拜。本文从“求生意志”谈起,通过与通常伦理学相比较,可以显现出施韦策伦理学的特色。     

第三次国际生命伦理学学术会议主题报告：：生命伦理学和社会责任

第三次国际生命伦理学学术会议主题报告：生命伦理学和社会责任美国威斯康星大学教授国际生命伦理学学会主席ＤａｎｉｅｌＷｉｋｌｅｒ什么是生命伦理学家？假定我们可以通过描述生命伦理学这个领域的主题来定义这个角色,然而,生命伦理学的主题一直在变化。生命伦理学已...     

国际生命伦理学和伦理学相对主义

国际生命伦理学和伦理学相对主义美国威斯康星大学教授ＤａｎｉｅｌＷｉｋｌｅｒ国际生命伦理学会会长东亚生命伦理学学术会议（ＥＡＣＢ’９５）召集人邱教授和坂本教授邀请我谈谈伦理学和文化相对主义与国际生命伦理学的关系。这是一项困难的任务,一项超过我个人作为生...     

儒家生命伦理学何以可能?

儒家生命伦理学是否可能,是目前生命伦理学界争论的一个话题。对这一问题最有代表性的诘难是对儒学能否作为我国生命伦理学的思想基础以及儒学能否提供构建当代生命伦理学的理性基础的质疑。本文回应了这两个问题,并且认为儒家生命伦理学不仅必要而且可能,同时分析了儒学与生命伦理学会通的可能性及意义。     

The value of dignity in and for bioethics: rethinking the terms of the debate

The discussion of the nature and value of dignity in and for bioethics concerns not only the importance of the concept but also the aims of bioethics itself. Here, I challenge the claim that the concept of dignity is useless by challenging the implicit conception of usefulness involved. I argue that the conception of usefulness that both opponents and proponents of dignity in bioethics adopt is rooted in a narrow understanding of the role of normative theory in practical ethical thinking. I then offer an alternate understanding of the nature and value of dignity. I begin by recognizing that claims that one’s dignity has been violated point to an important difference between “respect for autonomy” and “respect for persons.” I then suggest three different conceptions of how dignity can be normatively guiding for bioethics, and conclude that, ultimately, understanding dignity as the cornerstone of a reflective perspective that frames moral reflection and deliberation is valuable for doing bioethics well.     

The implausibility of appeals to human dignity: an investigation into the efficacy of notions of human dignity in the transhumanism debate

In recent decades, recourse to notions of human dignity has increased extensively within the field of bioethics. In particular, the notion has been utilised in arguments that seek to constrain a variety of biotechnological endeavours, examples of which include human cloning and transhumanism. In this regard, transhumanism is frequently described as an affront to human dignity in a manner that appears to be aimed at halting the possibility of further debate. The efficacy of the concept of human dignity has itself, however, been questioned. Criticisms include its ambiguous nature and thus the lack of adequate definition by those who utilise it, its supposedly religious undertones as well as the fact that it may be used to argue for diametrically opposing positions within the same argument, due to the existence of distinct and conflicting interpretations. In this paper, I briefly discuss the aims of the transhumanist movement and explicate the concept of human dignity in order to assess one of the most renowned dignity arguments that has been lodged against transhumanism, namely, the argument of the bioconservative thinker Leon Kass. In addition, I discuss the counter-argument of the transhumanist Nick Bostrom. These findings have implications for the concept's efficacy to adjudicate the complex ethical conundrums posed, not only by transhumanism, but in the bioethics arena in general.     

Death with dignity from the Confucian perspective

Death with dignity is a significant issue in modern bioethics. In modern healthcare, the wide use of new technologies at the end of life has caused heated debate on how to protect human dignity. The key point of contention lies in the different understandings of human dignity and the dignity of death. Human dignity has never been a clear concept in Western ethical explorations, and the dignity of death has given rise to more confusions. Although there is no such term as “dignity” in Confucian ethics, there are discussions of a number of ideas related to human dignity and the dignity of death. Therefore, Confucian bioethics can offer a new perspective for understanding the theoretical difficulties associated with the dignity of death and new methods for solving them. In this article, we attempt to reconstruct Confucian views on human dignity and the dignity of death and, based on those views, to analyze the following issues: the relationship between the dignity of death and biological life, the relationship between the dignity of death and suffering, the relationship between the dignity of death and the autonomy of human beings, and the relationship between the dignity of death and social justice. This article will also compare the Confucian views on these issues with the views of Western philosophers. Confucian ethics can offer distinct answers to the above issues and help resolve some confusions concerning concepts and theories in Western research on the dignity of death.     

Respecting difference and moving beyond regulation: tasks for U.S. bioethics commissions in the twenty-first century

This article focuses on two possible missions for a national bioethics commission. The first is handling differences of worldview, political orientation, and discipline. Recent work in political philosophy emphasizes regard for the dignity of difference manifested in "conversation" that seeks understanding rather than agreement. The President's Council on Bioethics gets a mixed review in this area. The second is experimenting with prophetic bioethics. "Prophetic bioethics" is a term coined by Daniel Callahan to describe an alternative to compromise-seeking "regulatory bioethics." It involves a critique of modern medicine. In the contemporary context, the areas of biotechnology and access to health care cry out for prophetic attention. The Council has addressed biotechnology; unfortunately, that experience suggests that the kind of prophecy that it practices poses risks to conversation. With regard to access issues, the article proposes an effort that unites themes of human dignity, solidarity, and limits in support of reform, while highlighting, rather than papering over, differences.     

Universalism, particularism and the ethics of dignity.

This paper explores the problem of universalism and particularism in contemporary ethics, and its relationship to Christian bioethics in particular. An ethic of human dignity is outlined, which, it is argued, constrains moral discourse in the broad sense--thus meeting the demands of universalism--but which is at the same time amenable to a variety of particularist interpretations--thus acknowledging the current shift toward historicism, traditionalism, and culture. The particularist interpretations that are of central concern here are those provided by historic Christianity. The eventual goal is to indicate how a Christian conception of human dignity can have universal normative relevance both as a standard against which to assess competing particularist conceptions, and as a practical guide for everyday living. A Christian conception of dignity will in turn have significant implications when addressing contemporary issues in bioethics. These are ambitious goals, and a full explication of the ideas presented will not be possible in this context. Nevertheless, there is value in getting a bird's-eye view of the landscape before one goes about scaling the mountains and exploring the valleys. The present essay is intended as a general geography of the moral terrain in which an ethic of dignity in general, and a Christian perspective on dignity in particular, can provide normative guidance.     

Examining the suitability of the principle of subsidiarity for bioethics

The political and social principle of subsidiarity can be useful as a general principle of bioethics. The principle states that only those decisions and tasks that cannot be effectively decided upon or performed by a supported or subsidized lower level authority ought to be relegated to a more central or higher authority. The concept of subsidiarity has been embedded tacitly in Western political thought for two millennia, but it has been articulated expressly only in the twentieth century. The principle has unique strengths: it is the only principle that addresses the issue of locus of decision making; it is strongly linked to human dignity, democracy, and solidarity; and it can assist in reaching agreements on the common good. There are also potential drawbacks that need to be taken into account when developing rules and guidelines for the principle's application in bioethics. The principle is particularly helpful in public health ethics, but it is also of use in the ethics of personal care and human research ethics.     

Defining “Human Dignity” in the Debate Over the (Im)Morality of Physician-Assisted Suicide

Leon Kass's often-cited essay, “Death with Dignity and the Sanctity of Life,” provides the basis for a case study in the rhetorical function of definition in debates concerning bioethics. The study examines the way a particular definition of “human dignity” is used to maintain an advantage of power in the debate over the morality of physician-assisted suicide. It also considers sources of human dignity that are deflected from attention by the rhetoric of Kass's formulation.     

Bioethics critically reconsidered: Living after foundations

Given intractable moral pluralism, what ought one to make of the bioethics that arose in the early 1970s, grounded as it was in the false assumption that there is a common secular morality that secular bioethics ought to apply? It is as if bioethics developed without recognition of the crisis at the heart of secular morality itself. Secular moral rationality cannot of itself provide the foundations to identify a particular morality and its bioethics as canonical. One is not just confronted with intractable moral and bioethical pluralism, but with the absence of a secular ground that can show why one should act morally rather than self-interestedly. The result is not merely the deflation of much of traditional Western morality to life-style and death-style choices, but the threat of deflating to political slogans the now-dominant secular morality, including its affirmation of human autonomy, equality, social justice, and human dignity. All of this invites one critically to reconsider the meaning and force of secular bioethics.     

给予老年人体面的照护：为什么尊严很重要——欧洲经验

在医学哲学领域以及相关领域中,“尊严”的概念越来越受到关注。最近,在生物伦理学的国际会议中很流行这个概念。同时,在欧洲的许多国家中,“尊严”的概念也被引入到有关卫生保健的国家立法和政策制定中。本文将从检验一个在关于尊严和老年人的欧洲计划中产生的尊严理论模型开始。然后根据参与这个计划的老年人和卫生及社会保健的专业人员那里得到的经验进行研究,有6个国家参加这项研究。结果证明尊严是一个非常重要的事情,尤其是对那些弱势群体来说。本文结论认为对于虚弱的老年人,相对于那种强调自主的医学伦理,长期的保健需要注重一个范围更为广泛的伦理内容。     

Protection of Life and Human Dignity: The German Debate between Christian Norms and Secular Expectations

The German debate on bioethics and medical ethics turns on achange in the meaning of human dignity. Such dignity is increasinglyrendered contingent upon a person's empirically assessable qualityof life. In contrast to such dignity-endowed human life, a merelybiological human life is taken to disqualify its bearer fromsuch dignity, depriving his life of the protection "respectfor human dignity" would otherwise guarantee. The idea of a"life not worth living" or "undignified life" evokes categories,which were developed at the beginning of the 20th century, andlater informed the crimes of National Socialist medicine inGermany. Against this secular development, this article analysesthe theological and church-based discussion of basic bioethicalquestions in Germany, especially the controversy among Protestants:once Protestant ethicists abandon an explicitly theologicalbasis for their arguments, their conclusions come to closelyresemble those of the secular participants in the debate. Asa result, such Protestants relativize fundamental ethical norms.They subordinate, along with their secular environment, theprotection of life to respect for autonomy. They thus preparethe ground for a revival of the risky concepts of the past.