略论罗尔斯顿环境伦理学价值范式的生态转向

通过论证大自然及其非人存在物的内在尺度和内在价值,罗尔斯顿的环境伦理学实现了价值范式由主观工具价值论向客观内在价值论的转换;通过论证生态系统的系统价值统摄个体生命的内在价值和工具价值,以及人类整体环境利益高于个体利益,罗尔斯顿的环境伦理学实现了环境整体主义转向.客观内在价值论并不否认人的主观价值的存在,环境整体主义也不排斥而是包容了人类利益和个体利益,罗尔斯顿环境伦理学价值范式的生态转向,通过强调道德的关系性和整体性而赋予了伦理道德以涵容更广的生态性.     

阴阳学说与传统农业

阴阳观是中国传统思维及认知的重要取向，阴阳学说充当了自然社会事物发生发展变化的机制机理性解释。阴阳学说在古农书及相关典籍中，普遍被用作对“天地人物”系统及其农业生态系统、农学思想原理的阐释，指导农业生产实践。由此，引导了传统农业走向整体系统、有机协调的精耕细作道路，铸就了传统农业的历史辉煌。时至今日，阴阳学说虽然存在着不可避免的历史局限性，但其蕴含及其延展的系统整体、辩证对待、互补平衡等诸多思想内核，在农业可持续发展、食品安全及生态环境保护等人类诸多诉求中，仍然具有一定的借鉴意义。     

人与绿色环境

绿色环境是人类赖以生存的摇篮,是人类社会进步的产物,是文明的标志和象征。人与绿色环境是处在相互作用的生态系统之中,人是主体,绿色环境是客体,两者成为有机结合的整体。完善的城市生态系统,应满足这个系统中的主体“人”的全面要求,就是要研究物质环境(包括自然条件和人类生存、发展的物质条件)和社会心理环境综合影响。本文试图对人与绿色环境的相互关系及绿色环     

道家文化附加值与现代广告创意

道家文化倡导人的生命“不为物役”,强调自然关怀,“天人合一”,这种生命本位的价值观和重视系统、强调和谐的整体思维模式,契合了当今社会的心理需求。今天人类赖以生存的自然环境和生态系统的结构和功能都已经严重失衡,越来越多现代广告的价值诉求,已经以道家文化为载体或在广告中融人道家文化的元素,文化附加值的广告致效作用越来越成为社会的共识。     

关于培育和践行社会主义文明观的几个问题

文明是关于一个国家和社会开化程度和进步状况的总体评价性概念,是对人类调整同外部世界的关系以及自身的关系的实践能力的价值认定,是人类作为整体的生存和发展实践能力的价值标识.本文探讨了文明内蕴的三层含义和其所体现的客观性、主体性和实践性的内在规定,文明的内在结构系统及其相互关系；提示了社会主义文明观作为新型文明观的三个基本特征；阐发了培育和践行社会主义文明观所应该遵循的四个重要原则,以期为建设富强、民主、文明、和谐的社会主义强国,实现中华民族伟大复兴的中国梦,提供理论支撑和价值导向.     

论马克思恩格斯的系统思想

系统科学和系统哲学的兴起，引发了人们对马克思恩格斯系统思想的研究和关注。马克思恩格斯有着丰富深刻的系统思想，在确立和坚持新唯物主义世界观的过程中，他们大量使用了系统和有机体概念，用以清除机械论和形而上学的影响；他们深刻揭示了系统的整体性、结构性、层次性、开放性等基本特征，为认识和改造世界提供了系统性原则。马克思开创性地运用系统分析方法，揭示了价值、货币、资本的社会系统属性；运用系统综合方法再现了资本主义经济系统的整体形态，揭示了资本主义经济系统的运行规律。马克思恩格斯的系统思想为现代系统哲学的建构提供了重要根据，为坚持运用系统观点提供了经典范例。     

宗教伦理视野中的生态大系统

宗教伦理视野中的生态大系统是一个相互联系、有机结合的动态活性大系统。它不仅是一个无所不包的整体 ,任何生命体均只是地球生命圈中的一部分 ,而且各部分与其他部分处于有机联系的伦理关系网络之中。这种生态系统的良性循环与和谐发展不仅是宗教生态伦理的内在要求 ,更是人类可持续发展的需要。在创建人类理想家园、人类新文明的进程中 ,宗教生态伦理思想 ,将愈益显示其不可忽视的强大内力     

宗教是什么?──对吕大吉教授回答的质疑与异议

宗教是人类暂且借助神性力量替代其现实弱小的人类力量以应付人类终极需求的社会历史现象。基于这一定义，作者提出：宗教的本质在于人，而不在于神；宗教的本质在于人的特定存在即人类弱小力量与其强劲终极需求的矛盾；宗教的本质是理性的，宗教的特征是神性的；宗教存在的客观性（或必然性）在于人类的弱小力量，或者说宗教存在的根源在于人类的弱小力量，宗教存在的价值在于人类的终极需求，宗教存在的形式在于宗教的神性力量或种性特征；宗教可依据人类对自然、自身和社会的三种不同终极需求分类为自然宗教、生命宗教和社会宗教；宗教的理性本质决定了宗教演变的历史趋势，而人类力量对神性力量的逐步取代则反映了宗教演变的历史特征。在本文中，作者将据此基本观点，对吕大吉教授关于宗教是什么问题的回答提出质疑和异议。     

动物利用的道德正当性和伦理边界

从人类与动物生物属性与社会属性的差异、人类与动物在生态系统中的价值与价值秩序、人类与动物之间权利和义务关系三个角度可以厘清动物利用的道德正当性关系的基础;以目的正当性、手段正当性、结果正当性作为动物利用的道德正当性评价标准,能够为人类利用动物提供道德正当性辩护;以人类生存原则、人类基本利益优先原则和人类有限发展原则作为动物利用的伦理边界,可以为动物利用的实践提供明确而有效的理论支撑。     

以人为中心的多极主体化——对人类中心主义与非人类中心主义的一点思考

人类中心主义者认为,“人类利益是人类认识和实践活动的出发点与归宿”,人是唯一的价值主体。非人类中心主义者则认为,自然与人有着平等的价值主体地位,并注目于“地球上千百万物种和生态系统的福利”。从表面看来,这两类中心主义观点是完全相对立的,其实,我们至少可以找到它们的三个共同之处。     

The holistic presumptions of the indispensability argument

The indispensability argument is sometimes seen as weakened by its reliance on a controversial premise of confirmation holism. Recently, some philosophers working on the indispensability argument have developed versions of the argument which, they claim, do not rely on holism. Some of these writers even claim to have strengthened the argument by eliminating the controversial premise. I argue that the apparent removal of holism leaves a lacuna in the argument. Without the holistic premise, or some other premise which facilitates the transfer of evidence to mathematical portions of scientific theories, the argument is implausible.     

Holism, Strawberries and Hairdryers

The paper "Does Epistemological Holism lead to Meaning – Holism" (Cozzo, 2002) touches one of the main problems of a molecularist theory of meaning: how to restrict the class of inferences connected with a word, in order to define the sense of the word. I will discuss the starting point of this approach, mainly the pre-theoretical criterion against meaning holism: meaning holism, following a well-known argument by Dummett, reduces communication to a mystery. However there is a strong background assumption of this argument: communication is sharing the same meanings. Accepting this assumption without acknowledging it makes the entire proposal more problematic than it appears at first sight. In what follows I will try to clarify the possibility of a different reaction to meaning holism, putting forward some distinctions which come to light when the above stated assumption is made explicit. Then, some other comments will follow on the difficulty of avoiding extreme meaning holism, even within Cozzo's elegant attempt to implement a molecularist vision; in the end, his notion of the sense of a word will appear to be difficult to define, if these holistic aspects of language take the space they deserve even in his theory. I conclude with two remarks regarding two relevant requirements for a theory of meaning (conservativeness and harmony). This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Dispensability in the Indispensability Argument

One of the most influential arguments for realism about mathematical objects is the indispensability argument. Simply put, this is the argument that insofar as we are committed to the existence of the physical objects existentially quantified over in our best scientific theories, we are also committed to the mathematical objects existentially quantified over in these theories. Following the Quine–Putnam formulation of the indispensability argument, some proponents of the indispensability argument have made the mistake of taking confirmational holism to be an essential premise of the argument. In this paper, I consider the reasons philosophers have taken confirmational holism to be essential to the argument and argue that, contrary to the traditional view, confirmational holism is dispensable.     

Holism: Revolution or reminder?

Conclusion Among the four propositions considered in this paper, we have found two which can contribute to a holistic environmental ethic: individuals acquire some of their value through participating in communities, including biotic communities, and wholes, including biotic communities, can have values which are not the sum of the values of the individuals composing them. However, accepting these propositions does not represent a revolutionary break distinguishing holism from traditional value theories or ethics. On the other hand, the holistic propositions we considered which would clearly differentiate holism from (at least some) traditional value theories and ethics are unacceptable. Consequently, if the propositions we have discussed fairly represent what goes under the name of holism, then rather than being a new kind of ethic, a viable ethical holism will make its contribution by emphasizing the communal elements of traditional ethics which have sometimes been neglected in glorifications of the individual. This would not be an inconsiderable contribution, philosophically, socially, or environmentally.     

INCOMPLETE KNOWLEDGE AND THE CHANCES OF A CONSTRUCTIVE MASTERING

In spite of incomplete knowledge we are permanently forced to act in complex real-life situations. First, a modern concept of information, the non-trivial transition from information to knowledge, patterns of missing knowledge, and the concept of perspective notions are studied. The main sections review some guidelines for action under incomplete information. A modern view of the concepts of holism and wholeness reveals that (in contrast to some critics) general system theory does not require any metaphysical assumption or previously accepted worldview. The concepts of holism and wholeness, as well as general system theory, are well-founded, even under strict criteria.     

Holism in Cartesianism and in Today's Philosophy of Physics

The aim of this paper is to contribute to a more balanced judgement than the widespread impression that the changes which are called for in today's philosophy of physics and which centre around the concept of holism amount to a rupture with the framework of Cartesian philosophy of physics. I argue that this framework includes a sort of holism: As a result of the identification of matter with space, any physical property can be instantiated only if there is the whole of matter. Relating this holism to general relativity, I maintain that this holism cannot be directly applied to today's philosophy of physics consequent upon the failure of geometrodynamics. I show in what respect precisely the holism in quantum physics amounts to a revision of the holism within Cartesianism. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Defining and Defending Social Holism

Abstract

This paper offers a definition of social holism that makes the doctrine non-trivial but possibly true. According to that definition, the social holist maintains that people depend non-causally on interaction with one another for possession of the capacity to think; the thesis is meant to be a contingent truth but one, like physicalism, that is plausible in the light of some a priori argument and some plausible empirical assumptions. The paper also sketches an argument in support of social holism, which connects with themes in a number of traditions, philosophical and sociological. The key idea is that people depend on socially shared dispositions and responses for the ability to identify – identify fallibly – the properties and other entities that they consider in each individual has to the course of thinking.     

Indispensability and Holism

It is claimed that the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical entities (IA) works in a way that allows a proponent of mathematical realism to remain agnostic with regard to how we establish that mathematical entities exist. This is supposed to be possible by virtue of the appeal to confirmational holism that enters into the formulation of IA. Holism about confirmation is supposed to be motivated in analogy with holism about falsification. I present an account of how holism about falsification is supposed to be motivated. I argue that the argument for holism about falsification is in tension with how we think about confirmation and with two principles suggested by Quine for construing a plausible variety of holism. Finally, I show that one of Quine’s principles does not allow a proponent of mathematical realism to remain agnostic with regard to how we establish that mathematical entities exist.     

Can the new indispensability argument be saved from Euclidean rescues?

The traditional formulation of the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical entities (IA) has been criticised due to its reliance on confirmational holism. Recently a formulation of IA that works without appeal to confirmational holism has been defended. This recent formulation is meant to be superior to the traditional formulation in virtue of it not being subject to the kind of criticism that pertains to confirmational holism. I shall argue that a proponent of the version of IA that works without appeal to confirmational holism will struggle to answer a challenge readily answered by proponents of a version of IA that does appeal to confirmational holism. This challenge is to explain why mathematics applied in falsified scientific theories is not considered to be falsified along with the rest of the theory. In cases where mathematics seemingly ought to be falsified it is saved from falsification, by a so called ??Euclidean rescue??. I consider a range of possible answers to this challenge and conclude that each answer fails.