分析哲学与古希腊哲学——以斯特劳森的《个体》为例

通过对斯特劳森《个体》一书中的"描述的形而上学"的分析,本文在揭示它与亚里士多德的以可感实体为基本存在者的形而上学体系的内在一致性的同时,也揭示了这种在日常经验中复活形而上学的现代哲学企图的内在思想问题。文章联系培根的"四假象"和康德的"先验幻相"对这种经验意义上的形而上学进行了批判,并由此论及分析哲学与古希腊哲学(尤其是柏拉图、亚里士多德的形而上学)在形而上学思维方式上的共同特征,说明了当代分析哲学家经常诉诸于柏拉图与亚里士多德的哲学文本进行哲学史编纂的方法论根源。     

亚里士多德的技艺概念:图景与问题

一技艺、技术、艺术与同时代的许多其他希腊哲学家一样,亚里士多德理解的同技术有关的概念是技艺(t′εχνη),这个概念包含着技术与艺术,两者在其中未加分别。他的这种理解方式来自柏拉图。柏拉图把工匠的制作活动和诗文、绘画的创作活动都作为运用技艺的活动来谈论。对柏拉图来说,理解技艺的重要之点在于,它是一种善,一种能力,但不是自然给予人的装备,而是人通过经验的学习获得的能力;因此也不是人人均享的,而是只为一部分人具有的;同时,运用这种能力的活动同理论的活动和实践的活动都不同。亚里士多德的讨论在这个基础上特别加深了对运…     

论古希腊形而上学的基本样式北大核心CSSCI

古希腊形而上学的开端是巴门尼德的存在学说,经由苏格拉底、柏拉图理念论的发展,在亚里士多德的思想体系中完成了形而上学的初步奠基。古希腊形而上学是一种研究"存在"的本体论体系,其理论原则是柏拉图的"世界二重化"。从奠基路径上看古希腊形而上学是通过概念逻辑的方式建立的一种对象性的形而上学,其基本思路是以理性认识的方式来把握万物的本质和真理。形而上学作为西方哲学的核心内容,从古希腊时期起就蕴含着理论与精神的一体性,力图彰显形而上学与人的本性的深层关联,以及其超越性的神学旨趣。     

论古希腊形而上学的基本样式

古希腊形而上学的开端是巴门尼德的存在学说,经由苏格拉底、柏拉图理念论的发展,在亚里士多德的思想体系中完成了形而上学的初步奠基。古希腊形而上学是一种研究"存在"的本体论体系,其理论原则是柏拉图的"世界二重化"。从奠基路径上看古希腊形而上学是通过概念逻辑的方式建立的一种对象性的形而上学,其基本思路是以理性认识的方式来把握万物的本质和真理。形而上学作为西方哲学的核心内容,从古希腊时期起就蕴含着理论与精神的一体性,力图彰显形而上学与人的本性的深层关联,以及其超越性的神学旨趣。     

上帝存在证明,第一部分:形而上学论证

自柏拉图与亚里士多德的时代以来,人们提出了许多关于上帝存在的形而上学证明.本文的证明试图把来自20世纪思想中的三个见解结合进柏拉图、亚里士多德、奥古斯丁、托马斯及其解释者的处于萌芽状态的见解中去.     

形而上学的当代构建及其现实意义

形而上学从最初规定的确认与演变理路来说是对“逻各斯”本身的追询与探讨,力图“以同样的方式在一种精神本原———逻各斯发现世界的本质”(策勒尔,第48页),进而演变成柏拉图关于理念论形而上学的现象。亚里士多德对第一哲学的规定是说明“存在”之所以成为“存在”的基质依据。在他看来,在“存在的存在”的根基之处,科学、神学与哲学是一体的。亚里士多德对形而上学理论奠基的影响具有划时代的价值:哲学从旨趣与结构方面,乃至在其本性规定方面,就成为了“形而上学”。这样,作为第一哲学的形而上学,“它对于每一个存在物而言都是真的,并且…     

论“新柏拉图主义”对亚里士多德《范畴篇》中第一实体“优先性”的解释

亚里士多德在《范畴篇》中把个别事物看作"第一实体",认为它优先于作为"第二实体"的普遍者。新柏拉图主义者们区分了两种意义上的"优先性",一种是自然上的优先性,一种是对于我们而言的优先性。而《范畴篇》中讨论的诸范畴仅仅限于可感领域,"第一实体"的优先性仅仅是"对于我们而言的优先性",而非自然上的优先性。新柏拉图主义者试图以此化解亚里士多德《范畴篇》与《形而上学》中实体理论的"矛盾",缓解亚里士多德和柏拉图之间的紧张。     

关于正义的不同认识

“正义”(justice)是西方政治哲学中的一个核心概念,与“公正”基本同义。时至今日,对它的理解主要经历了三个不同的认识发展阶段,即从苏格拉底、柏拉图、亚里士多德对正义的肯定性的原初认识,到霍布斯对正义的否定,再到罗尔斯在社会契约论基础上对正义的新的肯定。一关于正义的原初认识最早开始思考正义问题的是苏格拉底,而最早比较完整地界定正义范畴的是柏拉图。他在其著名论著《理想国》一书中,明确地将正义规定为每一部分都各司其职,不介入其他部分的事务。在柏拉图那里,正义者最终被证明是哲学家。生意人和武士即使在正义城邦中也不真…     

“是”、“所是”、“是其所是”、“所是者”──关于亚里士多德《形而上学》中几个术语的翻译

亚里士多德的《形而上学》是由后人编辑而成，经历了中世纪和近现代的翻译和解释。我们自己也有中文翻译著作和研究解释。面对亚里士多德的著作和后人的这些研究成果，我感到，若想真正理解亚里士多德的形而上学思想并搞好对它的研究，必须首先注意语言问题。具体地说，我们必须仔细分析和研究其中的ｅｉｎａｉ以及与ｅｉｎａｉ相关的几个概念和短语，因为亚里士多德的形而上学的核心内容主要是围绕着它们形成的。做好这个工作，可以说是研究亚里士多德的形而上学思想的基础。 在关于亚里士多德的《形而上学》的研究中，首先存在着翻译的问…     

德性是否可教?——兼解柏拉图的《美诺篇》

在《美诺篇》中,柏拉图试图放弃他承自苏格拉底的"德性即知识"的信念,以彻底与智者决裂.但囿于定义论思维方式的固有局限,混淆了道德德性和技艺德性.只有循着亚里士多德的思路,厘清技艺德性、道德德性和理智德性之间的相互关系,我们才能辨明柏拉图在《美诺篇》中陷入的困局,并合理解答德性是否可教的问题.     

The Modal Nature of Structures in Ontic Structural Realism

Ontic structural realism is the view that structures are what is real in the first place in the domain of fundamental physics. The structures are usually conceived as including a primitive modality. However, it has not been spelled out as yet what exactly that modality amounts to. This paper proposes to fill this lacuna by arguing that the fundamental physical structures possess a causal essence, being powers. Applying the debate about causal vs categorical properties in analytic metaphysics to ontic structural realism, I show that the standard argument against categorical and for causal properties holds for structures as well. Structural realism, as a position in the metaphysics of science that is a form of scientific realism, is committed to causal structures. The metaphysics of causal structures is supported by physics, and it can provide for a complete and coherent view of the world that includes all domains of empirical science.     

Why did Leibniz fail to complete his dynamics?

Leibniz’s ‘new science of dynamics’ is typically taken to have been completed in the late monadological metaphysics. On this view, stemming from Martial Gueroult and continuing in the recent interpretations of Robert Adams and Pauline Phemister, Leibniz accomplished his dynamics in his later account of physical forces as merely phenomenal modifications of monadic, metaphysical forces. This paper argues, by contrast, that Leibniz considered the dynamics to be an unfinished project: this is evident in statements from throughout his mature period until his final months. Two possible reasons for the non-completion of the dynamics are discussed. The first is that his encounter with the superior physics of Newton’s Principia caused Leibniz to continually defer his own contribution. I argue, however, in favour of a second reason: that there are philosophical difficulties inherent in the science of dynamics that prevented its completion. These difficulties are found in the relation of dynamics to metaphysics, and in the more fundamental split within dynamics, into the doctrine of primitive and derivative forces. Through three late exchanges with de Volder, Wolff and Des Bosses, I show that the relation of primitive and derivative forces remained an unsolved – although not in principle unsolvable – problem for Leibniz.     

A Principle of Incarnation in Derrida’s (Theologische?) Jugendschriften: Towards a Confessional Theology

In pursuing the question of incarnation, it must be noted from the beginning that what is at stake is Platonism. More specifically, my concern will be the relationship of Christian theology to Platonism. In this paper, I contest contemporary readings which suggest that Socrates offers an "incarnational" paradigm and construe Derrida as a "Platonist" more traditionally understood. Instead, I will argue that latent in Derrida's earlier accounts of language, particularly in Speech and Phenomena , one finds an incarnational account of language which is precisely the basis for his critique of Platonic metaphysics.     

Rosy with Sider? The Case of the Metaphysical Liar

An important trend in contemporary metaphysics denies that the structure of natural language is an important datum for investigating fundamental structure. Ted Sider proceeds on this basis to propose a metaphysical semantics for natural language. Within this framework he argues that natural language and a fundamental, ‘jointcarving’, language could be subject to distinct logics. Developing an argument of Hartry Field’s, I show that Sider’s preferred option of fundamental classicality combined with non-fundamental non-classicality trivialises within the framework of Siderian metaphysical semantics. The position can be saved only by revising key claims about truth and metaphysical semantics. This has serious implications for methdology in the metaphysics of logic.     

Keep the chickens cooped: the epistemic inadequacy of free range metaphysics

Synthese - This paper aims to better motivate the naturalization of metaphysics by identifying and criticizing a class of theories I call ’free range metaphysics’. I argue that free...     

Should Metaphysics Care About Linguistics?

Naturalized metaphysics is based on the idea that philosophy should be guided by the sciences. The paradigmatic science that is relevant for metaphysics is physics because physics tells us what fundamental reality is ultimately like. There are other sciences, however, that de facto play a role in philosophical inquiries about what there is, one of them being the science of language, i.e. linguistics. In this paper I will be concerned with the question what role linguistics should and does play for the metametaphysical question of how our views about fundamental reality can be reconciled with the everyday truisms about what there is. I will present several examples of two kinds of approaches to this question, linguistics-based accounts and purely philosophical accounts, and will discuss their respective methodological merits and shortcomings. In the end I will argue that even proponents of a purely philosophical answer to the metametaphysical question should take the results of linguistics seriously.     

Metaphysics as modeling: the handmaiden’s tale

Critics of contemporary metaphysics argue that it attempts to do the hard work of science from the ease of the armchair. Physics, not metaphysics, tells us about the fundamental facts of the world, and empirical psychology is best placed to reveal the content of our concepts about the world. Exploring and understanding the world through metaphysical reflection is obsolete. In this paper, I will show why this critique of metaphysics fails, arguing that metaphysical methods used to make claims about the world are similar to scientific methods used to make claims about the world, but that the subjects of metaphysics are not the subjects of science. Those who argue that metaphysics uses a problematic methodology to make claims about subjects better covered by natural science get the situation exactly the wrong way around: metaphysics has a distinctive subject matter, not a distinctive methodology. The questions metaphysicians address are different from those of scientists, but the methods employed to develop and select theories are similar. In the first section of the paper, I will describe the sort of subject matter that metaphysics tends to engage with. In the second section of the paper, I will show how metaphysical theories are classes of models and discuss the roles of experience, common sense and thought experiments in the construction and evaluation of such models. Finally, in the last section I will discuss the way these methodological points help us to understand the metaphysical project. Getting the right account of the metaphysical method allows us to better understand the relationship between science and metaphysics, to explain why doing metaphysics successfully involves having a range of different theories (instead of consensus on a single theory), to understand the role of thought experiments involving fictional worlds, and to situate metaphysical realism in a scientifically realist context.     

Possible Worlds for Modal Primitivists

Among the most remarkable developments in metaphysics since the 1950’s is the explosion of philosophical interest in possible worlds. This paper proposes an explanation of what possible worlds are, and argues that this proposal, the interpreted models conception, should be attractive to anyone who thinks that modal facts are primitive, and so not to be explained in terms of some non-modal notion of “possible world.” I articulate three constraints on any acceptable primitivist explanation of the nature of possible worlds, and show that the interpreted models conception meets the three constraints.     

Donald C. Williams’s defence of real metaphysics

In the middle of last century metaphysics was widely criticized, ridiculed, and committed to the flames. During this period a handful of philosophers, against several anti-metaphysical trends, defended metaphysics and articulated novel metaphysical doctrines. Donald C. Williams was one of these philosophers. But while his contributions to metaphysics are well known his defence of metaphysics is not and yet it played a key part in the development and revival of metaphysics. In this paper I present his defence of metaphysics in its historical context. I also show how his defence is relevant in response to recent attacks on metaphysics.