论人的二重性与道德

本文从道德哲学的角度提出“人的二重性与道德”的问题,试图通过人的二重性：“理性”与“情感”对道德的作用来论证道德的产生与维系不可避免地依赖于二者,并对人的自由、责任与使命作了道德性的分析,从而揭示人类生活应当追求至真、至善、至美的三重境界。     

从道德自律到道德自然

道德需要自律,自律无疑优于他律.但自律仍然带有强制性,只不过是用内在强制取代了他律的外在强制.因此,道德不能以自律为极限,而应当超越自律,即由道德自律走向道德自然.道德自然通过对道德自律的扬弃,否定了道德自律中的内在强制因素,但将道德的本质属性予以存留,且将其自由升华至极致,这就造就了没有任何强制的道德以及道德选择中充分的、完全的个体自由.与道德自律相比较,道德自然具有非强制、无意识、不造作等特征.道德自然是一种最高的道德境界,这种道德境界是在人的原初心理基础上,经过实践、反思与情感升华的长期过程而逐渐生成的.     

试论豪瑟尔的道德进化论

豪瑟尔的道德进化论主要阐明了人类道德基因在人们作出道德评价时的决定作用,否认了情感和理性在道德判断中的先决作用。道德的来源是人类进化过程中的一个产物,对道德神创论的理论进行了反驳。     

论道德与生活的关系及道德生活的本质特征

就生活与道德的关系而言,可以说生活需要道德、包含了道德但并不等于道德,道德始终存在于人的整体生活之中,没有脱离生活的道德。道德生活的本质特征表现在,道德生活是一种属人的或人类所特有的社会生活,是建立在物质生活基础之上的并渗透在物质生活之中引导和规范物质生活的精神生活,是一种有意义和价值并能予以价值评价的生活,是一种主体自由意志自觉自为并能进行道德选择的生活,是一种通过道德意识表现为道德关系涵盖一切道德活动的社会生活。     

论道德自由境界

在中国传统伦理语境中,道德自由是一种境界:一是从整体主义的框架中获得的个人自由,二是从道德规范的认识到内化而获得的心性自由。道德自由境界的达成主要基于对体现道德必然性的道德规范的体认与内化,进行道德修养。     

道德增强与反增强的博弈与反思

随着技术干预和增强人类道德的系统性实现,引发了人们的希望与恐惧、期待与不安、支持与反对的对立。增强派认为,人类道德的发展已经严重滞后于科技进步,人类完全有权利进行道德增强:道德增强与自由意志、社会公平、人格特性等问题并不冲突,并能助人以达到"行善"境界。反增强派则主张人类无权进行道德增强:道德增强是一种"扮演上帝"的行为,会限制人类自由、扩大社会差距、人格同质化,甚至引发个体安全和社会风险等问题,道德增强的交锋实质上是传统道德自然主义与道德非自然主义两派博弈的理论翻版,它把技术与道德关系的思考引向深入,有助于人类探寻道德发展的新路径。     

技术侵入:道德自由的传统与超越

道德自由是道德主体的意志觉解和境界,是在道德意志的统摄下,按照道德必然采取行动的能力。技术作为人类把握客观世界的独特方式,一方面确证和实现道德自由,另一面限制和压抑道德自由。自从人猿揖别后,人便始终处于技术化进程当中,随着习俗教育、生物医学、人工智能、基因编辑的技术侵入,道德自由因此展开了一幅跌宕起伏的历史图景。     

论道德自由的三个基本向度

自由是人类永恒的价值目标。人类有无道德自由?道德自由是什么?这些道德形上问题一直困扰着思想家们,也关涉到现实道德生活的质量。道德自由不仅是一种意志自由,也是一种自由境界;同时还应该包括道德自由权,亦即道德自由在道德权利上的表述,它是衔接意志自由和道德自由境界的桥梁。道德自由的这三个向度相互联系,共同构成道德自由的丰富内涵。一、道德意志自由向度意志自由最先从伦理角度提出,后发展成在哲学意义上对自由与必然、决定论与非决定论的探讨。在伦理学范畴里,意志自由是“……指人在行动时对善与恶,道德与不道德的一种选择自由(…     

论道德境界的划分

一种好的道德境界划分法,应既能为提升人格道德水平提供路向指标,也能为评判人格道德水平提供有效尺度。道德划境法不外以事划境与以人划境这两种。比较而言,孔子的以人划境法是最可取的,但仍有明显不足。而从构成个人道德意识的五个方面,即道德知识、道德情感、道德意志、道德理智、道德信念,去区分人的道德境界,可将人格的道德水平划分为小人境界、俗人境界、庸人境界、君子境界和完人境界这五个由低到高的层次。     

道德德性:人类学以及实践认知的维度

伦理学涉及行为中的人.伦理学是关于善(Guten)的学说.作为自由的、有理性的存在者,我们能够在其中发现幸福.然而,"幸福"并不是简单的,主观上的满足,而是根据理性的尺度实现了理想.因此,伦理学涉及到对"主观真实性"的条件的分析.一种美德伦理学断言:这些条件首先在于拥有德行.根据传统的理解,道德德性是人类人格的表达,因此,在真理和理性中视为好的东西,在主观上也作为好的呈现出来:即道德德性对于行为主体的理性来说是情感上的需要.道德德性针对行为主体对善的情感需求来提高实践理性,特别是在能力方面,也包括认识道德上正确的事情并且有效地实践.因此,道德德性就存在两方面的任务,即人类学和认知实践的二重任务,而没有借此定义道德义务,或过多地对道德原则、规则或规范进行理性地讨论.     

Moral Realism,Moral Disagreement,and Moral Psychology

Abstract

This paper considers John Doris, Stephen Stich, Alexandra Plakias, and colleagues’ recent attempts to utilize empirical studies of cross-cultural variation in moral judgment to support a version of the argument from disagreement against moral realism. Crucially, Doris et al. claim that the moral disagreements highlighted by these studies are not susceptible to the standard ‘diffusing’ explanations realists have developed in response to earlier versions of the argument. I argue that plausible hypotheses about the cognitive processes underlying ordinary moral judgment and the acquisition of moral norms, when combined with a popular philosophical account of moral inquiry—the method of reflective equilibrium—undercut the anti-realist force of the moral disagreements that Doris et al. describe. I also show that Stich's recent attempt to provide further theoretical support for Doris et al.'s case is unsuccessful.     

Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge

To have moral worth an action not only needs to conform to the correct normative theory (whatever it is); it also needs to be motivated in the right way. I argue that morally worthy actions are motivated by the rightness of the action; they are motivated by an agent's concern for doing what's right and her knowledge that her action is morally right. Call this the Rightness Condition. On the Rightness Condition moral motivation involves both a conative and a cognitive element—in particular, it involves moral knowledge. I argue that the Rightness Condition is both necessary and sufficient for moral worth. I also argue that the Rightness Condition gives us an attractive account of actions performed under imperfect epistemic circumstances: by agents who rely on moral testimony or by those who, like Huckleberry Finn, have false moral convictions.     

Moral Overridingness and Moral Theory

I begin by proposing and explicating a plausible articulation of the view that morality is overriding. I then argue that it would be desirable for this thesis to be sustained. However, the prospects for its vindication will depend crucially on which moral theory we adopt. I examine some schematic moral theories in order to bring out which are friendly and which unfriendly to moral overridingness. In light of the reasons to hope that the overridingness thesis can be sustained, theories apparently incompatible with it – I argue that consequentialism is one – have a count against them.     

Moral Relativism and Moral Expressivism

Though moral relativism has had its supporters over the years, it is not a dominant position in philosophy. I will argue here, though, that the view is an attractive position. It evades some hardcore challenges that face absolutism, and it is reconcilable with an appealing emotivist approach to moral attitudes. In previous work, I have offered considerations in favor of a version of moral relativism that I call “perspectivalism.” These considerations are primarily grounded in linguistic data. Here I offer a self‐standing argument for perspectivalism. I begin with an argument against moral absolutism. I then argue that moral terms, such as ‘wrong’ and ‘right’, require for their application that the moral judge instantiate particular affective states, and I use this claim to provide further defense of moral relativism.     

Moral Accountancy and Moral Worth

People do good or bad things, and get or do not get good or bad credit for their actions, depending (in part) on knowledge of their actions. I attempt to unfold some of the interconnections between these matters, and between them and the achievement of moral worth. The main conclusion is that the heights of moral worth seem to appear in the oddest places.     

Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs

Gilbert Harman and Judith Thomson have argued that moral facts cannot explain our moral beliefs, claiming that such facts could not play a causal role in the formation of those beliefs. This paper shows these arguments to be misguided, for they would require that we abandon any number of intuitively plausible explanations in non-moral contexts as well. But abandoning the causal strand in the argument over moral explanations does not spell immediate victory for the moral realist, since it must still be shown that moral facts do figure in our best global explanatory theory.