论个体道德情感

道德理性、道德情感和道德意志相互渗透,构成一个支配个人道德活动的完整的心理机制.本文着重论述了道德情感的内容、特点与功能,认为它对充实道德理性、增强道德意志、坚定道德信念、推动道德实践、培养崇高的道德人格等方面有重要的作用.     

道德自由概念探原

自由可划分为观念自由和实在自由,观念自由因仅在主体意识中产生,总是表现为对各种限制的力图超越,而实在自由因需在主体与对象的共在关系中形成,则必须正视和承认各种限制.道德作为一种利益关系的调节者,必然具有基于各种关系限制的约束性,但由于道德是人的内在需要,因而其约束性也会表现出一种自觉自愿的主动特征.道德自由作为自由与道德的概念组合,既是自由的道德与道德的自由之内在统一,也是约束与任性的统一,当主体成为纯粹的道德主体、主体之性完全成为道德之性时,约束即为任性,任性即为约束.此时,主体便达到了随心所欲而不逾矩的道德自由境界.     

情感·自由·理性——“情感儒学”的基础概念

蒙培元先生提出了“情感儒学”概念,并围绕这个概念进行了论证。“情感儒学”的论证涉及“主体”“心灵”“超越”“境界”“自然”等诸多概念,其实,在这些概念背后的“情感”“自由”“理性”才是“情感儒学”的基础概念,因为它们在儒学语境下的各自含义、相互关系乃“情感儒学”之可能的基础。分析这三个概念及其关系,可以揭示“情感儒学”建构的基本理路,即“情感”的本义及当代回归、“自由”之多义及儒家式理解、情感与自由之关系、情感与理性之关系等四个方面。     

何为情感理性

西方道德情感主义者主张人类天生的情感或情感反应能力是理解、解释和辩护道德的最终根据。但如果情感自身的合理性得不到说明,或者需要情感以外的理性概念来加以辩护,那么,以情感来理解、解释和辩护道德的道德情感主义路径从根本上来说就是难以成立的。我们需要一种有别于西方传统理性概念的情感理性概念来为道德情感主义做根本的辩护。情感理性既可以界定为一种推理能力,即通过情感反应从某些事实前提推出规范性判断或价值判断的能力,也可以界定为规范性或应当性的来源之一。情感理性的思想为近期认知神经科学的实验研究所证实。历史经验也表明,恻隐之心所产生的道德情感往往是我们判断道德是非更为可靠的标准。自然选择的理论也为情感理性的思想提供了进一步的支持。     

论道德自由境界

在中国传统伦理语境中,道德自由是一种境界:一是从整体主义的框架中获得的个人自由,二是从道德规范的认识到内化而获得的心性自由。道德自由境界的达成主要基于对体现道德必然性的道德规范的体认与内化,进行道德修养。     

自由：源子理牲设计还是情感道德——卢梭和费希特的政治哲学观之比较

自由,无论是对卢梭还是对费希特,都是其理论的内在追求和预设,并且被赋予最高的价值。然而,由于各自论证的理路不同,结果便大相径庭。卢梭注重情感与心灵的直觉,强调社会秩序的和谐取决于人们之间内在情感道德的齐一性;而费希特则秉承启蒙传统,要求理性的查审,认为理性个人之间的交往才是国家的真正基础。他们虽然追求的是同一个目标,但诉诸不同的理论运思方法,故导致了极为不同的政治秩序。     

历史唯物主义视阈中的道德自由及其实现路径

西方道德哲学以理性的个人为基点,形成了“意志自由”和“行动自由”两条确证道德自由的代表性理路.从历史唯物主义的观点看,这两条理路由于忽略了道德自由问题产生的现实生活基础,要么将道德自由推向了道德强制,要么将道德自由降格为道德任意.道德自由只有在现实的人及其社会关系中才能获得真实的理解,现实的人及其社会关系是道德选择和道德责任发生的具体场域,也是道德自由得以可能的真实支点.历史唯物主义视阈中的道德自由是社会伦理自由,社会性的个人所承担的道德责任是现实的社会伦理责任.只有在共产主义社会的自由人联合体中,社会伦理责任所承载的道德自由才能真正实现.     

道德与审美 ——孔子道德情感的审美意识探源

总体来看,在孔子那里,道德的提升和审美的超越都落实在人生当中。第一,孔子从未将\"仁\"、\"知\"或道德与人的情感相脱离。第二,孔子思想中道德情感的审美特征为现实性、内省性和实践性。第三,孔子提倡的人道和德行,被灌注了充满人文理性精神的情感。     

道德焦虑:一种不可或缺的道德情感

道德焦虑在本质上是一种道德情感.道德焦虑与羞耻感以及内疚感相比是更为基本的道德情感,它所需的条件更少.根据人类在远古时期以及幼年时期的情形,我们发现道德焦虑在产生与维持伦理秩序的过程中有重要作用.当进入伦理世界之后,道德焦虑则在主体行为净化和人格升华等方面具有重要的价值.     

论人的二重性与道德

本文从道德哲学的角度提出“人的二重性与道德”的问题,试图通过人的二重性：“理性”与“情感”对道德的作用来论证道德的产生与维系不可避免地依赖于二者,并对人的自由、责任与使命作了道德性的分析,从而揭示人类生活应当追求至真、至善、至美的三重境界。     

Spinoza and the Feeling of Freedom

We seem to have a direct experience of our freedom when we act. Many philosophers take this feeling of freedom as evidence that we possess libertarian free will. Spinoza denies that we have free will of any sort, although he admits that we nonetheless feel free. Commentators often attribute to him what I call the ‘Negative Account’ of the feeling: it results from the fact that we are conscious of our actions but ignorant of their causes. I argue that the Negative Account is flawed. The feeling of freedom also depends on a vacillation of the mind. When the mind forms too many incompatible associations, it vacillates between them. When we act, the mind vacillates back and forth between the kinds of actions that we associate with our present mental state. We then mistake this subjective vacillation for an objective feature of ourselves—namely, the power to do otherwise.     

自由秩序及其道德基础--对转型期社会价值冲突的分析及未来中国主流人文精神的展望

自由主义的核心价值是个体的自主性 ,因而 ,政府的首要职责是保护个体免受强制和伤害。相信非强制的共识是可能的 ;普遍人性是存在的 ;反思平衡是最基本的道德真理 ,这三项基本信念构成了自由秩序得以实现的道德基础 ,而我们内心的恐惧和野蛮则是自由最大的敌人     

Moral and Nonmoral Freedom in Kant

Many scholars, in view of the close link that he draws between morality and freedom, argue that Kant does not think that there are free choices between nonmoral ends. On this view, Kant only posits a freedom to resist our desires and act morally. We are still responsible for immoral choices because we always have the power to act morally. Henry Allison has opposed this reading by arguing that Kant grounds a notion of nonmoral freedom in the Incorporation Thesis. In this paper, I criticize Allison's argument and then try to replace it with an alternative that grounds nonmoral freedom in morality.     

The Freedom of Extremists: Pluralist and Non-Pluralist Responses to Moral Conflict

Philosophia - This paper distinguishes two ways in which to think about the freedom of extremists. Non-pluralists claim to have identified the general rule for resolving moral conflicts, and...     

Foreign Aid and the Moral Value of Freedom

Peter Singer has famously argued that people living in affluent western countries are morally obligated to donate money to famine relief. The central premise in his argument is that, If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do so. The present paper offers an argument to the effect that affluent people ought to support foreign aid projects based on a much weaker ethical premise. The new premise states that, If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of moral importance, we ought, morally, to do so. This premise, supplemented with a notion of final value drawing on Amartya Sen's concept of freedom as capabilities and functionings, is conceived as a special version of a weak, egalitarian Pareto principle.     

Moral Responsibility,Reactive Attitudes and Freedom of Will

In his influential paper, “Freedom and Resentment,” P. F. Strawson argued that our ordinary practices of holding persons morally responsible and related reactive attitudes (such as blame, resentment, indignation, and moral approval) were wholly “internal” to the practices themselves and could be insulated from traditional philosophical and metaphysical concerns, including concerns about free will and determinism. This “insulation thesis” is a controversial feature of Strawson’s influential paper; and it has had numerous critics. The first purpose of this paper is to explain my own reasons for thinking that our practices of holding responsible cannot be entirely insulated from incompatibilist concerns about freedom and determinism. The second purpose is to argue that these incompatibilist concerns are in fact legitimate concerns: There are sound reasons to believe that our ordinary practices of holding persons morally responsible do require at least sometimes in our lives that we must be capable of acting freely in a manner that is not determined. I defend this thesis by spelling out why I believe various compatibilist strategies attempting to show that moral responsibility is compatible with determinism fail to show this. In the course of this critique, a general theme will emerge: In order to do full justice to our ordinary practices of holding persons responsible and the freedoms thus involved, one must distinguish between different types of freedom, and in particular, between freedom of action and freedom of will.