法律的本源道德与正义原则

社会的本源道德是蕴涵在物质生产关系中的伦理属性 ,是一种体现社会发展必然规律、以权利义务关系表达、本体与价值相统一的伦理范型。法律正义就是社会本源道德在法律制度中的体现。如果说 ,社会主义市场经济的伦理属性是当代中国社会的本源道德 ,是一种以“为人民服务”为宗旨、权利与义务相统一的伦理范型 ,那么它便是各种具体社会制度道德的根据 ,并以不同的形式体现在不同的制度中。体现在社会主义法律制度中 ,就是权利本位、公益优先和人民主权三大正义原则     

原始儒家伦理精神论纲

中国古代以道德立国 ,文化以伦理为本位 ,而这一切与原始儒家的学术努力有着密切的关系。本文主要讨论原始儒家伦理的人文精神、实践精神、能动精神、境界精神、仁爱精神与唯物精神     

论消费者的技术责任

现代消费是以技术为主要对象的消费,消费者是技术的重要主体,因而也是技术的责任主体,消费者应通过负责任的消费为技术承担生态责任、社会伦理责任和促进技术健康发展的责任.     

"入世"后中国消费者教育及其权益保护

加入WTO以后,中国的消费品市场将发生巨大变化,如何使中国百姓在得到实惠的同时自身权益免受侵害,这是一个重大的实践课题.本文对我国消费者在消费活动中易受损害进行了归纳分析,提出要提高消费者应对这种市场变化的能力和综合素质,相关管理机构应重视对国民进行主体性、法制化、国际消费惯例及新消费文化导向的教育.     

论信息消费的道德选择

要使信息消费始终沿着健康的轨道运行 ,就必须有信息消费伦理的指导。信息消费者不仅有利益偏好 ,而且还有道德偏好。道德偏好影响信息消费的性质 ,而且与信息消费之后果的道德责任有关。结合信息消费领域的特殊问题 ,从一般的道德偏好引申出信息消费的具体的道德指标 ,就为信息消费者的消费行为选择提供了可行的道德路径。     

公德建设要超越伦理本位传统

公德是公共行为的道德规范.公德建设能够推动法治建设.在中国,由于长期伦理本位传统的影响,公德建设滞后,影响了中国道德建设,也遏制了中国法治建设的发展.推动中国公德建设必须超越伦理本位传统,将公德建设纳入法治轨道.     

论儒家义务论伦理的内生现代性转化——兼与陈嘉明教授商榷

陈嘉明教授在《中国现代化视角下的儒家义务论伦理》一文中认为,儒家义务论伦理是一种单边式义务,权利缺失是儒家义务论的根本缺陷。因而需要引入西方权利观念来建构我国现代义务伦理。实际上,我国儒家经典著作中不乏关于双向性义务与权利的相关论述。更为重要的是,儒家义务论伦理具有开化出现代性义务论伦理的可能性。在重视权利之于义务重要性之余,必须意识到权利实现是以义务遵守为基本前提和根本保障,在这点上中西文化具有通契性。故传统儒家思想中的义务论伦理能内在衍生出现代权利概念,即义务本位能够开化出权利自由。     

梁漱溟新乡村组织的伦理探析

20世纪二三十年代,在探寻中国社会新出路的过程中,梁漱溟等新知识分子倡导乡村建设运动。他从对中国传统社会"伦理本位"的认识出发,将"伦理情谊"融入团体组织,依新礼俗为规范,从义务本位确立"团体-个人"中的新关系,以相对论的伦理主义原则培育"团体-个人"中的新观念,以"人生向上"为目标建设中国乡村的团体生活。这种坚持以民族传统资源构建新社会的伦理精神,为和谐社会的构建提供了思路和方法,但因过度倚重传统伦理道德的力量而忽视其在经济社会变迁中应有的现代转换,梁漱溟的新乡村组织陷入伦理本位主义的理论困境,在"私德"向"公德"的伦理转换和培育中出现了种种矛盾。     

改革开放以来我国人权伦理学研究述评

改革开放以来,人权已成为我国市场经济、民主政治和宪法法律的基本价值诉求。而这一价 值观念的巨大变迁, 要归因于我国社会主义市场经济的建立和发展。市场经 济重塑着一个社会的价值理念、行为模式和运行规则。人权伦理是社会主义市场经济和民主 政治的必然要求,是现代法律运行的社会基础。与此同时,人权伦理在现代道德体系中也居 于最核心的地位。人权在本质上是一种道德权利。经过哲学、伦理学界学者们几十年的艰辛 探索,有关人权的道德基础(或道德论证)、道德内涵以及人权伦理的实践应用等理论研究 也逐步走向成熟与深化。     

论公正

公正的基准是权利。权利在本质上是一种获得性的社会性资格。公正就是这样的原则 :以权利为本位而义务与权利相对等、对称和对应。公正作为美德就是尊重他人的权利和尊重公共规则。公正作为制度伦理首先就是以权利为本位 ,其次是普遍和平等 ,再次是公开、明确和有既定程序。     

Welfare Rights and Conflicts of Rights

The fact that welfare rights – rights to food, shelter and medical care – will conflict with one another is often taken to be good reason to exclude welfare rights from the catalogue of genuine rights. Rather than respond to this objection by pointing out that all rights conflict, welfare rights proponents need to take the conflicts objection seriously. The existence of potentially conflicting and more weighty normative considerations counts against a claim’s status as a genuine right. To think otherwise would be to threaten the peremptory force – and hence the analytical integrity – of rights. The conflicts objection is made more pressing once we have conceded that welfare rights give people entitlements to what are potentially scarce goods. I argue that welfare rights can survive the conflicts objection if, and only if, we take scarcity into account in the framing of a given welfare right. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Nuffield Political Theory Workshop in Oxford and the Canadian Philosophical Association Congress 2006 at York University. I am grateful to Adam Swift, David Miller, Idil Boran, Sarah McCallum and two anonymous referees for their comments, and to the Economic and Social Research Council for research funding.     

Rights

Liberals claim that some perceptual experiences give us immediate justification for certain perceptual beliefs. Conservatives claim that the justification that perceptual experiences give us for those perceptual beliefs is mediated by our background beliefs. In his recent paper ‘Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic’, Nico Silins successfully argues for a non-Moorean version of Liberalism. But Silins's defence of non-Moorean Liberalism leaves us with a puzzle: why is it that a necessary condition for our perceptual experiences to justify us in holding certain perceptual beliefs is that we have some independent justification for disbelieving various sceptical hypotheses? I argue that the best answer to this question involves commitment to Crispin Wright's version of Conservatism. In short, Wright's Conservatism is consistent with Silins's Liberalism, and the latter helps to give us grounds for accepting the former.     

Parental Rights

ABSTRACT This paper is concerned with the philosophical foundations of parental rights. Some commonly held accounts are rejected. The question of whether parental rights are property rights is examined. It is argued that there are useful analogies with property rights which help us to see that the ultimate justification of parental rights lies in the special value of parenthood in human life. It is further argued that the idea of generation is essential to our understanding of parenthood as having special value and that parental rights properly belong, in the first instance, to natural parents.     

Makers' Rights

This paper examines the thesis that human labor creates property rights in or from previously unowned objects by virtue of labor's power to make new things. This thesis is considered for two possible roles: first, as a thesis to which John Locke might have been committed in his writings on property; and second, as a thesis of independent plausibility that could serve as part of a defensible contemporary theory of property rights. Understanding Locke as committed to the thesis of makers' rights has seemed to many of the best known recent Locke scholars to explain and unify Locke's various claims about property in a way that more traditional labor-mixing interpretations cannot. This paper argues that there is in fact no convincing evidence in Locke's texts to suggest any commitment to the thesis of makers' rights for humans. Further, not only does a version of the traditional labor-mixing argument yield a much superior interpretation of Locke's writings, it is an argument that is far more convincing than makers' rights arguments, quite independent of its usefulness in the interpretation of Locke's theory.     

Welfare Rights

The article tries to qualify the contentious issue of whetherthere is a human right to welfare. Our notion of human rightsis practically without criteria for distinguishing between whenit is used correctly and when incorrectly. The first step inany satisfactory resolution of the issue about welfare rightsis to supply duly determinate criteria. I then consider thechief reasons for doubting that there is a human right towelfare, in the light of what seem to be, all things considered,the best criteria to attach to the notion of a human right.