The Virtue of Epistemological Dualism

The article tries to answer the following question: what is the most promising epistemological strategy if my objective is the construction of a theory which gives me the opportunity to decrease the risk of getting to what is actually absolute, that is, to irreversible negative actions (irreversible as a theory might not be, but as an action often is)? The answer proposed is a form of epistemological dualism which means that I metaphysically believe (that is, I programmatically and systematically believe, without certainly knowing it) that the epistemological relationship between any theory and any reality is dualistic. More specifically, I metaphysically believe that the epistemological relationship between any theory and any reality is not saturated: in any theory there is an ideal error, because there is no theory which is totally saturated by reality, and any reality can actualize the ideal error, because there is no reality which is totally saturated by theory.     

What Is Integral Theory?

Integral theory is a way of knowing that helps foster the recognition that disparate aspects of reality—such as biological constitution, cultural world‐views, felt‐sense of selfhood, and social systems—are all critically important to any knowledge quest. Integral theory provides an “all quadrants, all levels” (K. Wilber, 2006, p. 26) metatheoretical framework that simultaneously honors the important contributions of a broad spectrum of epistemological outlooks while also acknowledging the parochial limits and misconceptions of those perspectives. In other words, integral theory affords a perspective that allows counselors to situate diverse knowledge approaches in such a way that they synergistically complement, rather than contradict, one another.     

A Proposal for the Demarcation of Theory and Knowledge

Research communication in interdisciplinary research projects requires a way of demarcation of theory and knowledge that is easy to communicate, is inconsequential for the framework of concepts, results, and procedures within existing scientific disciplines, and abstains from trying to resolve the dispute between (neo)positivists and constructivists. A simple way of demarcation starts from the notion of language-independent and language-dependent reality. Currently, what passes for knowledge (“news”) and myth (“fake news”) depends, besides on sheer volume and frequency of the messages, increasingly on the internal consistency of (computer) language-dependent reality and decreasingly on language-independent reality. All language is instruction, and knowledge is to know which instructions (that is, theory) are predictive of a result, state, or situation in language-independent reality. Any theory that doesn’t reduce outcome space, or contains one or more empirically/physically impossible instructions, or produces wrong predictions, or falls short of demonstration is not knowledge.     

Reflections on White Racism

An account is given of the intellectual process by means of which I wrote my first book, White Racism: A Psychohistory. The process included an incorporation of society and history into the discourse of the unconscious—that is, a way of treating external reality nonreductively while remaining faithful to a radical depth psychology.     

The confusion about epistemology and "epistemology"--and what to do about it

The epistemology debates within the field of family therapy have become relatively infrequent in the last year or so, perhaps as a consequence of the confusion they have generated for many family therapists. This article maintains that the primary reason for the confusion is a failure to distinguish clearly between the conventional meaning of the term epistemology, which concerns the nature of knowledge, and the unconventional meaning given the term in family therapy, which concerns the nature of what we know. It is proposed that the confusion can be diminished by understanding the relationship between the two meanings, which are here distinguished as epistemology (meaning 1) and epistemology (meaning 2) respectively. Particular attention is given to the logical consequences of adopting a position on epistemology (meaning 1)—e.g, is the knower capable of knowing an independent reality, or does the act of knowing make its own reality?—or on epistemology (meaning 2)—e.g., is causality linear or nonlinear?. The relevance and implications of these problems for the theory and practice of family therapy are discussed.     

TRANSVALUATIONISM ABOUT VAGUENESS: A PROGRESS REPORT

The philosophical account of vagueness I call “transvaluationism” makes three fundamental claims. First, vagueness is logically incoherent in a certain way: it essentially involves mutually unsatisfiable requirements that govern vague language, vague thought‐content, and putative vague objects and properties. Second, vagueness in language and thought (i.e., semantic vagueness) is a genuine phenomenon despite possessing this form of incoherence—and is viable, legitimate, and indeed indispensable. Third, vagueness as a feature of objects, properties, or relations (i.e., ontological vagueness) is impossible, because of the mutually unsatisfiable conditions that such putative items would have to meet. In this paper I set forth the core claims of transvaluationism in a way that acknowledges and explicitly addresses a challenging critique by Timothy Williamson of my prior attempts to articulate and defend this approach to vagueness. I sketch my favored approach to truth and ontological commitment, and I explain how it accommodates the impossibility of ontological vagueness. I argue that any approach to the logic and semantics of vagueness that both (i) eschews epistemicism and (ii) thoroughly avoids positing any arbitrary sharp boundaries (either first‐order or higher‐order) will have to be not an alternative to transvaluationism but an implementation of it. I sketch my reasons for repudiating epistemicism. I briefly describe my current thinking about how to accommodate intentional mental properties with vague content within an ontology that eschews ontological vagueness. And I revisit the idea, which played a key role in my earlier articulations of transvaluationism, that moral conflicts provide an illuminating model for understanding vagueness.     

‘For Beauty is nothing but the barely endurable onset of Terror’: Outline of a general psychoanalytic aesthetics

Even close to 80 years after Freud's words that psychoanalysis “has scarcely anything to say about beauty” (Freud, Civilization and its Discontents, SE 21, p. 82) the question of a specific psychoanalytic aesthetic is still faced with a deficit in theory. Since aesthetics is related to Aisthesis, the Greek word for ‘perception’, a psychoanalytic aesthetic can solely emerge from a psychoanalysis of perceptive structures. The term ‘kinaesthetic semantic’ is introduced in order to exemplify via music how perceptive experiences must be structured for them to be experienced as beautiful. The basic mechanisms – repetition of form (rhythm, unification) and seduction (deviation, surprise) – are defined. With the help of these mechanisms an intensive contact between perceiving object and kinetic subject, the physical self, is established. The intensive relatedness is a requirement for the creative process in art and also for psychic growth on the subject's level. The described basic mechanisms of the aesthetic process in music can also be encountered in painting and poetry. By the means of a self‐portrait by Bacon it will be examined how, in art, terror and traumatization are represented via targeted disorganization of beauty endowing mechanisms, hence finding an enabling form of confrontation and integration of fended contents.     

SHOULD A CHRISTIAN ADOPT METHODOLOGICAL NATURALISM?

It has become standard practice for scientists to avoid the possibility of references to God by adopting methodological naturalism (MN), a method that assumes that the reality of the universe, as it can be accessed by empirical enquiry, is to be explained solely with recourse to natural phenomena. In this essay, I critique the Christian practice of this method, arguing that a Christian's practices should always reflect her belief that the universe is created and sustained by the triune God. This leads me to contend that the Christian should adopt a theologically humble approach to the sciences (instead of MN), with which she humbly acknowledges that special divine action is not discernible by empirical science. To further my critique, I consider three ways in which the practice of MN can be particularly problematic for Christianity.     

Reality in science

One way in which to address the intriguing relations between science and reality is to work via the models (mathematical structures) of formal scientific theories which are interpretations under which these theories turn out to be true. The so-called ‘statement approach’ to scientific theories—characteristic for instance of Nagel, Carnap, and Hempel—depicts theories in terms of ‘symbolic languages’ and some set of ‘correspondence rules’ or ‘definition principles’. The defenders of the oppositionist non-statement approach advocate an analysis where the language in which the theory is formulated plays a much smaller role. They hold that foundational problems in the various sciences can in general be better addressed by focusing on the models these sciences employ than by reformulating the products of these sciences in some appropriate language. My model-theoretic realist account of science lies decidedly within the non-statement context, although I retain the notion of a theory as a deductively closed set of sentences (expressed in some appropriate language). In this paper I shall focus—against the background of a model-theoretic account of science—on the approach to the reality-science dichotomy offered by Nancy Cartwright and briefly comment on a few aspects of Roy Bhaskar's transcendental realism. I shall, in conclusion, show how a model-theoretic approach such as mine can combine the best of these two approaches.     

Correspondence to Reality in Ethics

This paper examines the view of ethical language that Wittgenstein took in later years. It argues that according to this view, ethics falls into place as a part of our natural history, while every sense of the mystical or supernatural that once surrounded it is irrevocably lost. Moreover, Wittgenstein argues that ethical language does not correspond to reality “in the way” in which a physical theory does. I propose an interpretation of this claim that shows how it sets his view apart from a “realist” theory of ethics. The reality of which he speaks is the reality of human life.     

Lexical entries and rules of language: a multidisciplinary study of German inflection

Following much work in linguistic theory, it is hypothesized that the language faculty has a modular structure and consists of two basic components, a lexicon of (structured) entries and a computational system of combinatorial operations to form larger linguistic expressions from lexical entries. This target article provides evidence for the dual nature of the language faculty by describing recent results of a multidisciplinary investigation of German inflection. We have examined: (1) its linguistic representation, focussing on noun plurals and verb inflection (participles), (2) processes involved in the way adults produce and comprehend inflected words, (3) brain potentials generated during the processing of inflected words, and (4) the way children acquire and use inflection. It will be shown that the evidence from all these sources converges and supports the distinction between lexical entries and combinatorial operations. Our experimental results indicate that adults have access to two distinct processing routes, one accessing (irregularly) inflected entries from the mental lexicon and another involving morphological decomposition of (regularly) inflected words into stem + affix representations. These two processing routes correspond to the dual structure of the linguistic system. Results from event-related potentials confirm this linguistic distinction at the level of brain structures. In children's language, we have also found these two processes to be clearly dissociated; regular and irregular inflection are used under different circumstances, and the constraints under which children apply them are identical to those of the adult linguistic system. Our findings will be explained in terms of a linguistic model that maintains the distinction between the lexicon and the computational system but replaces the traditional view of the lexicon as a simple list of idiosyncrasies with the notion of internally structured lexical representations.     

Empathy is interpretation (and who ever said it wasn't?)

Whenever the subject is explicitly addressed, all analysts agree that empathic perception is an attitude one takes toward making observations, not a privileged means of perception. Furthermore, analysts seem to agree that observations made with an empathic intention are interpretations like any other observations. Empathy is not a conduit to the patient's inner life. But despite these points of consensus, it often seems to be implied in the psychoanalytic literature, usually unintentionally, that empathy is a privileged means of knowing another person. This undercurrent is sometimes present even in the work of theorists who simultaneously state their opposition to this very point of view. In this paper, after presenting an example from the literature of this kind of contradiction, I, basing my argument in hermeneutics, offer the view that all observation, inside and outside psychoanalysis, is interpretation. Then, turning to the three papers of the symposium individually, I take the perspective that in one way or another they all portray empathic perception as a privileged means of observation. These portrayals are examples of the unconscious politics of theory.     

LANGAGE ET PENSÉE

This paper is devoted to some issues which are to be first examined in order to approach the problem of the relations between language and thought in a positive way. The term “thought” arouses distrust in the psychologists who are attached to the scientific method, because it evokes philosophical presuppositions. However, when the problem is posed in terms of what does happen in the subject or what sort of cultural reality does correspond to a system of concepts, an objective analysis is possible and has been realized in some well-known works. Then, the author emphasizes the fact that any attempt at defiring the influence of language on the development of thought, for instance, demands that both terms should not be dealt with as global entities. Discussing the priority of thought over language, or vice versa, is greatly sterilized as long as these terms are treated so. For instance, intelligence does not necessarily correspond to the same abilities before language — or independently from it — as after language — or when intelligence is informed by it. All the same, language is not a whole: a subject who has low abilities in mere grammatical forms can nevertheless use language in an efficient way. Deaf children offer great opportunities for the study of the role of language in mental development, because, by studying them, one avoids wrong explanations based only on correlations which result from the studies in normal children. The collaboration between linguists and psychologists is discussed. The difficulties which psychologists sometimes meet with the works of linguists are outlined; the author eventually suggests some issues on which the cooperation of the linguist could particularly help the psychologist.     

Truth and Generalized Quantification*

Kripke [1975] gives a formal theory of truth based on Kleene's strong evaluation scheme. It is probably the most important and influential that has yet been given—at least since Tarski. However, it has been argued that this theory has a problem with generalized quantifiers such as All(?, ψ)—that is, All ?s are ψ—or Most(?, ψ). Specifically, it has been argued that such quantifiers preclude the existence of just the sort of language that Kripke aims to deliver—one that contains its own truth predicate. In this paper I solve the problem by showing how Kleene's strong scheme, and Kripke's theory based on it, can in a natural way be extended to accommodate the full range of generalized quantifiers.     

Automaticity and the ACT* theory.

An explanation of automaticity within the framework of the Adaptive Control of Thought (ACT*) production system theory (Anderson, 1983, 1987) is presented. There is no automaticity mechanism per se in ACT*. This is as we would expect it to be. It would be the exception rather than the rule that we would find in a scientific theory mechanisms that directly correspond to natural language concepts. The critical question is whether ACT* can give an account of the phenomena associated with the term automaticity. This article is structured as follows: First, I will try to identify the phenomena of automaticity to be explained, then give a brief overview of the ACT* theory, and finally explain how these phenomena of automaticity are to be understood in terms of the theory.     

U.S. ethnic minorities' attitudes towards Whites: The role of shared reality theory in intergroup relations

In the current research, we suggest that shared reality, the belief that one perceives the world the same way as another group, can predict attitudes towards that group. We tested shared reality theory in the context of American ethnic minority groups' (i.e., African Americans, Asian Americans, and Latinas/os) attitudes towards White Americans. In surveys of two samples recruited from different geographical locations in the USA, we tested predictions derived from different theories of intergroup relations. Using mediational analysis, we defined models to assess the extent to which shared reality theory predicted—directly and indirectly—prejudicial attitudes towards Whites. We tested the model derived from shared reality theory against other theoretical alternatives. Taken together, the results of the research indicated that shared reality predicts attitudes towards White Americans among these three ethnic groups. Thus, shared reality is a relevant, though largely overlooked, factor in intergroup dynamics.     

On Creating a Theory of Feminist Therapy

Feminism implies, and comes out of, a phenomenological philosophy. This means that we know what is true not by the "givens" of society, but by listening to our inner experience and that of others. The fundamental political act is the same as the fundamental therapeutic act: it is the process of joining another person's experience in a way which enables that person to make explicit her internal knowledge of what is real. The therapeutic stance, which implies a belief in the basic rightness of a person's way of being in the world, is what makes this kind of experimental knowing possible. To carry our thinking and practice of feminist theory forward in an authentic way, we must approach ourselves and one another from a therapeutic stance. From this we can begin to formulate a reality which encompasses the experience of those who have thus far been invisible and silenced. This article uses the problem of boundary violations as an example of a current issue in feminist therapy that can be explored from an experiential perspective. The questions that come out of this perspective can inform our creation of a therapy and society that is truly pluralistic.     

The sequential view: From rapidly fading stimulus traces to the organization of memory and the abstract concept of number

The development of the sequential approach to instrumental learning from about 1958 to the present is described. The sequential model began as an attempt to explain a particular class of neglected partial reward phenomena, those in which performance in acquisition and extinction is influenced by the particular sequence in which rewarded and nonrewarded trials occur in acquisition, and it was subsequently applied to a variety of other phenomena. Over time, the sequential model grew, sometimes through the replacement of older assumptions by novel ones, as when retrieved memories replaced stimulus traces, and sometimes simply through the addition of novel assumptions, such as that animals are capable of remembering retrospectively one, two, three or more prior nonrewarded outcomes—the N-length assumption. The most recent assumption added to the sequential model is that on a given trial the animal may utilize its memory of prior reward outcomes to anticipate both the current reward outcome and one or more subsequent reward outcomes. One way to view the sequential model is to say that it is a specific theory in various degrees of competition with other specific theories. Several examples of this are provided. Another way to view the sequential model, a more important way in my opinion, is to see it as a representative of a general theoretical approach, intertrial theory, which differs in fundamental respects from another much more generally utilized theoretical approach, intra-trial theory. I suggest that there is a substantial body of data that can be explained by inter-trial mechanisms but not by intratrial mechanisms. The future may well reveal that the inter-trial mechanisms have greater explanatory potential than the currently more popular intratrial mechanisms.     

Representation and cognitive science

‘Representation’ is a concept which occurs both in cognitive science and philosophy. It has common features in both settings in that it concerns the explanation of behaviour in terms of the way the subject categorizes and systematizes responses to its environment. The prevailing model sees representations as causally structured entities correlated on the one hand with elements in a natural language and on the other with clearly identifiable items in the world. This leads to an analysis of representation and cognition in terms of formal symbols and their relations. But human perception and cognition use multiple informational constraints and deal with unsystematic and messy input in a way best explained by Parallel Distributed Processing models. This undermines the claim that a formal representational theory of mind is ‘the only game in town’. In particular it suggests a radically different model of brain function and its relation to epistemology from that found in current representational theories.