人工语法学习中习得知识的分离:基于信号检测论和结构知识的视角

习得知识的意识觉知问题一直以来是内隐学习领域的研究热点和难点。以加工分离程序来分解击中率和虚报率、以结构知识中意识和无意识测量为视角,采用2（测验方式：SDTT,SKT）×2（学习程度：30试次,60试次）混合设计,试图去分离人工语法学习中习得的意识知识和无意识知识。结果发现：（1）学习程度影响到习得的无意识知识,但还未影响到习得的意识知识;（2）在分离人工语法学习的习得知识上,SDTT的敏感性高于SKT;（3）SKT夸大了元认知中的意识成分。     

运动知识与概念知识概率学习下的内隐学习效应

研究采用序列学习范式,用反应时间接测量被试的内隐知识,问卷以及再认成绩直接测量被试的外显知识,并采用PDP测量被试的意识与无意识贡献率.结果表明:(1)无RSI条件下能习得一定的无意识知识,而在有RSI条件下习得的知识大部分能被外显地意识到.(2)当内隐序列学习中既包含运动知识又包含概念知识时,无RSI条件下易获得运动知识;而在有RSI条件下,如果时间充分且能协调注意资源,运动知识和概念知识均能有效学习.     

片段再认任务在内隐序列学习研究中的有效性检验

内隐序列学习到底能习得何种知识呢？已有研究从任务分离范式发展到加工分离程序试图来捕获习得的知识。本研究根据信号检测论原理把三元素再认测验的成绩离析成击中率和虚报率, 再试图运用加工分离程序的思想来分离习得的意识知识和无意识知识, 为示区别将这种测验命名为片段再认任务, 并以序列生成任务为效标, 通过两个实验来检验片段再认任务的效度和敏感性。实验1以反应–刺激间隔(RSI)为自变量来检验片段再认任务和序列生成任务在测量习得知识上的效度, 结果显示前者的效度高于后者; 实验2进行测验的敏感性分析, 以参与度为自变量, 结果表明前者更为灵敏所以测量效度高。总之, 与序列生成任务相比, 片段再认任务是一种高效而灵敏的测量工具。     

序列位置内隐学习产生机制的实验研究

内隐学习是当今认知和学习领域继内隐记忆之后又一重要的研究课题。该研究利用序列反应时研究程式,通过两个实验,对序列位置内隐学习产生的机制进行了探讨。结果表明：（１）在序列反应时任务程式中,随着反应一刺激间隔的延长,序列位置内隐学习的学习量逐渐减少;（２）异形同模式迁移组和异形异模式迁移组被试间内隐学习量无显著差异,被试未能内隐地习得抽象的序列模式。说明序列位置内隐学习产生的基础是水平联结,在该实验条件下没有发现垂直联结存在的证据。     

样例数量对内隐序列学习的影响

本研究采用序列学习范式,探讨了样例数量对内隐序列学习的影响,以揭示意识在学习中的作用以及内隐学习获得的知识表征。研究发现,在内隐序列学习中：（1）被试既可以记忆具体的样例知识也可以抽取抽象的规则知识;（2）样例数量影响被试对样例和规则知识的获得,在样例较少时被试可以获得更多的样例和规则知识;（3）样例数量影响被试对意识知识的获得,在本研究中仅当样例数为4时被试获得了有关样例和规则的意识知识。     

内隐知识具有抽象性吗?——来自内隐序列学习迁移的证据

内隐知识是否具有抽象和概括性,已有研究有着不同的争议,而迁移是检验习得知识是否具有抽象性的有效手段。探索RSI从0 ms至1000 ms中5种条件下内隐序列学习的迁移差异,并试图证实随着RSI的变化,迁移发生从无到有的变化,以迁移来证明内隐知识的抽象性。结果发现:随着RSI的增加,迁移出现了从无到有的质变,证明了内隐知识可具有抽象性;内隐序列学习效应和转移组段的新异刺激效应共同促进了迁移的产生,纯粹的内隐序列学习是产生迁移的必要非充分条件,转移组段(新异刺激)则加速促进了内隐知识的学习;本实验条件下产生的不可知但可迁移的内隐知识具有边缘意识特点。     

人工语法学习中意识加工的渐进发展

内隐学习研究致力于探讨学习活动的意识加工程度, 当前相关的研究逻辑从传统的意识二分观转向渐进意识假设。本研究通过对人工语法范式进行改造, 并借鉴加工分离程序的有关思想, 在学习阶段引入双重测量任务, 并根据双重任务成绩计算分离出相应学习时段的意识与无意识成分的贡献分数, 从而考察在内隐学习过程中两种加工成分的动态变化特征。研究结果支持渐进意识假设, 在学习进程中, 无意识成分和意识成分都呈现出渐进发展的趋势; 而随学习的深入, 两种成分呈现出不同的变化模式, 中后期意识加工快速增长, 无意识加工则保持平缓发展, 渐进意识系统整体呈现向外显学习推进的发展态势。     

试析内隐学习的意识-无意识兼容性

内隐学习研究初期,其无意识特点揭示了区别于外显学习的独特本质。但随着研究的深入,内隐学习逐渐昭显出与意识的丝丝联系。本文从此出发,探讨内隐学习的意识-无意识的兼容特点,具体从理论和实证两方面探讨内隐学习和无意识的联系,从次要任务研究、内隐学习的理解性以及内隐知识的发展三方面阐述内隐学习和意识的联系。     

高低情感开放性者概率内隐序列学习进程差异

大五人格情感开放性子量表(openness/feeling)能否预测内隐序列学习的问题存在争议。本研究采用概率性内隐序列学习范式, 比较高低情感开放性者在各反应刺激间隔(response stimulus interval, 即RSI)的差异。发现：(1) RSI = 0 ms和250 ms, 高分组在转移组块后习得高概率序列, RSI = 500 ms及以上在其之前习得; 所有RSI点低分组都在其之前习得。每个RSI点只有高分组习得低概率序列。证明随RSI增加两者内隐进程有本质差异, openness/feeling子量表可预测内隐序列学习个体差异。(2)低概率序列可作为测量概率性内隐序列学习及个体差异的新指标, 经典转移组块、再认、生成任务的测量效果却十分有限。     

专家与新手教师内隐与外显学习的比较

教师作为典型的知识密集、技术密集的群体,其隐性知识也自然比较集中和典型,而专长研究可以有效地揭示教师的知识获取特点和学习规律。然而,以往的专长研究往往通过测量专家教师和新手教师在某方面的外显行为或外显知识的差异了解教师的知识结构和行为特点,这种做法由于忽略了教师的内隐学习和隐性知识,因此难以有效地揭示专家教师与新手教师在知识和能力结构上的真实差异。本研究借鉴认知心理学对专长的研究方式（即专家--新手比较）,运用经典的序列反应时任务（SRT）调整后的范式,采用带颜色边框的同一个学生的四种真实课堂表情图片作为刺激材料,以表情作为内隐学习的维度,以颜色作为外显学习的维度,对61名专家教师与88名新手教师在内隐/外显序列学习上的差异进行了比较研究。结果发现：（1）专家和新手教师被试群体均能够习得内隐/外显序列规则;（2）专家教师与新手教师在内隐学习上存在显著差异,专家教师内隐学习效果要优于新手教师;（2）专家教师与新手教师在外显学习维度上差异并不显著。结论：专家教师与新手教师有着近乎相当的外显学习能力和外显知识水平,但专家教师的内隐学习能力和隐性知识水平要显著高于新手教师。     

Explicit feedback maintains implicit knowledge

The role of feedback was investigated with respect to conscious and unconscious knowledge acquired during artificial grammar learning (AGL). After incidental learning of training sequences, participants classified further sequences in terms of grammaticality and reported their decision strategy with or without explicit veridical feedback. Sequences that disobeyed the learning structure conformed to an alternative structure. Feedback led to an increase in the amount of reported conscious knowledge of structure (derived rules and recollections) but did not increase its accuracy. Conversely, feedback maintained the accuracy of unconscious knowledge of structure (intuition or familiarity-based responses) which otherwise degraded. Results support a dual-process account of AGL. They suggest that implicit learning of the to-be-rejected structure at test contaminates familiarity-based classifications whereas feedback allows competing familiarity signals to be contextualised, which is incompatible with theories that consider familiarity context-insensitive.     

Measuring unconscious knowledge: distinguishing structural knowledge and judgment knowledge

This paper investigates the dissociation between conscious and unconscious knowledge in an implicit learning paradigm. Two experiments employing the artificial grammar learning task explored the acquisition of unconscious and conscious knowledge of structure (structural knowledge). Structural knowledge was contrasted to knowledge of whether an item has that structure (judgment knowledge). For both structural and judgment knowledge, conscious awareness was assessed using subjective measures. It was found that unconscious structural knowledge could lead to both conscious and unconscious judgment knowledge. When structural knowledge was unconscious, there was no tendency for judgment knowledge to become more conscious over time. Furthermore, conscious rather than unconscious structural knowledge produced more consistent errors in judgments, was facilitated by instructions to search for rules, and after such instructions was harmed by a secondary task. The dissociations validate the use of these subjective measures of conscious awareness.     

The speed of metacognition: Taking time to get to know one’s structural knowledge

The time course of different metacognitive experiences of knowledge was investigated using artificial grammar learning. Experiment 1 revealed that when participants are aware of the basis of their judgments (conscious structural knowledge) decisions are made most rapidly, followed by decisions made with conscious judgment but without conscious knowledge of underlying structure (unconscious structural knowledge), and guess responses (unconscious judgment knowledge) were made most slowly, even when controlling for differences in confidence and accuracy. In experiment 2, short response deadlines decreased the accuracy of unconscious but not conscious structural knowledge. Conversely, the deadline decreased the proportion of conscious structural knowledge in favour of guessing. Unconscious structural knowledge can be applied rapidly but becomes more reliable with additional metacognitive processing time whereas conscious structural knowledge is an all-or-nothing response that cannot always be applied rapidly. These dissociations corroborate quite separate theories of recognition (dual-process) and metacognition (higher order thought and cross-order integration).     

Implicit sequence learning and conscious awareness

This paper uses the Process Dissociation Procedure to explore whether people can acquire unconscious knowledge in the serial reaction time task [Destrebecqz, A., & Cleeremans, A. (2001). Can sequence learning be implicit? New evidence with the Process Dissociation Procedure. Psychonomic Bulletin &Review, 8, 343-350; Wilkinson, L., & Shanks, D. R. (2004). Intentional control and implicit sequence learning. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 30, 354-369]. Experiment 1 showed that people generated legal sequences above baseline levels under exclusion instructions. Reward moved exclusion performance towards baseline, indicating that the extent of motivation in the test phase influenced the expression of unconscious knowledge. Experiments 2 and 3 revealed that even with reward, adding noise to the sequences or shortening training led to above-baseline exclusion performance, suggesting that task difficulty and the amount of training also affected the expression of unconscious knowledge. The results help resolve some current debates about the role of conscious awareness in sequence learning.     

Attentional load and implicit sequence learning

A widely employed conceptualization of implicit learning hypothesizes that it makes minimal demands on attentional resources. This conjecture was investigated by comparing learning under single-task and dual-task conditions in the sequential reaction time (SRT) task. Participants learned probabilistic sequences, with dual-task participants additionally having to perform a counting task using stimuli that were targets in the SRT display. Both groups were then tested for sequence knowledge under single-task (Experiments 1 and 2) or dual-task (Experiment 3) conditions. Participants also completed a free generation task (Experiments 2 and 3) under inclusion or exclusion conditions to determine if sequence knowledge was conscious or unconscious in terms of its access to intentional control. The experiments revealed that the secondary task impaired sequence learning and that sequence knowledge was consciously accessible. These findings disconfirm both the notion that implicit learning is able to proceed normally under conditions of divided attention, and that the acquired knowledge is inaccessible to consciousness. A unitary framework for conceptualizing implicit and explicit learning is proposed.     

Can unconscious knowledge allow control in sequence learning?

This paper investigates the conscious status of both the knowledge that an item is legal (judgment knowledge) and the knowledge of why it is legal (structural knowledge) in sequence learning. We compared ability to control use of knowledge (Process Dissociation Procedure) with stated awareness of the knowledge (subjective measures) as measures of the conscious status of knowledge. Experiment 1 showed that when people could control use of judgment knowledge they were indeed conscious of having that knowledge according to their own statements. Yet Experiment 2 showed that people could exert such control over the use of judgment knowledge when claiming they had no structural knowledge: i.e. conscious judgment knowledge could be based on unconscious structural knowledge. Further implicit learning research should be clear over whether judgment or structural knowledge is claimed to be unconscious as the two dissociate in sequence learning.     

Evaluating the relationship between explicit and implicit knowledge in a sequential reaction time task

Can knowledge underlying a simple perceptual-motor skill be unconscious? Three experiments (a) trained participants on a 4-choice reaction time (RT) task in which the stimulus on each trial was determined by a repeating 12-element sequence and (b) studied the extent to which participants' knowledge of this sequence was implicit, that is, unavailable for conscious access. Participants proved via an indirect test to have acquired knowledge of the sequence, because their RTs increased when the sequence was changed. To evaluate whether this knowledge was consciously accessible, participants were asked to perform an "objective" free-generation or recognition test of sequence knowledge. Results show that sequence knowledge is fully accessible on these objective tests. Moreover, it is demonstrated in this procedure that old-new recognition cannot be explained by unconscious attribution of perceptual-motor fluency. The question is raised whether distinct implicit (procedural) and explicit (declarative) forms of knowledge are acquired when participants learn a perceptual-motor skill.